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CONDITIONAL RULES IN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: ALICE IN WONDERLAND MEETS
THE CONSTITUTION
David Rossman*
INTRODUCTION
Without recognizing that it has done so, the Supreme Court
has created a category of constitutional rules of criminal
procedure that are all in a peculiar format, conditional rules. A
conditional rule depends on some future event to determine
whether one has failed to honor it. In a wide variety of contexts,
if a police officer, prosecutor, judge or defense attorney does
something that the Constitution regulates, one cannot determine
if the constitutional rule has been violated or not until some
point in the future.
The Court has used three methods to create these rules. One
looks to prejudice, and requires an evaluation at the end of the
trial process to see if what happened had an adverse effect on the
result. Another method creates rules that depend on the reaction
of someone else, typically the defendant, to trigger the violation.
The last way the Court has created conditional rules is to
aggregate the time frame in which to make a judgment about the
legitimacy of the actor's behavior, so that it must await further
behavior by the same actor or someone exercising governmental
power toward the same end.
These rules superficially resemble applications of the
harmless error doctrine or examples of waivers of rights, but
they differ in fundamental ways. They are far less protective of
the rights of defendants and they send a much different message
about the limits of government power to those who control the
criminal justice system. They create confusion, fail to guide the
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behavior of the government actors whose power the Constitution
limits, stand as barriers to institutional efforts at ex ante
prevention, mislead the public about the scope of their rights,
and often do not take into account any of the symbolic values
that lay behind the provisions of the Constitution governing the
state's power to use a criminal sanction.
"Sentence first-verdict afterwards." Lewis Carroll,
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, in The Illustrated Lewis
Carroll 99 (Roy Gasson ed., 1978).
THE Quiz
If you are reading this article, it is a fair assumption that you are
familiar, at least in a general way, with the basic constitutional rules
that govern the criminal process in the United States. You know that
the privilege against self-incrimination prevents the prosecutor from
calling the defendant in a criminal trial as a witness for the State.'
You're acquainted with the fact that the Supreme Court used the
privilege in Miranda v. Arizona as the basis for requiring police
officers to warn suspects in custody of their right to remain silent
before interrogating them.2 And if you're particularly well versed,
you may know that if a defendant remains silent after receiving a
Miranda warning, that Doyle v. Ohio prevents the prosecutor from
using that fact as evidence of the defendant's guilt.
3
You are almost certainly aware that the Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures and probably know that the
Supreme Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio required police officers to
have reasonable suspicion that a suspect was involved in a crime in
order to detain the suspect briefly in a public setting.4 You know that
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) ("[T]he constitutional
language in which the privilege is cast might be construed to apply only to situations in which the
prosecution seeks to call a defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial, its application has not
been so limited.").
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,467-68 (1966).
3. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,635 (1976).
4. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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CONDITIONAL RULES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
the Sixth Amendment not only guarantees defendants the right to be
represented by an attorney but imposes an obligation on the state to
provide lawyers for the indigent. 5 You surely have some sense that
the same right to counsel provision has additional implications for the
way the system implements it in practice. The prosecution, you might
well believe, cannot listen in on privileged conversations between the
lawyer and his client.6 And, you might remember that there is some
quality control mechanism, the idea of effective assistance of
counsel, directed toward the competence level of a defendant's
attorney.
7
You may have a vague memory from law school about the famous
Brady case that prohibits the prosecutor from hiding exculpatory
evidence. 8 And if Brady ever led you to think at all about the
Compulsory Process Clause, you may believe that the prosecutor
cannot prevent the defendant from having access to a potential
witness.
9
I am quite confident that you are familiar with the concept of the
presumption of innocence, though you may not be quite sure where in
the Constitution it appears. I have to admit, though, that it is
unrealistic to expect you, the casual reader, to be aware at all of the
implication it has for the practice of requiring a defendant to appear
in front of the jury in prison clothes. 10 I trust, however, that you can
see the problem.
The stage having been set, it is now fair to ask you to hazard a
guess about whether the examples that follow describe situations in
which there is a violation of the constitutional rule that governs in
each case. And, yes, for each of these examples, there is a rule that
controls.
5. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963).
6. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 560 (1977).
7. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
8. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
9. United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982).
10. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13 (1976).
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1. A police officer comes upon someone standing in the street
and with no reason at all to think that the person is involved
in criminal activity, other than the fact that the person is
wearing a hooded sweatshirt, the officer pulls out his gun
and announces: "Don't move."
2. The prosecutor in a bank robbery case does not reveal to
defense counsel that an eyewitness to the crime told the
police that a third person, not the defendant, was the culprit.
3. The judge presiding over the arraignment of a defendant
charged with assault and battery, a misdemeanor that has a
maximum sentence of two and one-half years, refuses to
appoint a lawyer to represent her even though the defendant
insists she is going to take her case to trial in front of a jury.
4. After the defendant testifies on direct that he was just an
innocent bystander and not an active participant in the crime,
the prosecutor asks on cross-examination: "Isn't it true that
after the police gave you a Miranda warning, you remained
silent and never told them you were an innocent bystander?"
5. A police detective gives a Miranda warning and hears the
suspect say he wants to remain silent. Ignoring the suspect's
statements, the detective continues to question him and
elicits a confession.
6. Prior to trial, the defendant's court appointed attorney has
spoken to him for only one-half hour. In that time, the
defendant did manage to tell his lawyer that he had an alibi,
and identifies the friends who would corroborate his
whereabouts at the time of the crime. The defense attorney
does nothing to investigate the alibi.
7. The judge orders a defendant brought into the courtroom for
trial, in front of the jury, knowing that the defendant is
wearing distinctive prison clothes.
8. An undercover police agent is indicted as a codefendant,
though the prosecutor never intends to place him on trial,
and, pretending to be on the defendant's side, attends a
meeting between defendant and his lawyer where they
discuss trial strategy.
[Vol. 26:2
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CONDITIONAL RULES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
9. Law enforcement authorities deport a person in their custody
who was arrested at the same time as the defendant and who
was a joint venturer in the crime with which the defendant is
charged, making the person unavailable to the defense as a
witness.
You suspected some sort of trick, didn't you? Of course, none of
the examples has obvious answers. In each and every case, the
correct answer is: you cannot tell if the relevant constitutional rule
has been violated or not. In none of the examples do you have enough
information to be able to answer the question. What's missing in each
case is something that will only happen in the future.
The reason for this, in a nutshell, is that the rule that governs each
situation is a conditional rule. There are three elements that define a
conditional rule. First, there must be some actor whose behavior is
the target of the rule. Second, the actor must engage in some
predicate behavior that triggers the rule. And third, there is some
future consequence that defines a violation of the rule.
Each of the examples has an actor whose behavior is evaluated by
a constitutional rule: a judge, prosecutor, policeman, or defense
attorney. Each actor has engaged in the predicate behavior that
triggers the rule. But in none of the examples has the story unfolded
to allow you to determine if the consequence that defines the
violation has occurred.
The police officer in the first example may end up violating the
Fourth Amendment, but if the sweat-shirted suspect shows foolhardy
valor and runs away, the officer is guilty of doing nothing more than
displaying extraordinary incivility. The prosecutor in the second
example may never reveal the troublesome eyewitness, but if the
evidence she introduces at trial is sufficiently strong, she may get in
trouble with the ethics authorities in her jurisdiction but certainly will
not have violated the constitutional right of the defendant. And the
judge who refuses to appoint a lawyer for the misdemeanor defendant
facing two and one-half years in jail can insulate himself from any
possibility of reversal on appeal by sentencing the defendant to pay a
fine if he is convicted rather than incarcerating him. As you read
20101
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through the rest of this discussion, you'll see that you can tell a
similar story about all of the others. Their behavior on its face may
not be laudable. But unless some future event unfolds in a certain
way, they will have done nothing that violates the Constitution.
Part I of this article first explores the different methods the Court
has used to craft conditional rules. It describes them in roughly the
order in which they appeared. First came rules that incorporated
prejudice, in terms of having an adverse effect on the outcome of the
case, as the future consequence that defined the violation. Next are
rules that depend on the person whose interests the rule protects
reacting in some way to the predicate behavior. And last are cases in
which the future consequence is some subsequent behavior by the
actor or someone else working in concert with the actor.
Part II of this article attempts to evaluate the phenomenon of
conditional rules from the point of view of their desirability as policy,
both pragmatic and constitutional. First, it discusses the
disadvantages of these types of rules. It considers their efficacy in
shaping the behavior of the actors that conditional rules regulate. It
discusses the effect conditional rules have on the ability of courts to
serve as vehicles for institutional reform of the agencies that are
regulated by the rules and the practices they engage in. It notes how
conditional rules can be misleading about the limits placed on the
exercise of power in the justice system. And, it explores the problems
with rules that rely on a showing of prejudice.
The discussion in Part II then examines the reasons that a
conditional rule might be preferable. The first two are the utility of
the underlying behavior and reluctance to specify the rules that
govern the primary actors. Then it explores the pragmatic
considerations-like cost and collateral effects-that might influence
a court to adopt a conditional rule. And last, Part II explores whether
the language of the Constitution itself, specifically the Due Process
Clause, compels the adoption of a conditional rule.
The conclusion is followed by two appendices: one that lists all of
the cases in which the Court either discussed or actually adopted a
conditional rule; and another indicating the votes of the Justices in
each of those cases.
[Vol. 26:2
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONDITIONAL RULES
A. Conditional Admission in the Law of Evidence
The concept underlying a conditional rule-that future events must
unfold before one can make a final judgment about the legitimacy of
an action-is a familiar one in the law of evidence. Common law
judges often found themselves in the position of having to rule on the
admissibility of evidence in circumstances where all of the facts
necessary to establish either its relevance or competence had not yet
been established. Rather than suffering the inconvenience of
requiring the party offering the evidence to prove foundational facts
out of the order which logic commended, a judge would allow the
evidence to come in de bene, or conditionally.' 1 If the proponent of
the evidence subsequently "brought home" or "connected up' 12 the
evidence, then it became part of the proof the jury could consider. If,
however, the proponent failed to come forward with the necessary
predicate for evidence that had already been admitted, the judge
would order it stricken and tell the jury to disregard it.' 3
11. See 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1871 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) ("Thus the fundamental rule,
universally accepted, is that with reference to facts whose relevancy depends upon others, the order of
presentation is left to the discretion of the party himself, subject of course to the general discretion of the
trial court in controlling the order of evidence.") (emphasis added); Edmund M. Morgan, Functions of
Judge and Jury in the Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165, 166-67
(1929) (questions of relevancy and competence often depend on the existence of other facts); John
Maguire & Charles Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibility of
Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392, 394 n.9 (1927) ("Judges sometimes admit evidence conditionally or de
bene subject to a motion to strike out.").
12. Christopher Mueller, The Federal Coconspirator Exception: Action, Assertion, and Hearsay, 12
HOFSTRA L. REv. 323, 326 (1984).
13. See O'Brien v. Keefe, 175 Mass. 274. 279 (1900) ("The possibility of testimony admitted de
bene not being subsequently made competent is one of the considerations to be passed upon by the
presiding magistrate in determining whether to admit such evidence at the time it is offered or not; and it
is necessary, in the conduct of trials, that such discretion should be exercised; if evidence admitted de
bene is not subsequently made good, the only remedy that can be given is, on the proper application
being subsequently made, to rule out the testimony. Whether, in such a case, the party, who produces the
witness whose testimony has been confused, or the party who has undertaken to assert that the witness is
not to be believed because he is a criminal, and it turns out that that assertion is unfounded, is the greater
sufferer, is open to question; if he has suffered an injury, it is one inherent in the trial of causes and it is
well settled, when such evidence is admitted in a jury trial, that the objecting party cannot be heard to
complain, if the evidence is ruled out and the jury are instructed to disregard it.") (citing Smith v.
Whitman, 6 Allen 562 (1863); Selkirk v. Cobb, 13 Gray 313 (1859); Whitney v. Bayley, 4 Allen 173
(1862)); see also Maguire & Epstein, supra note 11, at 411 n.65 (1927) (referring to "the time-saving
20101
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When a judge conditionally admits evidence in a criminal case, it
can have constitutional implications. Where an out-of-court statement
by an absent witness is part of the prosecution's case, it can violate
the defendant's right to cross-examine under the Confrontation
Clause. 14 However, if the statement was made by a co-conspirator
while the conspiracy was ongoing and the statement was in
furtherance of the conspiracy's objective, there is a long standing
practice that allows the statement into evidence.' 5 The historical
pedigree removes the co-conspirator exception from the realm of
practices prohibited by the Confrontation Clause.16
Conspiracy cases are often by their nature quite complex.
Requiring the prosecutor to establish the existence of the conspiracy,
the defendant's involvement, and the connection of the out-of-court
statement with the conspiracy's objective before allowing the
statement into evidence can be a logistical nightmare. 17 Thus, early
on in the American courts' encounters with these types of trials,
judges had the leeway to allow the statements in conditionally.18 If
device of tentatively admitting the [evidence] subject at the close of the case to a motion to strike out,"
in reference to Lord Penzance's ruling in Hitchens v. Eardley, L.R. 2 P. & D. 248 (1871)).
14. See Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 433 n.12 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating it is a violation of
defendant's Confrontation Clause right to admit statement of co-conspirator when statement was not
made in furtherance of the conspiracy); Sanders v. Moore, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1311 (M.D. Fla. 2001)
(granting habeas relief because out of court statements offered in evidence were not made by a co-
conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy: "[1If the evidence did not satisfy the
requirements of the coconspirator exception to the rule, then there was not only an evidentiary error,
there was also a violation of the right of confrontation.").
15. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460 (1827) (interpreting statements of co-conspirator as res
gestae and thus admissible against defendant); Mueller, supra note 12, at 325 (tracing the co-conspirator
exception to English treason trials in the late eighteenth century).
16. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) (recognizing co-conspirator's statements as a
historically recognized exception to the hearsay rule); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183
(1987) ("[T]he co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is steeped in our jurisprudence."); Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the introduction
of a statement by a co-conspirator made during the concealment phase of the conspiracy).
17. State v. Winner, 17 Kan. 298, 305 (1876) ("Ordinarily when the acts and declarations of one co-
conspirator are offered in evidence as against another co-conspirator, the conspiracy itself should first be
established primafacie, and to the satisfaction of the judge of the court trying the cause. But this cannot
always be required. It cannot well be required where the proof of the conspiracy depends upon a vast
amount of circumstantial evidence-a vast number of isolated and independent facts.").
18. See id; I SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § I1ll, at 127 (2d ed.
1844) ("Sometimes, for the sake of convenience, the acts or declarations of one are admitted in
evidence, before sufficient proof is given of the conspiracy; the prosecutor undertaking to furnish such
proof in a subsequent stage of the cause. But this rests in the discretion of the Judge, and is not
[Vol 26:2
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the prosecutor did not follow through on the necessary proof
concerning the conspiracy, however, the judge either had to instruct
the jury to disregard the statement or declare a mistrial. 19 While the
preferred practice was for the prosecutor to establish the foundation
before admitting an absent co-conspirator's statement, 20 if it was not
reasonably practicable to do so, courts universally allowed the judge
to admit the statement conditionally.
2 1
The doctrine of conditional admission in the law of evidence
differs from the type of conditional rules that are the subject of this
article in one important respect. In the evidentiary context there is a
shared expectation among all of the participants in the process that
the actor whose behavior is governed by the rule, the lawyer seeking
to admit the evidence conditionally, will bring about the future
consequence necessary to legitimize the original action. Establishing
the reasonableness of this expectation, in fact, is a necessary
ingredient for the conditional admission of the evidence in the first
place. 22 The conditional rules that the Supreme Court has adopted in
the area of constitutional criminal procedure, on the other hand, do
not proceed on this assumption at all. When the initial action takes
place, there is no obligation on the part of the actor to establish that
the future consequence legitimizing it will occur. In fact, it is often
the case that the future consequence is entirely outside of the control
of the actor and as a result it would not be reasonable, or even
possible, for the actor to claim that the future event will take place.
permitted, except under particular and urgent circumstances; lest the Jury should be misled to infer the
fact itself of the conspiracy from the declarations of strangers.").
19. WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.34[6][c] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1997) [hereinafter
WEINSTEIN].
20. Id; GREENLEAF, supra note 18.
21. WEINSTEIN, supra note 19, § 801.34[6][c] [ii] (listing the rule in each federal circuit). In
Bouraily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987), the Court specifically declined to address the
question of the proper order of proof in establishing the foundation for the admission of an absent co-
conspirator's statement. However, the law in every circuit allows a judge to admit the statement
conditionally where it is not reasonably practicable to require the foundation to come beforehand.
22. See 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1871 (Chadboum rev. 1976) ("[1]f the evidential fact thus put
forward has on its face no apparent connection with the case, an accompanying statement of the
connecting facts must be made by counsel, and a promise to introduce them at a later time if they have
not already been introduced.") (emphasis added).
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B. Incorporating Prejudice
One future event that can make a rule conditional is the admission
of additional evidence that renders the outcome of the trial a foregone
conclusion despite the existence of the predicate action that triggered
the rule. In other words, courts simply incorporate a requirement of
expost prejudice in defining the rule.
For those who find that sports analogies make articles about legal
doctrine more fun to read, it is very much like the offsides rule in
soccer. Players in the half of the field closest to their opponent's goal
are penalized for being in an offsides position (when they do not have
two opposing players between them and the end line at the moment
when one of their teammates touches the ball) only if they gain some
advantage by failing to stay on sides.23 When the ball is played, the
assistant referee on the sideline raises a flag to indicate that someone
is in an offsides position but subsequent events must often unfold
before the referee on the field can make a decision about whether the
rule was violated and the defending team awarded an indirect free
kick.
Incorporating prejudice is the way the Court first adopted a
conditional rule and it remains the most common technique in the
Court's conditional rules universe. The value to which the Court has
directed the prejudice inquiry considers whether there was any effect
on the defendant's ability to convince the fact finder to return a not
guilty verdict or a more lenient sentence. It is, in order words,
entirely result oriented.
1. Harmless Error and Conditional Rules
A conditional rule based on ex post prejudice sounds a lot like the
doctrine of harmless error. Contemporary appellate courts affirm
convictions all the time despite the presence of some constitutional
23. Federation Internationale de Football Association, LAWS OF THE GAME 2005 Law 11, at 24 ("A
player in an offside position is only penalised if, at the moment the ball touches or is played by one of
his team, he is, in the opinion of the referee, involved in active play by: interfering with play or;
interfering with an opponent or, gaining an advantage by being in that position.").
[Vol. 26:2
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rule violation because they determine that the error did not affect the
result of the trial.24 Both harmless error and this type of conditional
rule stem from a concern that defendants escape convictions for
"technical" rule violations that do not affect the fundamental integrity
of the process.
The concept of harmless error came about as a reaction to the rigid
rule-based system of appellate review that prevailed prior to the early
decades of the twentieth century. 25  In the words of one early
proponent, the doctrine was a necessary antidote to the prevailing
process of review that allowed appellate courts to "tower above the
trials of criminal cases as impregnable citadels of technicality." 26 To
curb the formalistic practice of "record worship,"27 Congress first
24. E.g., United States v. Williams, 461 F.3d 441, 448 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Allen, 406
F.3d 940, 949 (8th Cir. 2005); Parsad v. Greiner, 337 F.3d 175, 185 (2d Cir. 2003).
25. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 48 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The harmless-error
rules now utilized by all the States and in the federal judicial system are the product of judicial reform
early in this century. Previously most American appellate courts, concerned about the harshness of
criminal penalties, followed the rule imposed on English courts through the efforts of Baron Parke, and
held that any error of substance required a reversal of conviction.").
The anti-formalist movement that led to the adoption of the harmless error rule on appeal also
affected the way the Court interpreted constitutional rules that applied in the trial process. Two cases
bracketing the turn of the century that dealt with the same issue display the philosophical current that
underlay each position. Both cases dealt with whether the Due Process Clause requires that before a trial
can commence the accused must first formally enter a not guilty plea.
The Court first encountered this application of due process in 1896, in Crain v. United States,
162 U.S. 625 (1896). Crain reversed a conviction because the record of the trial did not reflect the fact
that the defendant entered a not guilty plea. "It is true that the [C]onstitution does not, in terms, declare
that a person accused of crime cannot be tried until it be demanded of him that he plead, or unless he
pleads, to the indictment. But it does forbid the deprivation of liberty without due process of law; and
due process of law requires that the accused plead, or be ordered to plead, or, in a proper case, that a
plea of not guilty be filed for him, before his trial can rightfully proceed .... Id. at 645. Refusing to
draw the inescapable inference that the defendant did enter the appropriate plea from the fact that the
jury "was sworn to and tried 'the issue joined," id., the Court in Crain acted on the basis of a formalist
principle, handed down through the centuries, that "safety lies in adhering to established modes of
procedure devised for the security of life and liberty." Id. at 644. The four dissenting Justices in Crain
derided the Court's decision as resting "upon the merest technicality." Id. at 646.
Crain did not last long as binding precedent. By 1914, the dissent's position commanded a
unanimous Court in Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 (1914). The Garland Court overruled Crain,
evincing a sense of confidence in the overall integrity of the process that allowed it to dispense with
technical compliance with formality as a bulwark against incursions on liberty, the same impulse that
motivated the adoption of the harmless error doctrine.
26. Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial
Power, II A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925) (cited in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759 n.13
(1946)).
27. See ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 161 (1930) ("[Record worship is] an
excessive regard for the formal record at the expense of the case, a strict scrutiny of that record for
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adopted a statute dealing with the necessity for prejudice in
overturning criminal judgments in 1872.28
The Supreme Court first dipped its toe into the pool of
constitutional harmless error in a criminal case in 1900, in Motes v.
United States.29 Motes involved the conviction of six defendants for a
civil rights violation arising out of the murder of a witness in a
bootlegging case in rural Alabama. The Court reversed the conviction
of five of the six on the ground that their rights under the
Confrontation Clause had been violated by the admission into
evidence of the written statement of a witness who was not available
for cross examination at the trial.30 The sixth defendant, Columbus
Motes, was not so lucky. His case was different because at trial he
evidently tried to save his codefendants by taking the stand and
testifying that only two people were responsible for the murder,
himself and the missing witness. 31 The Court explained why Motes
was to be hoist on his own petard:
In this evidence the jury had conclusive proof of the guilt of
Columbus W. Motes of the crime charged in the indictment. The
admission of the statement of [the witness] in evidence was,
therefore, of no consequence as to him; for in his own testimony
enough was stated to require a verdict of guilty as to him, even if
'errors of law' at the expense of scrutiny of the case to insure the consonance of the result to the
demands of substantive law.").
28. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 761-62 (1962). The original statute, Act of June 1,
1872, Ch. 255, 17 Stat. 198, provided:
[N]o indictment found and presented by a grand jury in any district or circuit or other
court of the United States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or
other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of
form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant.
The statute morphed in that form into Rev. Stat. § 1025, which was cited by both the majority and
dissent in Crain, 162 U.S. 625.
In 1919, Congress mandated the use of a more general harmless error doctrine. Act of February
26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181. Section 269 of the Judicial Code required that "[o]n the hearing of any
appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall
give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical
errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
29. Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
30. Id. at 471-72.
31. Id. at 474-75.
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the jury had disregarded [the witness's] statements altogether.
We can therefore say, upon the record before us, that the
evidence furnished by [the witness's] statement was not so
materially to the prejudice of Columbus W. Motes as to justify a
reversal of the judgment as to him. It would be trifling with the
administration of the criminal law to award him a new trial
because of a particular error committed by the trial court, when
in effect he has stated under oath that he was guilty of the charge
preferred against him.
32
It took some time, however, for the Supreme Court formally to
recognize that the Constitution allowed a permanent breach in the
wall of automatic reversal. In the first substantial opinion grappling
with the application of the harmless error statute, Kotteakos v. United
States, the Court averred to the possibility that constitutional errors
might be outside the scope of the harmless error doctrine. 33 But it was
not until 1967, in Chapman v. California, that the Court first made
explicit the application of harmless error to constitutional defects in a
criminal conviction.
38
Chapman came to the Court from a California Supreme Court
decision ruling that a prosecutor's comment on the fact that the
defendant did not testify was, despite being a violation of the
defendant's privilege against self incrimination, harmless error under
the state's formulation "which forbids reversal unless 'the court shall
be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.' 34 The Court concluded that the question of
what remedy a state must provide in reviewing a conviction based on
an error of constitutional magnitude was just as much a federal
32. Id. at 475-76.
33. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946) ("If, when all is said and done, the
conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and
the judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a constitutional norm or a
specific command of Congress."); id. at 765 n.19 (citing Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404
(1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597 n.1 (1944); Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 540-42
(1897); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1012 (1943)) ("Thus, when forced confessions have
been received, reversals have followed although on other evidence guilt might be taken to be clear.").
34. Id. at 20.
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question as was the standard for defining the constitutional right that
the trial process disregarded in the first place. 35 After establishing its
role in saying how harmless error applied in constitutional cases, the
Court for the first time rejected the claim that no constitutional error
could be harmless, stating, "We conclude that there may be some
constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so
unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the
Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the
automatic reversal of the conviction."
36
Then the Court went on to disapprove of California's formulation
of the harmless error test, and adopted one articulated in an earlier
case, Fahy v. Connecticut, which concluded, without deciding the
issue, that even if a harmless error rule applied to the erroneous
admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
the conviction it was reviewing still could not stand: "The question is
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained
of might have contributed to the conviction."
37
Ever since Chapman, it has been commonplace to accept the
notion that a deprivation of a defendant's constitutional rights need
not invalidate a conviction. There is only a relatively small category
of errors for which the Constitution requires automatic reversal. In
making the list, the Court identified those "defect[s] affecting the
framework within which the trial proceeds, '' 38  so that they
"necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair."39 For constitutional
35. Id. at 21.
36. Id. at 22.
37. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
38. Arizona v. Fulimante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
39. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986). The Court's latest version of these "structural errors"
from United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 (2006), includes the following:
- the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963);
* lack of impartiality on the part of the judge, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927);
* the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand or petit jury,
see Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986);
- denying a defendant the right to self-representation at trial, see McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 177-78 n.8 (1984);
- failing to respect the right to public trial, see Wailer v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9
(1984);
[Vol 26:2
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errors not on this list, the Constitution allows a court to sanction a
conviction so long as it meets the appropriate harmless error test.
40
There is, of course, a difference between the doctrine of harmless
error and the idea of a conditional rule. The most significant is in the
audience to whom each is relevant. 4 1  Harmless error is a
constitutional mandate that directs only the behavior of judges
reviewing the validity of a conviction. It tells them when they must
prevent the state from upholding a conviction that results from a
constitutionally flawed process and when they can validate a
conviction despite the state's failure to abide by all of the
constitutional rules that govern the process. Conditional rules, on the
other hand, are directed to the primary actors in the trial process and
govern the behavior that leads to a conviction in the first place.
Saying that a conviction can stand despite a harmless error does not
validate the behavior of the state actor who deprived the defendant of
a constitutional right. It simply means that the defendant will be
unable to void the conviction as a remedy. Saying that a state actor
did not violate a conditional rule, however, means that the defendant
has not been deprived of anything the Constitution promises. It not
only validates the end result, if it happens to be a guilty verdict; it
validates each step in the process by which the state obtained the
result.
2. Due Process and the Defendant's Right to Be Present at Trial
The first time the Supreme Court announced a constitutional rule
in a conditional format was in 1933, when it decided Snyder v.
- giving the jury a defective instruction concerning reasonable doubt, see Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993);
- denying the defendant the right to select counsel of his own choice, see United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
40. The Chapman test applies when a conviction is reviewed on appeal. If a court is considering the
validity of a conviction in a collateral review process such as habeas corpus, the harmless error test can
be more forgiving. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 627 (1993) (stating that on habeas review,
the Constitution allows a test that asks whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or
influence in determining the jury's verdict").
41. There are, of course, other differences, such as which party bears the burden of proof and the
effect each has on the behavior of the actors who must obey constitutional rules. See infra Part II.A.iv.a.
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Massachusetts.42 Snyder did so by incorporating an ex post prejudice
evaluation into the definition of the right. The issue in Snyder was
whether Due Process required the defendant's presence when the jury
goes on a view. A view is essentially a field trip for the jury at the
start of the trial, where they get to look at the scene of the crime.
Under Massachusetts procedure, what the jury learned on the view
was part of the evidence they could consider in arriving at a verdict.
43
The jury in Snyder went with the prosecutor, judge, and defense
attorney to the location of the murder for which the defendant was on
trial. The judge refused to let the defendant accompany the group.
However, essentially all that occurred was for the lawyers to call the
jury's attention to various aspects of the physical surroundings. The
defendant only learned about what happened on the view after the
fact.
Snyder's lawyer in the Supreme Court was not exactly clear about
where in the Constitution he was basing his client's claim. The
Confrontation Clause was an attractive choice, since it directly
addressed the issue of a defendant's presence in the trial process. But
since a view entails neither having witnesses make statements nor
lawyers ask questions, the Court refused to expand the reach of a
defendant's confrontation right to the context of a view.44 What did
govern the process, though, was an implication from the right to
defend oneself that the Court found in the general guarantee of due
process. "In a prosecution for a felony," Justice Cardozo wrote, "the
defendant has the privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to be
present in his own person whenever his presence has a relation,
reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend
against the charge.
'A5
But how does one determine if a defendant's presence is
substantially related to the opportunity to defend himself?. The
Court's description of the general method was somewhat ambiguous.
The opinion states only that "the justice or injustice of that exclusion
42. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
43. Id. at 125.
44. Id at 108.
45. Id at 105-06.
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must be determined in the light of the whole record. 'A6 This is
certainly consistent with the way that one would articulate a
conditional rule. You would look to the record at the end of the trial
to see if the defendant's absence from the view detracted from his
opportunity to defend himself. But it could also mean that the judge
must evaluate the whole record at the time the defendant makes the
request to join the jury on its adventure rather than waiting for the
view and the trial that follows.
What the Court had in mind, however, becomes clearer by looking
at the way that the opinion justified rejecting Snyder's claim. The
Court evaluated whether it was unjust to bar Snyder from the view by
examining what happened when the jury visited the scene and at the
trial proceedings that followed.47 The jury was taken to the proper
place.48 They were shown features of the scene that the defendant
agreed were there at the time of the crime.4 9 The defendant learned
everything that happened after the fact and had an opportunity to
raise an objection to any misimpression or misinformation the jury
might have received. 50 Based on the way the events in Snyder
unfolded after the judge made the decision to bar the defendant's
presence, the Court was at a loss to see any conceivable way that he
could have gained even "a shred of advantage" by going on the
view.51 Since Snyder could not show a "reasonable probability that
injustice had been done" his claim that the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts violated a rule established by the federal Constitution
failed.5
2
Why did the Court adopt a conditional rule in Snyder? Because of
the same impulse that led, decades later, to the adoption of the
harmless error doctrine. "There is danger," Justice Cardozo wrote,
"that the criminal law will be brought into contempt-that discredit
will even touch the great immunities assured by the Fourteenth
46. Id. at 115.
47. Id. at 103-04.
48. Snyder, 291 U.s at 103.
49. Id. at 104.
50. Id. at 118.
51. Id. at 108.
52. Id. at 113.
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Amendment-if gossamer possibilities of prejudice to a defendant
are to nullify a sentence pronounced by a court of competent
jurisdiction in obedience to local law, and set the guilty free.",53 What
sense, one imagines the Snyder Court asking itself, would it have
made to overturn the conviction when the defendant could not
possibly have suffered any ill effect from the practice of which he
complained.
The concern with not reversing a case because of a mistake that
could have had no effect on the outcome, to the modem ear, makes
Snyder sound a lot like a garden variety harmless error case. So does
the textual justification that Justice Cardozo gave for why prejudice
was a necessary component of the right at issue in Snyder? He
explained that only rights that the Constitution expressly conferred
"would not be overlooked as immaterial [if] the evidence thus
procured was persuasive of the defendant's guilt. '54 A prejudice
requirement was also unnecessary for a right a like the opportunity to
be heard, which though not expressly mentioned in the Constitution
was "obviously fundamental." 55 But for rights merely implied by the
Due Process Clause, as was the right to accompany the jury on a
view, the Court was left with the task of making a contextual
judgment about whether the proceedings were fair, by reference to
the entire record.56 This division of rights into those that are express
or fundamental and those that are merely implied is very similar to
53. Id. at 122.
54. Snyder, 291 U.S at 116. This textual argument is one the Court would repeat over the years,
always with as little explanation as in Snyder for why the source of the right makes it necessary to
incorporate a prejudice requirement. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679-80 (1986); Donnelly
v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). Certainly, subsequent cases have not consistently hewed to
this line. Cases based on the Due Process Clause that have not incorporated a prejudice requirement
include the following: Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 85-89 (1988) (denying the appointment of counsel
on appeal); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702-04 (1975) (improperly shifting burden of proof);
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1973) (lacking reciprocity in discovery); Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 389 (1964) (no judicial determination of voluntariness of confession); Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (judge having a financial interest in a criminal conviction). It is not intuitively
obvious that the underlying rights involved in all of these cases are more fundamental than the one at
issue in Snyder. Of these cases, only Tumey was decided before Snyder. Tumey, however, was
mentioned only by the dissent in Snyder. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 128 (citing Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523); see
infra Part lI-A-iv-a.
55. Snyder, 291 U.S at 116.
56. Id. at 117.
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the way the Court, decades later, bifurcated harmless error analysis
into those rights subject to its application and those so fundamental
that they constituted "structural error" and were never harmless.
57
Indeed, in Rushen v. Spain,5 8 a case raising the question of whether
the due process right involved in Snyder is the sort of constitutional
claim that is subject to harmless error analysis, the Court cited Snyder
for the proposition that the right to be personally present was subject
59to harmless error.
The reference to Snyder as a harmless error case, however, was not
quite accurate. The language Snyder used was phrased in terms that
made clear excluding the defendant from the view did not violate his
right to be present at all critical stages of the trial. You cannot have
harmless error without error in the first place.
The fact that Snyder failed to use the framework of harmless error
but instead incorporated prejudice into the terms of the constitutional
rule was hardly surprising. In 1934 when Snyder was decided, the
Supreme Court, and most everyone else, assumed that any
constitutional error required reversal.6 ° So if the Court felt it
57. See supra note 42.
58. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 (1983). Spain presented the Court with a question about the
consequence of the trial judge's holding an ex parte conference with a juror. Spain, on trial for several
murders committed during the course of a prison break, was a member of the Black Panther Party.
During voir dire, the juror in question said she did not particularly associate the Black Panthers with any
sort of violence. Id. at 115. However, months later, during the course of trial testimony, the juror
recalled that she personally knew the victim of a murder committed by a party member. The juror
informed the judge, who met with her alone, to discuss her ability to remain impartial. The constitutional
basis for the defendant's complaint in Spain about the judge's behavior was, as in Snyder, his right to be
personally present at all critical stages of the trial, as well as his right to the assistance of counsel. See id.
at 117 n.2. Relying on the state's concession that the judge's behavior entailed an error of constitutional
dimension, the Court assumed without deciding that these two constitutional rights were in fact
implicated. The Court went on, however, to hold that whatever constitutional harm was involved in the
judge's action was harmless error.
59. Id. at 117 n.2.
60. See Richard Fallon & Daniel Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1733, 1771-72 (1991) ("A finding that an error is harmless does not, even
in theory, constitute a certain conclusion that the defendant was not prejudiced. Indeed, until early in this
century, errors at trial were generally treated as requiring automatic reversal, and before 1967 it was
generally assumed that constitutional errors were always prejudicial."); Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton,
Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 79, 82-83 (1988) ("Until 1967 it was
unclear whether constitutional errors occurring in a criminal trial could ever be harmless.").
In a case decided five years after Snyder, Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939), the Court
gave a sense of the type of problem for which it thought harmless error was appropriate: "Suffice it to
indicate, what every student of the history behind [the harmless error statute], knows, that that Act was
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necessary to take into account the inevitability of a conviction despite
the defendant's absence from the view, it had to make the underlying
rule conditional, since harmless error was not yet available as a
tool.
61
Snyder's legacy in the Court's somewhat limited jurisprudence on
the rule concerning a defendant's presence during the trial process
intended to prevent matters concerned with the mere etiquette of trials and with the formalities and
minutiae of procedure from touching the merits of a verdict." Id. at 294. Deprivation of a constitutional
right, such as the one with which the Snyder Court grappled, would hardly have been seen as dealing
merely with a formality and minutiae of procedure. Not until Chapman was harmless error a viable
alternative in the Supreme Court's decision making arsenal.
That Chapman staked the flag of harmless error on virgin territory is clear from its failure to cite
any previous Supreme Court decision, most notably not even Snyder or Motes, that affirmed a
conviction despite finding that the defendant was denied a constitutional right. Justice Harlan's
dissenting opinion did cite both cases for the proposition that "errors of constitutional dimension can be
harmless," Chapman, 386 U.S. at 50 n.3, but the majority opinion did not mention them at all.
Justice Stewart's dissent made the point explicitly, lamenting: "In devising a harmless-error rule
for violations of federal constitutional rights, both the Court and [Justice Harlan's] dissent proceed as if
the question were one of first impression. But in a long line of cases, involving a variety of
constitutional claims in both state and federal prosecutions, this Court has steadfastly rejected any notion
that constitutional violations might be disregarded on the ground that they were 'harmless."' Id. at 42.
The cases on which he relied dealt with a long list of constitutional provisions:
- The due process right against the admission into evidence of an involuntary confession.
See Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 (1963) (the argument "that the error in
admitting such a confession 'was a harmless one ...is an impermissible doctrine"');
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568
(1958); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503, 518-19 (1963); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964).
- The Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76
(1942); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52,
55 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963).
* The due process right against participation of a judge with a financial interest in the
outcome of the case. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
- The due process protection against effect of pervasive negative pretrial publicity on the
jury. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-52 (1966). Cf Rideau v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963). See also Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-44, 562-64 (1965)
(Warren, C.J., concurring); 593-94 (Harlan, J., concurring).
* The due process protection against jury instructions containing mandatory
presumptions. See Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1946).
* The doctrine that convictions resting on both a valid and constitutionally invalid basis
are nevertheless illegitimate. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367-68 (1931);
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292 (1942).
: And, the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments' protection against discrimination in the
selection of grand and petit jurors. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
61. Although Motes had laid the groundwork for a harmless rule some years earlier, Snyder did not
rely on Motes for the proposition that a constitutional error could be harmless. While the opinion did cite
Motes, it was not for that case's treatment of poor Columbus as compared to his five luckier co-
defendants, but for details about the application of the Confrontation Clause. See Snyder, 291 U.S. at
107.
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makes clear that the basis for the decision was the conditional nature
of the rule rather than an application of the harmless error doctrine. In
fact, this was an explicit issue in a 1987 case, Kentucky v. Stincer.
62
Stincer also dealt with a defendant who was prohibited from
attending a pretrial proceeding, in his case a competency hearing for
two child witnesses held outside the presence of the jury.
In concluding that the defendant's absence did not violate the
Snyder rule, the Court found it necessary to respond to Justice
Marshall's complaint in dissent that "the propriety of the decision to
exclude respondent from this critical stage of his trial should not be
evaluated in light of what transpired in his absence. To do so
transforms the issue from whether a due process violation has
occurred into whether the violation was harmless." 63 Justice
Blackmun's majority opinion directly answered this charge:
We do not address the question whether harmless-error analysis
applies in the situation where a defendant is excluded from a
critical stage of the proceedings in which his presence would
contribute to the fairness of the proceeding. In this case,
respondent simply has failed to establish that his presence at the
competency hearing would have contributed to the fairness of the
proceeding. He thus fails to establish, as an initial matter, the
presence of a constitutional deprivation.
64
3. Due Process and the Prosecutor's Obligation to Reveal
Exculpatory Evidence
The next conditional rule to make its appearance also sprung from
the Due Process Clause. As in Snyder, the complaint was not
something addressed by one of the specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights. It was, rather, a "free standing" due process dictate-this one
directed to the prosecutor.65 It dealt with the obligation to disclose
62. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
63. Id. at 754 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 747.
65. Jerold Israel, Free Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court's Search
for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LouIs L.J. 303 (2001).
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exculpatory information to the defense. In 1985, the Court eventually
cast this rule in a form that required prosecutors to reveal exculpatory
information prior to trial only if its significance in the context of the
evidence that was eventually admitted against the defendant was so
great that it would raise a reasonable probability that the defendant
would have been acquitted.66 The rule, however, did not emerge in
this format fully formed as a conditional one.
The path it took began in 1935, in Mooney v. Holohan.67 Mooney
was a habeas corpus case based on a claim that the state's entire case
rested on the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony. This
was the Court's first occasion to find in the Due Process Clause any
constitutional rule limiting the power of a prosecutor. A unanimous
Court concluded that due process:
[C]annot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if
a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of
liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the
presentation of testimony known to be perjured. 68
Mooney did not present the Court with an occasion to consider
whether to incorporate a prejudice requirement into the definition of
its new rule, since there was no factual dispute about the habeas
corpus petition's claim that the entire prosecution case consisted of
subomed perjury. The same was true the next time the issue appeared
seven years later, in Pyle v. Kansas.69 But a case that arose in the
1950s, Napue v. Illinois, indicated that the Court was concerned to
some degree with the effect that a prosecutor's knowing use of
perjured testimony had on the jury's evaluation of all the evidence. 70
Napue dealt with a prosecutor who allowed a witness to lie not
about what the defendant had done, as was the case in the earlier
66. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
67. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
68. Id. at 112.
69. Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
70. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
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decisions, but about something in the witness's background that
affected his credibility. In extending the Mooney decision to this
context, the Court addressed the state's contention that it was bound
by a factual determination in the state court that "the false testimony
could not in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of
the jury." 71 Rather than rejecting the contention as irrelevant to the
federal claim, the Court made its own examination of the record and
concluded that "the false testimony used by the State in securing the
conviction of petitioner may have had an effect on the outcome of the
trial."
72
A standard that asks a court reviewing a conviction to determine,
as Napue requires, whether the evidence "may have had an effect on
the trial" places it in exactly the same position it occupies when it
considers whether to apply the harmless error rule that was first
articulated in Fahy v. Connecticut eight years afterward: "whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of
might have contributed to the conviction." 73 For this reason, a court
considering a case dealing with the prosecutor's knowing use of
perjured testimony would never have to choose between a conditional
rule and harmless error. The process of applying the relevant legal
doctrine to the facts would always be the same.
As a result, neither Mooney nor any of its progeny interpreting the
rule preventing prosecutors from using perjured testimony ever truly
cast it in conditional form. That opportunity came, however, when
the Court had to consider extending the Mooney line of cases to
situations where the prosecutor's actions consisted of withholding
evidence that should have been revealed rather than presenting
evidence that never should have come to the attention of the jury.
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id. at 272. The context in which the Supreme Court was asked to decide this issue is much
narrower than the one that it subsequently adopted as part of the test for a prosecutor's obligation to
reveal exculpatory evidence. In Napue, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that there "was no
constitutional infirmity by virtue of the false statement," because the witness subsequently admitted that
he had been promised that efforts would be made to see that he would receive a reduced sentence if he
testified against Napue. Napue v. Illinois, 150 N.E.2d 613, 615 (1958). This makes Napue close to a
case where the question is whether the witness retracted his lie rather than one that looks at whether the
lie was sufficiently important to have affected the jury's decision to convict.
73. Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963).
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The case that the Court used as a vehicle to reach this issue was
Brady v. Maryland.74 Brady was tried for capital murder and
sentenced to die. In the face of overwhelming evidence, his defense
attorney's strategy was to concede his client's culpability but argue to
the jury that they should spare him the death penalty. Brady, in fact,
testified that he and a joint venturer, Boblit, both participated in the
robbery that led to the death of the victim but that Boblit, who was
tried separately, was the actual killer.
In an effort to find information that would have bolstered this
strategy, defense counsel had requested prior to the trial the discovery
of any of Boblit's statements the prosecution had in its possession.
Several were, in fact, produced. But not until after his conviction did
Brady find out that the prosecutor withheld the only statement that
Brady would have really wanted to see-the one where Boblit
admitted the homicide. In a collateral attack in state court, Brady got
the death sentence vacated, leaving the underlying murder conviction
intact.7
5
The Supreme Court's articulation of the rule governing situations
like Brady's left room for an interpretation that it was a conditional
one: "We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution., 76 The
key word is "material."
The Brady opinion gave no definition of the term. It is likely that
Justice Douglas meant it simply in its usual courtroom evidentiary
sense-to connote nothing more than evidence that is germane to the
fact at issue. In this way, it serves to shed light on what the Court
meant by "evidencefavorable to an accused."
The Brady Court's application of its rule to the facts of the case
before it is also consistent with this understanding. The Court left the
underlying murder conviction standing and affirmed the lower court's
74. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
75. Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167 (Md. 1961).
76. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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ruling vacating the imposition of the death penalty. In explaining this
split decision, Brady accepted, as it was obliged, the state court's
interpretation of its own law of evidence and of the elements of its
substantive crimes. Boblit's confession was not admissible on the
question of Brady's guilt because even if the jury accepted it as true,
it would have done nothing to negate any of the elements of first
degree murder under Maryland law. It would, however, have been
admissible on the question of punishment.
In this light, Brady is not exactly a conditional rule. It could simply
mean that a prosecutor has the obligation of disclosing beforehand
any evidence whose character met the terms of this evidentiary sense
of materiality, without regard for the proof that was eventually
admitted at trial. The rule morphed, however, in its subsequent
appearances before the Court.
The first part of the transformation came in United States v.
Agurs. Agurs dealt with a slightly different scenario than Brady in
terms of the interaction between the defense and prosecution prior to
the trial. Whereas Brady's attorney had specifically asked for the
information that the prosecutor withheld, Agurs's lawyer did not.
This difference led the Court to adopt a different test for materiality,
one that is expressly conditional.
The Agurs Court, like Caesar in his invasion of Gaul,78 found that
the territory it considered was divided into three parts. The first,
knowing use of perjury, meant that the Napue formulation applied
and a conviction "must be set aside if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment
of the jury."79 This formulation is essentially a harmless error
standard that puts the burden on the prosecutor to show that the
conviction should not be overturned. 80 The second, where the
77. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
78. JuLius CAESAR, THE BATTLE FOR GAUL, Anne & Peter Wiseman Trans., (D.R. Godine 1980).
79. Id. at 103.
80. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 299 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring and dissenting) ("We have
... equated materiality in the perjured-testimony cases with a showing that suppression of the evidence
was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679 (1985)
(Agurs first category stated a rule "in terms that treat the knowing use of perjured testimony as error
subject to harmless-error review.").
2010]
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prosecutor ignored a request for information specifically identifying
what the defense sought, requires the prosecutor to comply if the
information is material in the sense that Brady used the term-so that
"the suppressed evidence might have affected the result of the
trial."'" The third, where the defense either made no request or
simply asked for exculpatory information in broad, nonspecific
terms.
82
In this third category, the Court crafted a rule that required the
prosecutor before trial to evaluate how the significance of the
evidence would appear in context after the trial. "[I]f the omitted
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist,
constitutional error has been committed. This means that the
omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record.,
83
Unlike the Brady formulation, this clearly is conditional.
Taking this backward looking view, the prosecutor in Agurs did
nothing wrong by withholding information that the murder victim,
Sewell, had several convictions for crimes of violence (using a knife
as the weapon) despite knowing that the defendant intended to rely
on a claim of self defense in the face of a knife attack by Sewell.
Knowing that the victim had a record would not, in the Justices'
minds, have created a reasonable doubt in light of the trial evidence
revealing that the victim had been stabbed a number of times while
the defendant had no injuries at all.84
Agurs did not explain in any detail why it made the rule for this
category of exculpatory information conditional. Justice Stevens
pointed out that the problem of identifying what the Constitution
requires prosecutors to do arises at two different time frames: prior to
trial when the prosecutor has to decide whether to turn something
over or not; and after trial when a judge has to determine if the
prosecutor's inaction at the earlier stage violated the defendant's right
81. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 104.
82. Id. at 108.
83. Id. at 112.
84. Id. at 114 ("Sewell's prior record did not contradict any evidence offered by the prosecutor and
was largely cumulative .... ").
[Vol. 26:2
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to exculpatory information. 85 From there, he concluded that logic
required the rule to mean the same thing at both times.86 "[U]nless
the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial," Agurs states,
"there was no constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set
aside; and absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of
the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose." 87 But it is not
obvious why this insight into the coherence of a constitutional rule
requires that the Court adopt the post hoc vantage point rather than
the ex ante.
Perhaps more significant were the brief allusions in the opinion to
the difficulty the Court foresaw a non-conditional rule would create
for prosecutors. The opinion noted how "imprecise" the standard was
to identify exculpatory information and how "the significance of an
item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire
record is complete." 88 The opinion went on to bemoan the
impracticality of a non-conditional rule: "If everything that might
influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could
discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete
discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice.'
89
After Agurs, which category one placed an exculpatory evidence
case in made all the difference. If defense counsel specifically
requested the information, courts would apply a less forgiving
standard than when counsel made no request or just asked for Brady
material in general. However, nine years later, in United States v.
Bagley,90 the Court abandoned its categorization scheme and made
clear that there was only one rule governing a prosecutor's obligation
to disclose exculpatory evidence-that it was conditional.
Defense counsel in Bagley had requested information whether
prosecution witnesses had received any "deals, promises or
inducements" to testify.91 The prosecution failed to disclose that its
85. Id. at 107-08.
86. Id. at 108.
87. Id.
88. Agurs, 427 U.S at 108.
89. Id. at 109.
90. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
91. Id. at 669-70.
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two principal witnesses had entered into written agreements with
federal law enforcement authorities, literally titled a "Contract for
Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefore,"
giving them money in return for gathering information and testifying
against the defendant.
92
The Court of Appeals relied on defense counsel's specific request
as the trigger to apply the Brady test of materiality rather than the
more forgiving Agurs conditional rule. 93 Since information that these
witnesses were paid informants would have been material to the issue
of the defendant's guilt, it meant that the prosecutor had violated the
due process right of the defendant and left only the question of
remedy. This, in turn, required the court to apply the harmless error
rule.94 Casting about for the proper application of this doctrine, the
court reasoned that what happened here could never be harmless
because it not only implicated the defendant's right under the Due
Process Clause to receive exculpatory evidence but impaired his right
under the Confrontation Clause to effectively cross examine adverse
witnesses.95 That was a violation Supreme Court precedent had
placed outside the realm of harmless error.96 It was, in other words,
subject to automatic reversal.
The Bagley decision rejected the notion that harmless error was the
lens through which it was appropriate to consider what the prosecutor
had done. Rather than maintaining a separate regime for exculpatory
evidence cases depending on whether there has been a request or not,
the Court collapsed the two categories and adopted a test from
Strickland v. Washington, an ineffective assistance of counsel case:
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. A "reasonable
92. Id. at 687.
93. Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1463-64 (9th Cir. 1983).
94. Id. at 1463-64.
95. Id. at 1464.
96. See id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)).
[Vol. 26:2
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probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.
9 7
As before, the Court did not spend a lot of effort explaining why
the Constitution required a conditional rule even when the prosecutor
ignored defense counsel's specific request. It repeated the language
from Agurs about the basis for the rule being to ensure fundamental
fairness. The opinion also claimed that any non-conditional rule
would be wildly impractical: "a rule that the prosecutor commits
error by any failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, no
matter how insignificant, would impose an impossible burden on the
prosecutor and would undermine the interest in the finality of
judgments." 98 Taking this straw-man on its face, the Court went on to
comment that placing this type of obligation on prosecutors would
fundamentally alter the adversary system, presumably a result that the
Due Process Clause could not encompass. 9
9
The Bagley Court remanded the case for the application of its
newly announced standard. A Ninth Circuit panel of three former
trial judges found that the impeachment information was so
significant that it raised a reasonable probability that the result of the
trial would have been different.' 00 Bagley, serving a federal sentence
on other charges, was never retried.'0 '
4. Due Process and the Prosecutor's Obligation to Avoid
Improper Pre-Indictment Delay
Prosecutors control the timing of much of the process that brings
defendants to justice. They have total control over the decision
whether to charge someone with a crime and when to initiate a
complaint or indictment. The Due Process Clause provides the limit
on how long a prosecutor can wait in the pre-charge stage of a case
before initiating the process that brings the defendant into court. And
97. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
98. Id. at 676 n.7.
99. Id.
100. Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1300 n.2 (9th Cir. 1985).
101. United States v. Bagley, 837 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988).
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the governing rule that controls is conditional. The line of cases
dealing with exculpatory evidence influenced the format of the rule
the Court crafted for pre-indictment delay.
In United States v. Marion, the government brought a case directly
to the Court after the trial judge dismissed the indictment on the
ground that the three-year delay between the end of the defendant's
criminal behavior and the return of the grand jury's true bill violated
the Speedy Trial Clause.10 2 The Court summarily rejected this claim
on the ground that the speedy trial rule only governed the timing of
the process after a defendant is first brought into court.
10 3
However, that did not leave the timing of an indictment entirely
unregulated. In a brief passage in the opinion, the Court accepted the
government's concession that due process still served as a source for
preventing governmental overreaching. The resulting test had two
parts: first, a defendant had to show that the prosecutor delayed
bringing charges to gain a tactical advantage; and second, citing both
Brady and Napue, the defendant had to show that the delay "caused
substantial prejudice to [his] rights to a fair trial.', 10 4
Because Marion had not yet been tried and had neither alleged nor
proved any actual prejudice, relying only on the generic possibility
that because of the delay "memories will dim, witnesses become
inaccessible, and evidence be lost,"'10 5 the Court found it easy to clear
the path for his trial. In light of the lack of any facts against which to
craft a more precise standard, the Court left the issue without further
illumination.
One can glean the conditional nature of this rule, however, by
looking to statements the Court has made in the closely related area
of speedy trial law. Whereas prejudice is a necessary component of a
due process claim based on pre-indictment delay, it is only one of the
interests that the Speedy Trial Clause protects. However, in practical
102. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
103. Id. at 313.
104. Id. at 324 (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264
(1959)).
105. Id. at 326.
[Vol. 26:2
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terms, it is the most important and almost always the only interest at
stake in speedy trial case.
What the Court said about speedy trial claims in United States v.
MacDonald"°6 applies equally to claims based on Marion: "a central
interest served by the [due process rule dealing with pre-indictment
delay] is the protection of the factfinding process at trial. The essence
of a [Marion] claim in the usual case is that the passage of time has
frustrated his ability to establish his innocence of the crime charged.
Normally, it is only after trial that that claim may fairly be
assessed."'10 7 The necessity for a post-trial evaluation is the hallmark
of a conditional rule.
5. The Obligation of the Prosecutor Not to Impair the Sixth
Amendment's Right to Compulsory Process
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant will have
"compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."'0 8 There
must also be a rule that prevents the prosecutor from obstructing the
defendant's efforts to bring witnesses into court. Otherwise, it would
be too easy for the government to frustrate the obligation of a judge
to give the defendant the benefit of what the Compulsory Process
Clause requires. When a prosecutor contemplates action that will
make a potential defense witness unavailable, however, she only has
to avoid hindering the defendant's access to those witnesses for
whom the defendant can establish there was "a reasonable likelihood
that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of
fact" °-0 a standard that makes the rule conditional.
In constructing this rule, the Court, in United States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal, borrowed heavily from the exculpatory evidence cases, as
well as the undue pre-indictment delay and the speedy trial cases.
1
'
0
Valenzuela involved a charge of transporting aliens into the country
illegally. The defendant was arrested along with three Mexican aliens
106. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
107. Id. at 860.
108. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
109. United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 874 (1982).
110. Id.
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after fleeing from the car he was driving when he first came to the
attention of Border Patrol agents. All of the aliens were interviewed
by federal law enforcement authorities. One of them was held to
serve as a witness against the defendant. The other two were deported
before defense counsel had an opportunity to interview them.
The Court's precedents on the right to compulsory process were
sparse, but from them Valenzuela could extract a principle much like
the one that animated the limit that Brady contemplated. The
defendant must first establish that a witness, whose testimony would
be the subject of compulsory process, would have something to say
that could help the defendant on an issue material to the case against
him.11' Beyond this rather minimal test, however, the compulsory
process cases could not go.
The Court, however, had a body of law from other parts of the
Constitution that it thought related because they also dealt with "the
area of constitutionally guaranteed access to evidence., 1 2 Thus, the
Court looked to Agurs, the exculpatory evidence case, Marion, which
dealt with pre-indictment delay and Barker v. Wingo,113 a speedy trial
case. In each of these areas, Valenzuela noted, the defendant had to
establish prejudice to his ability to mount a defense in order to make
out a case that the constitutional rule had been violated. 14 So it
would be with compulsory process. Although the Court did not rule
out the possibility that a determination of whether the prosecutor
violated the rule of compulsory process could be made prior to trial,
in practical terms it is hard to see how a prosecutor can know at the
point in the process when a decision has to be made whether
deportation of a potential defense witness would violate the
defendant's rights. "Because determinations of materiality are often
best made in light of all of the evidence adduced at trial," then Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "judges may wish to defer ruling on motions until
after the presentation of evidence." ' 1 5 Though phrased in terms of a
111. Id. at 867.
112. Id. at 867-68.
113. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
114. Valenzuela, 458 U.S. at 868.
115. Id.at874.
[VoL 26:2
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 448 2009-2010
448   I SIT  I  (  :  
   
    
t   
   t  
  t    
ts   
  l   
 
   
   r   
   t 
 III   
   
   
 
 l  t    ,,112  
t r   rion,  
i t ent . o,l13  
  l  t  
   
ti l 1   
  
  t r 
    
i  ti l t  it i   t     t r     
r 
   
t'   ti s lit   
     
   
i   .,,1l5    
Ill  ld. t . 
. l .  7...{j . 
. r r . i ,  . .  ). 
. ,  . . t . 
lIS. l . t 87 . 
32
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/7
CONDITIONAL RULES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
suggestion, in practical terms there is often no other option than to
wait until after trial to decide if a prosecutor has violated the rule. It
is, for all intents and purposes, conditional.
6. The Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel and the Defense
Attorney's Obligation to Provide Effective Assistance
One aspect of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to
counsel is a quality control feature. Ever since the Court's first
encounter in 1935 with the constitutional dimension of the right to
counsel in the landmark decision in Powell v. Alabama,116 the
"Scottsboro Boys" case, it has recognized that in order to serve the
function contemplated by the Sixth Amendment, defense attorneys in
criminal cases must meet a minimum standard of competence.
This feature of the Sixth Amendment makes it unique among
constitutional rules because the actor whose behavior is subject to
evaluation does not exercise state power in any conventional way.
While some defense attorneys do work for the state, as full time
public defenders, and others may take on the role of quasi-public
employees by virtue of accepting a court appointment to represent an
indigent defendant, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of what has
come to be known as the effective assistance of counsel applies as
well to lawyers hired by defendants out of their own pockets. 117
Nevertheless, it does make sense to talk about the Sixth
Amendment as a rule that is directed toward the behavior of even
these private actors. Their behavior in conducting the defense of their
clients will determine the legitimacy of the process that the state has
initiated in its attempt to impose a criminal sanction. Certainly, if the
process ends in a conviction in which a private lawyer failed to
provide effective assistance of counsel, the government may not
legitimately deprive the defendant of life, liberty, or property
consistent with the Sixth Amendment. And, even if the defendant is
acquitted despite the bumbling efforts of an incompetent lawyer, one
may certainly argue that defendant failed to receive some benefit that
116. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
117. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980).
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the Sixth Amendment incorporates. When one looks closer, however,
at the details of the rule that defines competence one finds that the
Court has chosen a conditional format. Unless the lawyer's
incompetence in fact deprived the defendant of a reasonable
opportunity to achieve a better result, not even the starkest
incompetence violates the Sixth Amendment's rule requiring
effective assistance of counsel.
Powell and the right to counsel cases that followed over the next
fifty years in the Supreme Court never fleshed out the test by which
one could determine if a defendant received the effective assistance
of counsel that the Sixth Amendment required.1 18 Strickland v.
Washington gave the Court its first opportunity.ll 9
David Leroy Washington was represented by a court-appointed
lawyer in a capital, multiple-murder case in a Florida state court.
Against his lawyer's advice, Washington not only pled guilty to the
murders but chose to waive a jury in the sentencing hearing that
followed the plea by a week. Defense counsel, admitting later that he
was overcome at that point in the case by a sense of hopelessness,
ceased his efforts to investigate the defendant's background. 120 In
preparation for the proceeding which would decide his client's fate,
he only spoke to two people who could provide insight into his
background: the defendant's wife and mother. And he spoke to them
over the telephone, not in person. 12 1 Counsel's performance at the
sentencing hearing-which was the subject of Washington's claim
that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel-was
perfunctory. He failed to request a pre-sentence investigation by the
probation department, presented no evidence of his own, and did not
cross-examine the witnesses the prosecutor presented or the medical
experts who testified about the victims' injunies. 122
The only sign that defense counsel was actively engaged as an
advocate was his objection to the prosecutor's effort to introduce the
118. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
119. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
120. Id. at 672.
121. Id. at 673.
122. Id.
[Vol. 26:2
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 450 2009-2010
450   ( l. :  
t   
t     
'  
i t  i  t  
t it   lt,  
i t  i l t   '  
  
ll  t    
fift  r  i  t     
    
f l t t t  i t  1    
UT ' h  . fi . 11  rr s m t   I l O Ortu It  
i   i t  t   
la er i   it l, lti l - r r    
i st i  l r'  i , i t   
r ers t s  t  i   j     
f ll  t  l      
   , 
 i     '  12o  
r r ti   t  i    '   
 l   t  t  l     
ac r : t  f t's i   .  
r t  t l , t  . 1 l's   
s t i g ri - ich    i t 's  
t t  i  t i      
rf t r .  f il  t  t  t ce ti ti    
probation e art e t, r s ted  i     t 
r ss- ine t  it s  r s c tor t  t  i l 
rts  testified about the victims' injuries. 122 
e l  si  t t f  l     
a cate as is j ti  t  t  t r's rt t    
118. o ell . la a a, 7 . . 5 ( 32). 
119. Strickland v. ashington, 466 . . 68 ( 4). 
. I . t 72. 
1. I . at 673. 
. I . 
34
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 7
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/7
CONDITIONAL RULES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
record of the defendant's prior criminal history, which was offered to
prove that the defendant was a danger to commit further crimes of
violence. 123 This piece of lawyering legerdemain was accomplished
by objecting on the ground that the document the prosecutor was
trying to get in as evidence had not been properly certified. This
accomplishment is less impressive than it might otherwise seem in
light of the fact that defense counsel had already asked the judge to
spare his client's life on the ground that he had no history of criminal
activity. 1
24
Had Washington's attorney been more diligent in trying to
discover information that might have swayed the judge to find some
reason to sentence him to life imprisonment instead of death, he
would have discovered, as did the lawyers who represented him in
federal court, a lot. At least fourteen acquaintances and neighbors,
including a police officer, would have vouched for what an aberration
this spree of violence was and the financial pressure Washington was
under at the time. 12 5 In addition, he could have found expert
witnesses, like the two psychologists discovered by post conviction
counsel, who would have testified that at the time of the murders the
defendant was chronically depressed. 1
26
Strickland announced a two part test by which to judge the
constitutional adequacy of a defense attorney's efforts. One part was
to evaluate counsel's efforts, as the situation appeared at the time in
which they were undertaken, against a standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms. 127 Nothing about this, so far,
makes it a conditional rule. But the second half of the test did.
In addition to showing that counsel performed unreasonably, the
constitutional rule the Court crafted requires a showing of prejudice.
Justice O'Connor began her discussion of why this is so by noting
that "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does
123. Id.
124. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 673. While it may not be obvious to the reader of this account, it must
have been obvious to the judge that Washington did, in fact, have a criminal record because the judge
had excluded the defendant's rap sheet on evidentiary grounds.
125. Id. at 675.
126. Id. at 675-76.
127. Id. at 688.
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not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the
error had no effect on the judgment," a proposition for which she
cited United States v. Morrison.1
28
Morrison was an interesting choice for this purpose. It involved the
Court's review of the dismissal of an indictment because federal law
enforcement agents had contacted the defendant after her indictment
in order to persuade her to cooperate with their investigation against a
bigger fish. It appears that the DEA agents involved saw the key to
their success to be getting Ms. Morrison to jettison her attorney,
whom they believed would not have been particularly hospitable to
their suggestion. 129 In order to accomplish their end, they disparaged
her attorney's merit and urged her to replace him with a public
defender whom they thought more pliant. The government, once the
case reached the Supreme Court, urged the Justices to hold that,
absent a showing of actual prejudice, the actions of its agents did not
even violate the Sixth Amendment. The Court, however, assumed
without deciding that what the stalwarts from the DEA did was in
fact a violation of the constitutional rule, but agreed that it need not
be remedied by dismissing the indictment since Morrison could not
show prejudice of any kind. 130 She had not only resisted the agents'
entreaties to ditch her attorney, but promptly told him what they were
up to and stood by his subsequent efforts on her behalf.
Morrison's use of prejudice, then, is all about when you get a
remedy and not about defining the rule which sets the boundaries of
acceptable behavior for government agents in the sphere of
interfering with a defendant's relationship to her attorney.
Nevertheless, Strickland cited it as a basis for incorporating the
question of prejudice into the definition of the right.
Strickland offered a number of reasons that prejudice was
necessary as a definitional matter. Of primary importance was the
Court's view of the underlying value that the right to effective
assistance of counsel served: "The purpose of the Sixth Amendment
128. Id. at 691 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981)).
129. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 362 (1981).
130. Id. at 365.
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guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance
necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding.
Accordingly, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be
prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance
under the Constitution." 131 Pragmatic concerns played a role as well.
The government is not responsible for, and hence not able to
prevent, attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction
or sentence. Attorney errors come in an infinite variety and are as
likely to be utterly harmless in a particular case as they are to be
prejudicial. They cannot be classified according to likelihood of
causing prejudice. Nor can they be defined with sufficient
precision to inform defense attorneys correctly just what conduct
to avoid. Representation is an art, and an act or omission that is
unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in
another. Even if a defendant shows that particular errors of
counsel were unreasonable, therefore, the defendant must show
that they actually had an adverse effect on the defense. 13
2
For the standard by which a court was to judge the defendant's
claim of prejudice, Strickland borrowed from Agurs and Valenzuela-
Bernal. The defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that the attorney's inadequate representation adversely
affected the result of the proceeding.' 33 Using this standard, the Court
concluded that none of the evidence that Strickland said his trial
lawyer should have developed would have led to a sentencing profile
very much different than the one which led to his eventual death. 134
131. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692.
132. Id. at 693.
133. Id. at 694.
134. Id. at 700. Once a court is convinced that a defense attorney has performed incompetently, of
course, it increases the probability that the defendant will be hampered in her effort to show the lawyer's
incompetence adversely affected the result of the trial since, as Justice Marshall noted in his dissent,
"evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the
incompetence of defense counsel." Id. at 710.
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7. The Sixth Amendment's Right to Counsel and the Responsibility
of a Judge to Ensure That the Defendant's Attorney Is Not Subject
to a Conflict of Interest
Another part of the problem of defining competent defense counsel
comes in the context of conflict of interest. Ten years after Powell,
Glasser v. United States established that "the 'assistance of counsel'
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such
assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring
that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting
interests."'
135
When a defendant or a lawyer, prior to trial, objects to the
appointment of an attorney on the ground that the lawyer cannot
provide objective, unconflicted representation, the Glasser rule
requires the judge to act, either by appointing separate counsel or
investigating to ensure that the risk posed by joint representation is
too remote. This rule is not conditional. The judge can determine if
requiring the defendant to be represented by the attorney alleged to
have a conflict of interest would violate the Constitution or not at the
time that she makes the decision, ruling on the facts that were
brought to her attention.
But where the facts known to the judge prior to trial make it
apparent that a lawyer appointed to represent the defendant serves
conflicting interests, if neither the lawyer nor her client objects, the
Constitution's mandate is conditional. The failure of the judge to act
in the face of the facts available to her may, or may not, violate the
rule that governs in this situation.
This conditional rule appeared in Mickens v. Taylor, a 2002
decision. 136 The juvenile court judge who was responsible for
appointing a lawyer to represent Mickens on the murder charge he
faced had to have been struck by the coincidence of the victim's
identity. She had appointed a lawyer for the victim on weapons and
assault charges just seventeen days earlier and had dismissed those
135. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
136. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
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charges when the victim's body was discovered. 137 The very next
day, however, she called the lawyer she had appointed for the victim
and asked him to "do her a favor" and represent the person who was
charged with killing his former client.' 38 The lawyer did not object to
being placed in a situation that might compromise his ability to
represent Mickens and Mickens himself did not discover the conflict
until after he was convicted and sentenced to death. 13
9
In these circumstances, the majority held, Mickens's right to
effective assistance of counsel depended on his establishing that
some action the lawyer took after being appointed was adversely
affected by the lawyer's prior representation of the murder victim.
The message to judges charged with appointing lawyers in criminal
cases is a conditional one: even if you are aware that a lawyer serves
conflicting interests, your failure to act will only violate the Sixth
Amendment if the lawyer's subsequent behavior shows some effect
traceable to the conflict. 14
0
Justice Scalia's opinion in Mickens offered several reasons that the
rule should be a conditional one. One was the underlying purpose he
attributed to the right to counsel, as in Strickland. The Constitution
protects defendants from being represented by lawyers who have
divided interests "not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has
on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial."'14' And the way
that the Court can tell if a defendant had a "fair trial" is to determine
if there are "defects in assistance that have [a] probable effect upon
the trial's outcome."' 1
42
In conflict of interest cases, though, the Court makes an exception
to the rule that requires a defendant to show an effect on the outcome.
Unless the judge improperly overrules an objection that has been
raised prior to trial, as in Glasser, the defendant must show that the
lawyer's divided loyalties had an effect on some action the lawyer
137. Id. at 164.
138. Id. at 190n.1.
139. Id. at 191.
140. Id. at 173.
141. Id. at 166 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)).
142. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166.
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took or neglected to take, but not a probable effect on the outcome.1 43
Since the lawyer's dual representation may make it impossible for the
defendant to show prejudice in terms of outcome, all that the Court
looks for in this situation is a determination that the lawyer's
performance was adversely affected by an actual conflict of interest.
This future consequence still leaves the rule in conditional form. And
in Justice Scalia's view, finding a violation of the rule from the facts
in Mickens would be cutting the right to counsel too far adrift from its
purpose of ensuring reliable results.
Justice Scalia also believed that it was unnecessary to abandon a
conditional rule in Mickens as a way of ensuring that judges
conscientiously carry out their obligation to ensure that a defendant
receives conflict free counsel. Judges, he assumed, are not "as
careless or as partial as those police officers who need the incentive
of the exclusionary rule."144
Justice Souter's dissent addressed both these points. 14 5 He saw a
non-conditional rule requiring a judge to act whenever she learns that
defense counsel labors under a conflict the only "sensible regime."' 146
"The best time to deal with a known threat to the basic guarantee of
fair trial," he wrote, "is before the trial has proceeded to become
unfair."' 147 The majority's position, he maintained, was "skewed
against recognizing judicial responsibility.' 148
Justice Souter also took aim at the majority's defense of a
conditional rule on the ground of the underlying value of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel:
Requiring a criminal defendant to prove a conflict's adverse
effect in all no-objection cases only makes sense on the Court's
presumption that the Sixth Amendment right against ineffective
assistance of counsel is at its core nothing more than a utilitarian
143. Id.
144. See id at 173.
145. See id. at 207 (Souter, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 203.
148. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 208.
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right against unprofessional errors that have detectable effects on
outcome.... [T]he right against ineffective assistance of counsel
has as much to do with public confidence in the professionalism
of lawyers as with the results of legal proceedings. A revelation
that a trusted advocate could not place his client's interest above
the interests of self and others in the satisfaction of his
professional responsibilities will destroy that confidence,
regardless of outcome. 149
C. Liability Rules
Conditional rules do not have to rely on a post hoc evaluation of
whether there is prejudice. Another way to make a rule conditional is
to cast it as a liability rule. This type of rule allows the actor to
engage in the conduct that it addresses but gives to the person whose
legal entitlement the act adversely affects the right to obtain a
remedy. The essence of a liability rule is that its enforcement depends
the person most closely affected to ensure that the remedial
mechanism accompanying it is put into play.
It is, to pick a sports analogy closer to the American heart than
soccer, like the rule in baseball that requires a base runner to wait
until a fly ball is caught before leaving the base to advance her
position. If a runner leaves early, the individuals charged with
enforcing the rule will not act on their own. It is up to the opposing
team to lodge an appeal which sets in motion the umpire's ruling that
the runner left early and is, therefore, out.150
Liability rules play a major role in the law of torts, where they
represent the most efficient way to distribute resources when
negotiation between the parties is not practical. 151 As a mechanism
for constitutional rules, the most familiar example for this type of
format is the Takings Clause. 152 The Takings Clause does not
regulate when or how or under what conditions the government may
149. See id. at 207.
150. See N.C.A.A. 2007 BASEBALL RULES AND INTERPRETATIONS Rule 8, § 6(a), at 96-97.
151. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
152. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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take private property for public use. The rule only prescribes what the
government must do after it has taken the property.1
53
In three different situations (dressing the defendant in prison
clothes at trial, asking a defendant on cross examination about
exercising Miranda rights, and the police's confronting a person with
a show of force demanding that he or she submit), the Supreme Court
has crafted constitutional rules that operate much like liability rules.
They depend on the reaction of the person who is the rule's intended
beneficiary to determine if the governmental actor whom the rule
regulates has violated its precept. In each case, if the target does not
respond in the way necessary to define a violation of the rule, the
actor's behavior becomes unobjectionable. If, on the other hand, the
target does react in the appropriate way, what the actor has done will
have violated the target's rights. In a fourth context, a prosecutor's
introduction into evidence of a confession by a codefendant
implicating the defendant, the Court has molded a constitutional rule
into an even more unwieldy format that resembles a liability rule but
differs in one respect. The rule depends on the future action of
someone other than the beneficiary of the rule to determine the
legitimacy of what the government actor has done.
1. Due Process and the Defendant's Right Not to Appear at Trial
in Prison Clothes
A number of free-standing dictates of the Due Process Clause flow
from the concept of the presumption of innocence. This bedrock
principle has implications for a variety of facets of the criminal trial
system. It bears on the extent to which a defendant may be deprived
of his liberty prior to conviction, 154 the instructions the jury receives
about the significance of the fact that the defendant has been charged
with a crime, 155 and the requirement that prosecution bear the burden
of proof on each of its elements. 156 It also comes into play when the
153. See discussion infra Part ll.B.iv.
154. United States. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
155. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
156. Id.
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jury is exposed to information that presents an unacceptable risk of
influencing them to convict the defendant not because of the strength
of the evidence but because of his status as someone accused of a
crime.
In Estelle v. Williams, the Court considered the implication of this
dynamic in a case in which the defendant was clothed in prison attire
throughout the course of his trial. 157 The court system in which
Williams was tried-Houston, Texas-routinely had defendants who
were held on bail appear before the juries who sat on their cases in
distinctive, prison-issue clothing. The Court was aware of the
psychological implications of a defendant's appearance: "The
defendant's clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence
throughout the trial that, not unlike placing a jury in the custody of
deputy sheriffs who were also witnesses for the prosecution, an
unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into
play.'9 158 But, the rule the Court constructed to meet this danger was a
conditional one. It is only when a defendant objects that forcing him
to wear prison clothes violates the Constitution.1 59
Sometimes it makes sense that a rule requires an objection be
raised by the protected person before an act can constitute a violation.
The privilege against self-incrimination protects a person from
"be[ing] compelled . . . to be a witness against himself."' 160
Compulsion is part of the linguistic formula and the objectionable
aspect of the government's effort to obtain information that it needs
to prosecute someone. 161 When a witness is on the stand and is asked
a question that may lead to an incriminating answer, the law
governing the privilege requires the witness to seek its protection and
refuse to answer before being able to find shelter in its protection. If
the witness answers without having first asserted the privilege, the
answer is not compelled and therefore does not give rise to a
157. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
158. Id. at 505.
159. Id. at 508.
160. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
161. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) ("We hold the [self-incrimination]
privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself.").
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violation. As a result, the ordinary rule that governs the application of
the privilege does not prohibit a government official like a prosecutor
or judge from asking a witness a question that might tend to
incriminate. What the rule prohibits, however, is compelling someone
to answer over his or her objection. In other words, the rule's
protection only comes into play after the privilege is claimed. 162
Obviously, there is no similar linguistic reason for a rule that has
as its foundation in the Due Process Clause. Estelle found another
basis for justifying the incorporation of a requirement that the
defendant object. "[I]t is not an uncommon defense tactic," Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger wrote, "to produce the defendant in jail
clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury.... Under our
adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel the
vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be
made before and during trial rests with the accused and his attorney.
Any other approach would rewrite the duties of trial judges and
counsel in our legal system."'
163
There is a familiar doctrine that holds defendants to strategic
choices by which they, or their attorneys, consciously choose not to
assert underlying rights. That is, of course, the concept of waiver.
164
If a defendant knowingly and voluntarily chooses to forego a
protection that the Constitution would otherwise provide, the criminal
justice system is under no obligation to remedy the rule violation that
preceded the waiver. But this is not the basis on which the Court
decided Estelle.165 Under a waiver approach, the Court would have
recognized that the judge's decision to have the defendant appear in
prison clothes was a violation of due process and placed on the State
the burden of showing that the defendant waived this right. There was
nothing in the record to indicate in the slightest that the defendant
wanted to wear prison clothes in front of the jury.166
162. See discussion infra Part I.D.ii.
163. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512.
164. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) ("[W]aiver is the 'intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right."') (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)).
165. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512.
166. Id
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Nor is it accurate to view Estelle as an example of the closely
related doctrine of procedural default that the Court could have used
to justify its conclusion. Unlike waiver, this concept does not
presuppose the defendant's active abandonment of the rule's
protection. Rather, it strips the defendant of the ability to complain
about the rule's violation because of a failure to assert the right at
issue pursuant to the terms of a fair procedural mechanism."' While
Estelle appears superficially to be a procedural default case, since it
emphasized the defendant's lack of an objection when he clearly
knew that he was wearing prison clothes, it differs in a fundamental
way. 168 Procedural default is a doctrine about the remedies that one
loses by failing to follow the proper procedure. Estelle is about the
content of the rule that the judge must follow. 169
The four Justices who joined the majority opinion in Estelle could
not have been unaware of the possibility of reaching the result they
did by relying on the doctrine of procedural default. Justices Lewis F.
Powell and Potter Stewart concurred on precisely this ground. 170 In
their view, no relief was warranted in this case because the defense
attorney was aware of the possibility of objecting to the way his
client was dressed and failed to do so simply because he mistakenly
thought it futile.
171
There are different conclusions one might draw from the
majority's crafting a conditional rule rather than relying on the
doctrine of procedural default. One is the possibility that the majority
was concerned that the procedural default doctrine would not be
strong enough medicine to ensure the finality of convictions in cases
where the defendant did not lodge an objection. At the time Estelle
was decided, 1976, the law of constitutional remedies was much
more forgiving than it became in the last two decades of the twentieth
167. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 731 ('No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a
constitutional ight... may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely
assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it."') (quoting Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 444 (1944)).
168. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 509-10.
169. Id. at 507-08.
170. Id. at 513-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring).
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century. Defendants in the mid-1970s whose lawyers had failed to
object to the violation of their clients' rights stood a much better
chance of getting relief in a habeas corpus action than their
successors thirty years later when habeas relief was much stingier. 172
Another conclusion that one may draw from the majority opinion
in Estelle is that by making the rule conditional, the Court may
simply have been signaling to trial judges that they have completely
unfettered discretion in making decisions about whether defendants
appear in prison clothes. Certainly, if the rule in Estelle were not cast
in conditional form, the state would appear to have an affirmative
obligation to provide a less emotionally charged wardrobe for the
defendants it chooses to prosecute. It may be that Estelle was
motivated by a desire to spare that expense.
2. Due Process and Evidence That the Defendant Remained Silent
After Receiving a Miranda Warning
The famous Miranda v. Arizona decision has become so embedded
in popular culture that almost every English speaking moviegoer or
television watcher knows that after you are arrested, you have a right
to remain silent.173 In Doyle v. Ohio, the Court held that if a suspect
hears this warning and relies on it, it is so fundamentally unfair to
allow the prosecutor to use the defendant's silence as evidence of his
guilt that it violates due process.' 74 For eleven years, the Doyle rule
appeared to be straightforward. Prosecutors knew they could not
attempt to bring to the attention of the jury the fact that the defendant
had remained silent after receiving a Miranda warning. Greer v.
Miller, however, made the rule a conditional one. 175
Charles Miller took the stand in his murder trial and testified that
he had nothing to do with the crime. 17 6 When the prosecutor had an
opportunity to cross-examine, he chose to start out strong:
172. Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an "Actual Innocence" Exception to AEDPA 's
Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 343, 377-79, (2001-02).
173. Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
174. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,618-19 (1976).
175. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987).
176. Id. at 758.
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Q: Mr. Miller, how old are you?
A: 23.
Q: Why didn't you tell this story to anybody when you got
arrested?
177
By highlighting the defendant's post-Miranda silence at the very
beginning of his cross-examination, the prosecutor cannot have been
unaware of the impact this point must have had on the jury. It was no
accident that it was the second question, immediately after asking the
defendant's age. Defense counsel certainly knew what the prosecutor
was up to, for an objection immediately followed. 178 The judge
instructed the jury to "ignore [the] question, for the time being."' 179
The prosecutor never returned to the issue. Miller was convicted. 1
80
Both state appellate courts that considered Miller's appeal, the
federal district court that granted him habeas corpus relief and the
Seventh Circuit panel, as well as the en banc court that affirmed,
approached the case on the understanding that the prosecutor's
question violated the defendant's right to remain silent. For each of
these courts, the only issue they thought relevant was whether the
violation was harmless or not.'
8 1
The question on which the Court granted certiorari was what the
standard of harmless error should be in a habeas proceeding for a
Doyle violation. 182 But somewhere in the course of its consideration
of the case, the Court changed the structure of the Doyle rule. 183
Doyle itself dealt with a case in which the prosecutor had been
permitted to question the defendant about his failure to tell the police
the same story as included in his direct testimony and to argue to the
jury that his post-Miranda silence was proof that his claim of
innocence at trial was contrived. 184 Since the context of the case
177. Id. at 759.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Greer, 483 U.S. at 760-61.
182. Id. at 761 n.3.
183. Id. at 764-65.
184. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 614 n.5 (1976).
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presented the Court with afait accompli concerning the unfair use of
the defendant's silence, there was no reason for Doyle to have paid
attention to the difference between the effect of a prosecutor's merely
asking the forbidden question and the defendant's answering it. So,
the way that the Doyle opinion phrased its rule allowed the majority
in Greer to find room to make it conditional.
The quotes from Doyle that Greer excerpted to illustrate its rule
gave it room to maneuver:
[T]he holding of Doyle is that the Due Process Clause bars "the
use for impeachment purposes" of a defendant's post-arrest
silence. The Court noted that "'it does not comport with due
process to permit the prosecution during trial to call attention to
[the defendant's] silence."'1 85
The choice to make Doyle a conditional rule may have been a
result of the majority's reluctance to face head-on the proper
application of the harmless error doctrine to Doyle violations. More
than one circuit had taken the position that "Doyle violations are
rarely harmless," 186 and there was an as yet unsettled question of
whether the standard for harmless error should be the same in a
habeas corpus case, as this one was, as on direct review. Because the
defendant in Greer never answered the prosecutor's question, the
Court held, there was no Doyle violation in the first place and thus no
need to address the question of what harmless error standard should
apply.
187
Four Justices disagreed with the majority's decision to make Doyle
a conditional rule. 188 Justice Stevens "agree[d] with the 10 Illinois
judges and 12 federal judges who have concluded that the rule of the
Doyle case was violated when the prosecutor called the jury's
185. Greer, 483 U.S. at 763-64 (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619) (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 772 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 364 (4th Cir.
1980)).
187. Seeid. at765.
188. Id. at 769 (Stevens, J., concurring) (agreeing with majority's outcome but disagreeing on the
standard to be applied on direct appeal); id at 760-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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attention to respondent's silence."' 89  Although he affirmed the
conviction on the ground that the error was harmless, Justice Stevens
felt the majority's approach robbed the Doyle rule of clarity.' 90
Justices William J. Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, and Harold A.
Blackmun criticized the majority for eschewing a harmless error
approach that would have been more nuanced than the blunt
conditional rule that the Court adopted.' 9' A harmless error analysis
could not only take into account the fact that the prosecutor's
question went unanswered (the major factor relevant to the majority's
conditional rule), 192 but also the other events at trial that might have
led the jury to weigh the defendant's silence after arrest despite the
lack of explicit testimony on the point. 1
93
3. The Fourth Amendment and the Definition of a Seizure
If there is any provision in the Constitution where both the
historical understanding and the contemporary application depend on
government officials' being subject to clear rules which tell them in
advance of their exercise of power whether they can act or not, the
189. Id. at 767.
190. Greer, 483 U.S. at 763-64 ("But if there is to be a rule that prohibits a prosecutor's use of a
defendant's post-Miranda silence, it should be a clearly defined rule.").
191. Id. at 769-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. The majority also relied on the fact that the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard any
question to which an objection had been sustained. See id. at 764.
193. For example, the context in which the prosecutor's question came, the weight of the evidence,
and the importance of the defendant's credibility all played a factor in the lower court's conclusion that
the error in Greer was not harmless. Miller v. Greer, 789 F.2d 438, 445-47 (7th Cir. 1986) (en banc).
The majority was not completely blind to the inherent unfairness of allowing the prosecutor to
suggest by his question that the defendant should not be believed, because he did not tell his story to the
police. In a separate part of the opinion, they considered whether prosecutorial misconduct 'so
infec[ted] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process."' Greer,
483 U.S. at 765 n.7. But what was it that the prosecutor did that would even require the Court to
evaluate its impact in the context of the entire trial? It must be, though the Court never specifically says,
the possibility that the jury would infer as true the suggestion contained in the question posed by the
prosecutor about the defendant's silence. And what, one might ask, was that implicit suggestion? It must
have been the inference that the defendant remained silent after receiving a Miranda warning. But that is
precisely the factual assertion that Doyle itself prevents the prosecutor from making a part of the
evidence. True, it does more damage when the defendant admits the assertion than when the prosecutor
suggests it in a question. But it is hard to see why this difference justifies applying two different rules to
what is essentially the same problem. Nevertheless, by subsuming this analysis under the rubric of the
test applicable to prosecutorial misconduct, the majority was able to subject it to a less demanding
standard than the one that was in place at the time for harmless error. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 n.7.
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Fourth Amendment would be at the top of almost every list. Much of
the Court's recent Fourth Amendment analysis is driven by its desire
to make things simple for the police officers who have to translate
their legal doctrine into action out on the street. 194 Yet in one
important area, the Court has constructed a Fourth Amendment
conditional rule that makes the legitimacy of what a police officer
does dependent on how the target of his actions responds.
Boiled down to its essence, all Fourth Amendment issues relevant
to the cop on the beat depend on a preliminary question that defines
the relevant scope of action that the Amendment controls. Is she
doing something that the Amendment addresses? The Fourth
Amendment regulates only searches and seizures. 195 If a police
officer contemplates doing something that fits neither category, like
shining a flashlight into a car parked on a public street or following
someone walking through a public park, then that is the end of the
matter. 196 It is only if the conduct fits into one of these two categories
that the officer has to apply the myriad rules the Court has crafted to
fit the Amendment's standard of reasonableness to the vast array of
modem day contexts in which we expect our police to act.
The most common area where police action implicates the Fourth
Amendment is in one of the two varieties of seizures that infringe on
an individual's liberty interest. Ever since the Court broke the mold
of a unitary Fourth Amendment in Terry v. Ohio, police and courts
classify seizures, depending on how intrusive they are, into either
Terry stops or full-scale arrests.' 97 In order to make the sort of brief
stop of a suspect that Terry allows to conduct a threshold inquiry, an
194. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) ("[The protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments 'can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules which, in most instances,
makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is
justified in the interest of law enforcement."'); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)
("A single, familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.").
195. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
196. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927);
United States v. Feliz, No. 08-CR-133 (DLI), 2009 WL 3069742, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2009).
197. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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officer needs some reasonable suspicion that the person is, has been,
or will be engaged in a crime.
198
Reasonable suspicion, the Court has held many times, is
determined ex ante.199 It depends not on what the true state of affairs
turns out to be after the fact, but on how things appear to the officer
at the time she exercises her power. Otherwise, the Fourth
Amendment cannot serve as a guide to the officer's behavior.
One would think that the same logic must apply to the question of
defining a seizure. If an officer cannot tell in advance if she proposes
to engage in activity regulated by the Fourth Amendment, how can
she know if what she plans to do crosses the line? This was
essentially the question the Court confronted in California v. Hodari
D 20
0
The officers whose actions precipitated the Court's encounter came
across Hodari Dulin in an alley where he and a number of other
young men were huddled around a car.20 1 The boys scattered when
they saw the officers and, predictably, the police gave chase. In the
course of the pursuit, one of the officers saw Dulin throw down a
small rock of what he later learned was crack cocaine.20 2 In the
juvenile court proceeding, Dulin sought to suppress the use of the
drugs as evidence on the ground that he had been seized without
justification at the initiation of the chase and the discovery of the
cocaine was a "fruit of the poisonous tree." 203 Since the State
conceded that up until the time Dulin dropped the drugs the officer
did not have reasonable suspicion that Dulin was engaged in any
criminal activity,20 4 the legality of the officer's discovery of the drugs
depended on whether Dulin had been seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes when he saw the officer begin the chase.
20 5
198. Id. at 22.
199. Id.
200. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
201. Id. at622.
202. Id. at 622-23.
203. Id. at 623.
204. Id. at 623 n.1.
205. Id. at 623.
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 467 2009-2010
) I I L   I I L  467 
i r   l  i    rs n  , 
 l   in a crime. 198 
a le ,  t   
i ed  . 99  s t  t    
 t t r    r  i er 
r ises  i ,  
t t    's  
l        f 
.   r t    s 
e  it    t  t,   
      
  t  lif rnia  ri 
D?OO 
  t  '  ter  
   r   
   1 t r   
 l ,    
      
   20    
  ,   
  
i     
 it .,,203   
  r 
i   
 tivity,204 '     
 t 
 sa  the officer begin the chase.205 
[d.  
[d. 
  i , 1). 
 l  !d.   
!d.  
[d.  
[d. l  
[d.  
51
Rossman: Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure:  Alice in Wonderland Mee
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In doctrinal terms, the resolution of Hodari D. depended on
whether the Court would continue to adhere to its most widely
accepted modem day formulation of what constituted a seizure or
would revert to the historical common law understanding. The
prevailing contemporary test for defining a seizure under
circumstances like Dulin's was an objective one: "a person has been
'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in
view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable
person would have believed that he was not free to leave." 20 6 No one
on the Court disputed that the officer's action, chasing Dulin,
implicitly communicated that the State intended to interfere with his
freedom to run down that alley.20 7
The common law definition of a seizure came exclusively from the
tort law of trespass. It required that either the police must touch their
suspect physically or the suspect must submit in some way to a show
of force.20 8 Since Dulin was not touched and certainly did not submit,
he would have been unable to successfully establish the elements of
trespass, as the doctrine was known in the Eighteenth century.
Underlying the choice between these two approaches were the
different views the Justices had on the practical consequence of the
rule that would emerge. The historical account leads to a conditional
rule that gives police officers much more freedom in using a display
of authority to get people's cooperation, even if those people are
viewed by the police as targets for whom they lack objective indicia
of criminality. Justice Antonin Scalia, who wrote the majority
opinion in Hodari D., clearly belongs in this camp:
We do not think it desirable, even as a policy matter, to stretch
the Fourth Amendment beyond its words and beyond the
meaning of arrest .... Street pursuits always place the public at
some risk, and compliance with police orders to stop should
therefore be encouraged. Only a few of those orders, we must
206. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627-28 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
207. Id. at 625.
208. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553 ("[A] person is 'seized' only when, by means of physical force
or show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.").
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presume, will be without adequate basis, and since the addressee
has no ready means of identifying the deficient ones it almost
invariably is the responsible course to comply. Unlawful orders
will not be deterred, moreover, by sanctioning through the
exclusionary rule those of them that are not obeyed. Since
policemen do not command "Stop!" expecting to be ignored, or
give chase hoping to be outrun, it fully suffices to apply the
deterrent to their genuine, successful seizures. 20
9
The two dissenters, Justices Stevens and Marshall, thought that the
construction of a conditional rule to govern when police officers
could attempt to interfere with a person's liberty "profoundly
unwise." 210 Without a rule that allowed a police officer to know in
advance whether his course of action was consistent with the
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment, they argued, not only creates
uncertainty but also provides police with a perverse incentive. Since
merely directing a menacing show of force at an individual is, under
the majority's view, not governed by the Fourth Amendment, police
officers would be free to threaten to interfere with someone whom
they could not lawfully stop and hope that the suspect's reaction gave
them the reasonable suspicion that they otherwise lacked. 211 "In an
airport setting," Justice Stevens posed, "may a drug enforcement
agent now approach a group of passengers with his gun drawn,
announce a 'baggage search,' and rely on the passengers' reactions to
justify his investigative stops? 212
4. The Confrontation Clause and the Admissibility of a
Codefendant's Confession
In Bruton v. United States, the Court held that the Confrontation
Clause prohibits a prosecutor from introducing as evidence at a joint
trial the confession of one of the group charged with the crime if it
209. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 627.
210. Id. at 630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at643-44.
212. Id. at 645. E.g., United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that merely
pointing a gun at a suspect does not constitute a seizure).
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 469 2009-2010
) L   
, ill  it t   
 
 
ill   ,  
r   
 !"  
 
 h .. ul' 209  to t elr genume, success seIzures. 
469 
  ,  ,  
tr ti n   iti l   i  rs 
 r   '  t  dly 
ise.,,210      
      
r tri ti   t  t  ,      
t i t   s   .  
l  i ti   i   i l  
t  j rit '  i , t   t  t    
rs      e  
 l   l      '    
t  t  l    ise 11   
t ," i    ay  t 
t        
 age rch,'    gers'   
if  i  i esti ative stopS?,,212 
. t tion    
nt's  
I  r t  . it  t t , t  rt l  t t t  tation 
l  i it   cutor  i g i ence  t 
t i l t  i n      r ed      
. ri,  .s. t . 
210. Id. at  ( te e s, 1., iss ti ). 
. . t . 
212. I . at . . ., it  t t s . at r an,  .   (  ir. ) l i   l  
i ti    t  ct  t stit t   i . 
53
Rossman: Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure:  Alice in Wonderland Mee
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
incriminates a codefendant, even if the jury receives an instruction
directing them to consider it only against the person who made it.
213
The problem such a situation creates for the values the Confrontation
Clause protects stems from the Court's assumption about the utility
of a limiting instruction in this circumstance. The chance that the jury
would use the confession against both the person who made it and the
person whom it mentions is overwhelming. 214 Once that barrier is
breached, the confession becomes part of the evidence against the
nonconfessing codefendant, and its admission without the ability to
cross-examine its maker violates the Confrontation Clause's core
guarantee.215
On its face then, Bruton presents a straightforward nonconditional
rule. But two years later, in Nelson v. O'Neil, the Court found a way
to make it less clear. The trial in Nelson involved two codefendants,
O'Neil and Runnels. Runnels confessed and implicated O'Neil.216
The prosecutor put three witnesses on the stand: a police officer who
testified to the circumstances of the arrest; the victim of the crime,
who identified both men; and the police office to whom Runnels
made his confession. The judge instructed the jury that they were to
use the confession as evidence only against Runnels, not O'Neil.217
The trial took place before Bruton was decided, so neither the
prosecutor nor the judge would have had a reason to believe that this
limiting instruction did not eliminate the Confrontation Clause
problem inherent in the prosecutor's use of the confession. Bruton,
however, had been given retroactive effect in Roberts v. Russell, so
213. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
214. See id. at 135-36 ("[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical
and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here, where the
powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a co-defendant, who stands accused side-by-side
with the defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incriminations
devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect .... ).
215. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 116-17 (1999) (stating that admission of nontestifying co-
defendant's confession violates the Confrontation Clause despite state's hearsay exception for
declarations against penal interest).
216. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
217. Id. at 624.
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O'Neil was able to raise his Confrontation Clause claim in a habeas
corpus petition. 218
Nelson, however, presented the Court with a development at trial
that Bruton did not. As part of the defense case, each defendant took
the stand. O'Neil testified to an alibi. Runnels not only corroborated
the alibi, contradicting the account in the police officer's testimony
about the confession, but he denied making the confession at all.
O'Neil's defense counsel had an opportunity to cross-examine
Runnels, but chose to forego the chance. 219 Since the principal vice
the Court saw in the Bruton situation was the admission of an
inculpatory statement by an out-of-court declarant who was
"unavailable at the trial for 'full and effective' cross-examination, ' '22°
the mere prospect of putting questions to Runnels that O'Neil had
when his codefendant took the stand was enough to take this case out
of the ambit of Bruton.
22 1
What makes Nelson significant for the purpose of bringing it into
the lineup of conditional rule cases is the way the Court described the
consequence of Runnels's availability for cross-examination. The
Court announced as the reason for ruling against O'Neil: "there was
no violation of the Constitution in this case." 222 The simplest
meaning of this way of describing O'Neil's claim is to see Bruton as
a conditional rule. With the benefit of hindsight, knowing that O'Neil
had a chance to cross-examine the person who made the confession,
the Court treated this situation like a prosecutor's asking a question
about a defendant's assertion of Miranda rights, or a judge's ordering
a defendant to appear before the jury in prison clothes, or a police
officer's drawing a gun and ordering someone to halt. In all of these
218. Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968).
219. Nelson, 402 U.S. at 624.
220. Id. at 627.
221. Id. at 627-29. The majority assumed that had Runnels taken the stand and affirmed his
confession, there would have been no Confrontation Clause problem. Had Runnels done so, the Court
reasoned, O'Neil would have been in a worse position than if Runnels had denied making the
confession. Given that the former situation would not have violated the Confrontation Clause, it was
easy for the Court to conclude that neither did the latter.
222. Id. at 626.
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situations, something that happened in the future determined if the
Constitution had been violated or not.
If the Court had meant to convey that Bruton was not a conditional
rule, it could easily have adopted either of the two lines of reasoning
that the government put forward on the merits in the Ninth Circuit to
argue against O'Neil's Confrontation Clause claim. The first of these
arguments was that the opportunity to cross-examine Runnels
"cured" the Bruton error. 223 Going to a doctor who cures a disease is
quite different than going to one who tells you that you are perfectly
healthy. If the Court had used "cure" language, the rule would not
have been conditional. But it did not.
The Supreme Court was certainly familiar with the concept of
curing an error. The Court had used the metaphor in considering
whether a prosecutor's correction of her own improper remarks cured
the error of her presentation before the jury,2 24 a judge's instruction
cured the error of a prosecutor mentioning testimony in the
Government's opening statement that was not forthcoming in the
case in chief,225 and whether a defense attorney's use of a peremptory
challenge cured a judge's error in allowing a juror to sit who was not
226qualified. But there isn't any hint in Nelson that this is what the
Court was doing. The majority's opinion eschewed any suggestion
that what Runnels did cured a preexisting violation of the
Confrontation Clause. It simply made the post hoc announcement that
there was no violation at all.
227
The other argument the Court could have adopted in Nelson was
that the Bruton error was harmless.228 But as with the possibility of
223. O'Neil v. Nelson, 422 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1970).
224. See Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486,498 (1897).
225. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 734-35 (1969) (considering and rejecting argument that
instruction could not cure the error, by holding that there was no error at all given the context of the
remark in the overall evaluation of the fairness of the trial); Dunlop, 165 U.S. at 498 (trial judge's ruling
holding prosecutor's remarks improper in connection with prosecutor's withdrawing them will generally
cure the error).
226. See United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 304 (2000); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
81, 88 (1988) ("Petitioner was undoubtedly required to exercise a peremptory challenge to cure the trial
court's error.").
227. Nelson, 402 U.S. at 626.
228. See O'Neil, 422 F.2d at 322.
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framing what had happened as a cure, the Court rejected this way of
describing O'Neil's claim.229 Rather than conceding there was an
error, the Court concluded that an assessment of what the
Confrontation Clause requires extends beyond the close of the
prosecutor's case, making it a conditional rule:
We conclude that where a codefendant takes the stand in his own
defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court statement
implicating the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to
the defendant concerning the underlying facts, the defendant has
been denied no rights protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 2
30
Courts and commentators have, by and large, overlooked the
conditional nature of the rule in Nelson. This absence is hardly
surprising in reported decisions, given that the vast majority of them
come from judges reviewing convictions after the fact, when a court
already knows if the person who made the confession testified or not.
From that vantage point, nothing turns on whether one describes the
rule as conditional, though some courts still persist in labeling what
happened a "cure" of a prior Confrontation Clause violation,23' rather
than saying, as did the Supreme Court, that the defendant's rights
were not violated at all. On occasion, though, one can find a trial
court opinion that takes advantage of the conditional nature of
Nelson. Where a defendant moves on Bruton grounds to sever a
pending trial from that of a codefendant who has confessed,232 and
where the trial judge is reasonably certain that the codefendant will
take the stand, Nelson has been used as authority for denying
229. Nelson, 402 U.S. at 626.
230. Id. at 629-30.
231. See, e.g., Moore v. Casperson, 345 F.3d 474,489 (7th Cir. 2003).
232. In many jurisdictions, if the prosecution plans to introduce a confession by one of several co-
defendants, and the prosecution cannot redact it to eliminate any reference to the others who will be
subject to the joint trial, a motion to sever must be granted. See, e.g., United States v. Cleveland, 590
F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Truslow, 530 F.2d 257, 262 n.3 (4th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129, 1133 (5th Cir. 1973); Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17, 19 (5th
Cir. 1955); Smith v. United States, 312 A.2d 781, 788 (D.C. 1973); People v. Aranda, 407 P.2d 265,
272-73 (Cal. 1965); State v. Rosen, 86 N.E.2d 24, 26 (Ohio 1949).
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severance on the ground that in the end there will be no
Confrontation Clause violation. 233 If Nelson were not in a conditional
format, one can hardly imagine a trial judge's allowing the prosecutor
to use the codefendant's confession as part of the state's case in chief.
It would be akin to denying a meritorious motion to suppress a
confession on the ground that the defendant indicated he would plead
guilty if he lost, raising the prospect that the issue of the confession
would be moot.
234
The scarcity of cases where a trial judge allows a prosecutor to use
a codefendant's unredacted confession is a reflection of the unusual
nature of Nelson's conditional rule. Unlike the others that resemble
liability rules, the future action that determines the constitutionality
of admitting an unredacted codefendant's confession is dependent on
the decision of a third party, not the person whose rights are at issue.
Moreover, the third party's behavior comes, if at all, at some point in
time far removed from the action of the government that placed the
defendant's rights in jeopardy. Even more significantly, the remedy
for a violation of the rule is relatively severe. In the prison clothes
context, if the defendant objects to the way he or she is dressed, it
simply means that someone has to bring in something else to wear. If
a prosecutor asks a question implicating Doyle, an objection to the
question simply leads to the judge instructing the witness not to
answer and telling the jury to draw no inference from the question.
And when a suspect submits to an official show of force for which
there is no justification, the police are put in no worse a situation in
terms of discovering evidence of a crime than they would have been
233. See, e.g., United States v. Chapman, 501 F. Supp. 704, 705 (S.D. Ohio 1980) ("As to prejudice to
the defendant from statements by and a document admitted against his co-defendant, the circumstances
at this time do not indicate that defendant will suffer any prejudice thereby. Co-defendant's counsel has
indicated that his client will take the stand in his own defense. Consequently, defendant will be able to
cross-examine him thoroughly as to any incriminating statements he may make regarding defendant.");
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1048 (D. Md. 1976) ("The main difficulty with defendants'
contentions based on Bruton is that there is no present reason to believe that any defendant in this case
will not testify. Under such circumstances, it is clear that the Bruton rule is not applicable.").
234. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796 (1970) (holding that defendant may not attack
voluntary nature of guilty plea on ground that confession was coerced).
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in had they done nothing.235 In a situation raising a Bruton issue,
however, if the codefendant who made the confession does not
eventually take the stand, then the judge must almost always declare
a mistrial.
The awkward nature of prospectively applying a conditional rule
where the consequence of being wrong is so great has the practical
effect of influencing those who must abide by the rule to treat it as if
it were unconditional.236 Indeed, the Supreme Court is not unmindful
of the awkwardness of a conditional rule in protecting a defendant's
Confrontation Clause rights. In a case applying Bruton to the problem
of redacted confessions, Richardson v. Marsh, the Court explicitly
rejected a conditional rule because it was unworkable.237
Richardson addressed the question of whether Bruton would bar a
codefendant's confession that had been redacted to eliminate any
reference to the defendant, in circumstances where other evidence
made clear that the confession inculpated the defendant. 238 The case
involved a joint trial of two codefendants, Marsh and Williams. As
235. It is true that if a police officer makes a stop without proper justification, he or she is liable for
damages in a civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). But in practical terms, if the suspect was
released immediately there is very little likelihood of a successful lawsuit, in large part because the
damages would be nominal. See David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity:
Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 354-55 (2001) ("In
cases in which no contraband is found, and a strong legal claim for damages can be stated, the damages
may be too modest to justify full-scale litigation. Absent particularly harsh or malicious conduct, the
damages that flow from a relatively short stop and incidental frisk or search, may appear to be nominal
to some juries. As a result, such cases are not likely to attract competent counsel. Moreover, many civil
rights plaintiffs are burdened by racial and class characteristics that may prejudice juries against them.
Jurors tend to dismiss their allegations, often awarding them less than a full measure of compensation.").
236. A jurisdiction's rules on severance typically direct judges to avoid Bruton problems in advance.
See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 2.3 (Proposed Rev. 1968) which provides: "(a)
When a defendant moves for a severance because an out-of-court statement of a co-defendant makes
reference to him but is not admissible against him, the court should determine whether the prosecution
intends to offer the statement in evidence at the trial. If so, the court should require the prosecuting
attorney to elect one of the following courses: (i) a joint trial at which the statement is not admitted into
evidence; (ii) a joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evidence only after all references to the
moving defendant have been deleted, provided that, as deleted, the confession will not prejudice the
moving defendant; or (iii) severance of the moving defendant."
Rule 14(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also provides a mechanism for ajudge to
alleviate Bruton problems in advance, by providing that "[b]efore ruling on a defendant's motion to
sever, the court may order an attorney for the government to deliver to the court for in camera inspection
any defendant's statement that the government intends to use as evidence." FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(b).
237. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987).
238. Id. at 202.
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part of the State's case charging them in a robbery murder scheme,
the prosecution introduced Williams's confession into evidence. The
confession described how Williams and someone named Martin
drove to the robbery scene, discussing what would happen along the
way.239 According to the confession, Martin said that he would have
to kill the victims after the robbery. 240 The confession neither
mentioned Marsh nor suggested the participation of a third person in
the crime. 24 1 The judge instructed the jury to consider the confession
as evidence only against Williams not Marsh.242 Williams did not
testify.
243
What created the problem for Marsh was the other evidence in the
case. The only surviving victim testified that Marsh arrived at the
scene together with Williams and Martin and helped them commit the
robbery, leading to an inference that she must have been in the car
and overheard her two cohorts plan the crime while they were all
driving to the scene.244 Marsh's own testimony provided another link.
While she testified that her presence at the scene was as an unwitting
dupe, she also admitted that she had traveled to the scene of the
robbery in the car with Martin and Williams, albeit for an innocent
245purpose.24 She told the jury she knew they were discussing
something, but that she sat in the back seat and could not hear the
conversation. 2 46 But of course, the jury was not bound to accept all of
what she said. They could, and evidently did, believe she was in the
car and disbelieve her denying knowing about the plan.
The question that split the majority and the dissent in Richardson
was whether to apply Bruton by considering only the confession on
its face, or to evaluate it in the context of all of the evidence to
determine if it incriminated the defendant. 247 One of the factors that
239. Id. at 203-04.
240. Id. at 203 n. 1.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 204.
243. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 204.
244. Id. at 215 n.3.
245. Id at 204.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 213.
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played into this decision was the practical effect of each position.
How would the trial judge apply a rule making the admissibility of
the codefendant's confession turn on how the rest of the evidence
came out?
Justice Stevens, in dissent, proposed a conditional rule:
In most [of these kinds of] cases the trial judge can comply with
the dictates of Bruton by postponing his or her decision on the
admissibility of the confession until the prosecution rests, at
which time its potentially inculpatory effect can be evaluated in
the light of the government's entire case. 248
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, pounced on the problems
that this proposal, as all conditional rules, would entail:
Even more significantly, evidence requiring linkage differs from
evidence incriminating on its face in the practical effects which
application of the Bruton exception would produce. If limited to
facially incriminating confessions, Bruton can be complied with
by redaction-a possibility suggested in that opinion itself. If
extended to confessions incriminating by connection, not only is
that not possible, but it is not even possible to predict the
admissibility of a confession in advance of trial. The "contextual
implication" doctrine .. .would presumably require the trial
judge to assess at the end of each trial whether, in light of all of
the evidence, a nontestifying codefendant's confession has been
so "powerfully incriminating" that a new, separate trial is
required for the defendant. This obviously lends itself to
manipulation by the defense-and even without manipulation
will result in numerous mistrials and appeals. It might be
248. Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent never mentioned what would happen if the judge
determined that the rest of the evidence, as in Richardson itself, linked the defendant to the confession.
Presumably, though, the judge would have to declare a mistrial. Justice Stevens did make suggestions
about how to avoid the problem in the first place, by "granting immunity, making plea bargains, or
simply waiting until after a confessing defendant has been tried separately." Id. at 219 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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suggested that those consequences could be reduced by
conducting a pretrial hearing at which prosecution and defense
would reveal the evidence they plan to introduce, enabling the
court to assess compliance with Bruton ex ante rather than ex
post. If this approach is even feasible under the Federal Rules
(which is doubtful-see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 14), it would be
time consuming and obviously far from foolproof.
249
Neither opinion in Richardson mentions Nelson, much less implies
that the Bruton doctrine was already a conditional rule.
D. Aggregation
The third way that the Supreme Court has made constitutional
rules conditional is to aggregate the time frame in which to make a
judgment about the legitimacy of an actor's behavior. As with the
other forms of conditional rules, in order to determine if the action at
issue is constitutional, one must take into account a future event. But
with aggregation, the future event is one taken by the same actor who
was responsible for the original action, or by someone exercising
government power toward the same end.25° In generic form, such a
rule has the following form:
(i) If a government official does X at time 1, then it violates the
Constitution for the government to do Y at time 2.
(ii) X and Y both must occur to violate the rule.
For the appropriate sports analogy, one must turn to football. In
order to make a judgment about whether an ineligible receiver has
gone downfield on a pass play, the referee cannot simply determine
how far an interior lineman has moved past the line of scrimmage as
the quarterback goes back to pass. One must wait until the
249. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208-09 (Scalia, J., majority opinion).
250. Thus, a rule made conditional by aggregation differs from a liability rule in that in the latter, the
future action is taken by the person who is the beneficiary of the rule and in the former by the person
whose power the rule restricts.
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quarterback actually throws the ball while an ineligible receiver is in
a prohibited position before one can determine that a foul has
occurred.25'
At a trivial level, something like this analysis operates whenever a
judge makes an order for something to happen which will violate the
constitutional rights of the defendant. If the order is never executed,
the mere announcement will not violate the Constitution, absent some
extraordinary circumstance by which the words alone have an effect
on the process. It is on this basis, for example, that the result the
Court reached in Gaines v. Washington makes sense.252 The
defendant in Gaines claimed that he was denied his right to a public
trial by virtue of the trial judge's order closing the courtroom.253 The
record, however, disclosed that either the judge changed his mind or
the bailiffs simply ignored him. Because nothing ever happened as a
result of the judge's original order, the Court refused to find any rule
violation.
254
It is easy to see why aggregation is necessary in a Gaines situation.
Since the judge's order was never implemented, his words were no
more damaging to the defendant than the private thought that
immediately preceded them. Even where this is not the case,
however, aggregation is sometimes necessary because the words that
the defendant objects to are but a small part of a continuous course of
action whose impact depends on the overall effect. This is what
occurs when one must decide if a judge or prosecutor has deprived
the defendant of a constitutional right by a single comment that
comes in the course of a relatively lengthy presentation. An isolated
slip of the tongue that is immediately corrected, for example, would
not violate any constitutional rule. 2
55
251. N.C.A.A. Football Rules and Interpretations Rule 7.3, Art. 10 (2007).
252. Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928).
253. Id. at 84.
254. Id. at 86.
255. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cotto, 870 N.E.2d 109, 115 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (finding that trial
court's erroneous statement to jury that defendant had burden of proof with respect to element of the
crime was not a violation of defendant's rights as it was a "single, isolated slip of the tongue, which the
judge quickly corrected").
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When judges instruct juries on the law they must apply in deciding
a defendant's guilt, they often allude to a particular legal doctrine a
number of times, using different vantage points to illuminate related
aspects of interlocking concepts. For example, a judge may tell the
jury about the doctrine of the presumption of innocence, the
prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and how to
evaluate the truthfulness of witnesses' testimony. An isolated
statement to the effect that "every witness is presumed to speak the
truth," appears problematic in a case where all of the witnesses
appeared for the prosecution, as occurred in Cupp v. Naughten.25 6 In
considering, however, whether this statement so undermined the
presumption of innocence that it deprived the defendant of due
process, the Court applied an aggregation technique that made
evaluating the constitutional rule conditional:
In determining the effect of this instruction.., we accept at the
outset the well-established proposition that a single instruction to
a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be
viewed in the context of the overall charge. While this does not
mean that an instruction by itself may never rise to the level of
constitutional error, it does recognize that a judgment of
conviction is commonly the culmination of a trial which includes
testimony of witnesses, argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits
in evidence, and instruction of the jury by the judge. Thus not
only is the challenged instruction but one of many such
instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of
several components of the trial which may result in the judgment
of conviction.
257
256. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,142 (1973).
257. Id. at 146-47 (citations omitted). See also Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (no
due process violation where judge gave one erroneous instruction on the elements of the crime and at
least three correct instructions on the same issue, "not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a
jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation"); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380
(1990) (stating that where the defendant claims that a judge's instruction is ambiguous and therefore
subject to an erroneous interpretation, "the proper inquiry ... is whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in [an improper] way.").
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The same holds true when considering whether a single part of a
prosecutor's closing statement to a jury violates due process. 258
In the situations discussed below, however, the appeal of
aggregation is less obvious. The time frame within which events are
aggregated is much lengthier, and the effect of freeing the earlier
action from the direct application of the Constitution is more drastic.
1. The Sixth Amendment Right to the Appointment of Counsel for
Indigent Defendants Accused of Misdemeanors
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided one of the iconic cases in
constitutional criminal procedure, Gideon v. Wainwright.259 Gideon
held that the state of Florida violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to appoint a lawyer for an
indigent defendant charged with a felony.260 The case arose in the
heyday of due process incorporation, when the Warren Court picked
its way one by one through the specific provisions of the Bill of
Rights and decided whether or not they applied to the states in more
or less the same format as they did to the federal government. As did
almost every other incorporation case, Gideon held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel provision was the constitutional rule that
governed the appointment of counsel in state courts, rather than a
more general and less generous due process balancing test. Justice
Black wrote for the Court: "[R]eason and reflection require us to
recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person
hauled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."261 Finding the right to
counsel "fundamental and essential to a fair trial, 262 the Court held
that this part of the Sixth Amendment was applicable to the states.
258. See Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974) ("[Tlhe prosecutor's remark here,
admittedly an ambiguous one, was but one moment in an extended trial and was followed by specific
disapproving instructions. Although the process of constitutional line drawing in this regard is
necessarily imprecise, we simply do not believe that this incident made respondent's trial so
fundamentally unfair as to deny him due process.").
259. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
260. Id at 339.
261. Jd. at 344.
262. Id. at 342.
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On its face, however, the right to counsel clause does not explicitly
address the question that Gideon raised. "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." 263 There is no reference to the right to have
the state appoint you a lawyer if you are too poor to hire one on your
own. And, the historical context against which the provision was
included in the Bill of Rights presented a quite different issue-the
practice of English courts denying all felony defendants the right to
be represented by any attorney whatsoever. Nevertheless, Gideon did
not have to craft its own answer to what the right to counsel provision
of the Sixth Amendment meant for criminal courts confronted by an
indigent defendant.
In 1938, the Court had decided one of the few right to counsel
cases that came to its docket from the federal process, Johnson v.
Zerbst.264 Johnson was a habeas corpus petition challenging a federal
conviction on the ground that having been denied an appointed
lawyer and being unable to afford one on his own, the defendant was
being held in custody in violation of his right under the Sixth
Amendment. The Court viewed the right to counsel as a cornerstone
of the integrity of the entire criminal process-one of the "essential
barriers against arbitrary or unjust deprivation of human rights." 265
Relying on Powell v. Alabama for the proposition that without a
lawyer, the right to a hearing is essentially meaningless for even an
intelligent and sophisticated lay defendant, the Court held that "[t]he
Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal
proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life
or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of counsel. 266
Counsel was so fundamentally important a feature that without it, the
Court, "kiss[ed] the jurisdictional book" and made the claim
cognizable in habeas corpus.267
263. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
264. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
265. Id. at 462.
266. Id. at 463.
267. The reference is to the phrase coined by Judge Friendly. See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142, 151 (1970-1971).
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By incorporating the right to counsel clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment, Gideon established a relatively straightforward non-
conditional rule. But the state criminal court systems dwarfed their
federal counterparts, and the practical problem of providing attorneys
for the millions of state defendants led to efforts to restrict the scope
of Gideon's mandate. The obvious path to take for states that could
not, or did not want to, appoint attorneys in every case was to confine
Gideon only to felony cases. One could defend this line on more than
pragmatic grounds. Gideon itself was a felony case, and the Court's
language about the need for a lawyer to make the process fair
arguably was less relevant to the often simple and relatively brief
proceedings that resolved most misdemeanors. Moreover, there was a
constitutional provision, the right to a jury, which incorporated a
distinction that very closely tracked the felony-misdemeanor line.
Defendants in petty cases, generally those subject to a maximum
sentence of less than six months, were not entitled to a jury.268 If
defendants in less serious cases could be tried without a jury, why not
without a lawyer?
This led to the two cases in which the Court defined the limit of the
Gideon principle, Argersinger v. Hamlin,269 which came first, and
Scott v. Illinois. 27 Argersinger and Scott both involved misdemeanor
convictions of indigent defendants who had been denied an appointed
lawyer. They differed, however, in one fundamental respect.
Argersinger was sentenced to a short jail term,271 and Scott received
only a fine.272 The rule that emerged from the two was classically
conditional. An indigent misdemeanor defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to appointed counsel is violated if, and only if, at the end of the
process he receives a sentence of imprisonment.273 Thus, in
268. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968).
269. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
270. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
271. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 26.
272. Scott, 440 U.S. at 368.
273. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40 (holding that in misdemeanor cases "that end up in the actual
deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of 'the guiding hand of counsel' so
necessary when one's liberty is in jeopardy"); Scott, 440 U.S. at 374 (holding "that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal
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Argersinger, where the defendant went to jail, the Court held that his
sentence, not his conviction, violated the Constitution.274 And in
Scott, where jail was not an issue, the conviction was
unexceptional.275
One might think that these two cases are not really right to counsel
cases at all, but simply regulate a judge's sentencing authority. One
could reformulate the rule that emerged from Scott as a non-
conditional one, telling judges they may not sentence an indigent
defendant to incarceration in a misdemeanor case if the defendant
was not afforded the right to appointed counsel. But that kind of a
rule would logically require a quite different remedy than the one that
the Court imposed in Argersinger. A sentencing rule would call for a
new sentencing procedure, not invalidating the underlying
conviction. Thus, the misdemeanor version of the right to counsel
rule is truly a conditional one: you cannot tell if the judge violated the
rule until after the sentence is imposed.
The problem this creates, of course, is that a judge has to make a
decision about whether to appoint counsel at the start of the process.
In order to implement the rule in its conditional format, a judge
would have to make a decision at arraignment whether to preserve
the option of incarceration for a misdemeanor defendant. The
information available at such an early stage of the process is almost
always far less meaningful to an intelligent sentencing decision than
after a full exposition of the facts. The end result may be that a judge
will be forced by circumstance to "abandon his responsibility to
consider the full range of punishments established by the
legislature." 2
76
It is clear from both opinions that resource concerns played a
major rule in the Court's decision not to extend Gideon to the
misdemeanor context. Argersinger noted that misdemeanor cases
outnumbered felonies by more than ten to one, and that did not even
defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to
assistance of appointed counsel").
274. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40.
275. Scott, 440 U.S. at 369.
276. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 53 (Powell, J., concurring).
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count the 40 to 50 million traffic cases each year.277 But there were a
number of ways to create a different rule for misdemeanors without
making it conditional. Various alternatives were proposed by one
Justice or another writing in the two cases when not in the majority.
Among them were proposals to draw the line at cases where there
was no statutorily authorized term of imprisonment possible,278 or
where the defendant was charged with a petty crime so that there
279would be no constitutional right to a jury.
Scott's conclusion to keep the conditional rule by construing
Argersinger's line as the limit of the right to counsel was, at bottom,
a pragmatic one. Perhaps the most telling part of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion was the one that asserted: "Argersinger has
proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would create
confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs
on 50 quite diverse States." 280 Keeping a conditional rule was, quite
simply, the cheapest alternative.
2. The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "no person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.', 281 From the time of its adoption, until the
28Supreme Court decided Chavez v. Martinez in 2003, 82 the rule was
almost universally considered to be non-conditional. It prohibited
using compulsion to obtain testimony that could be used to provide a
link to a chain of evidence that might incriminate the person from
whom the government sought the information. 283
277. See id. at 34 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 55 (1967)).
278. Scott, 440 U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 380 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
280. Id. at 373.
281. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
282. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
283. Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The [Self-Incrimination] Clause protects an individual from
being forced to give answers demanded by an official in any context when the answers might give rise to
criminal liability in the future.").
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Chavez reconfigured it. Now, when a government official like a
police officer questioning a suspect in custody, a judge presiding over
a grand jury, or counsel for a legislative committee questioning a
witness, threatens or applies compulsion to get an incriminating
answer, they have not violated the privilege against self-incrimination
at all. They have merely set in motion a potential violation, which
becomes complete only if, and when, the compelled testimony is
introduced as evidence against its author.
284
Chavez was a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking
damages for a violation of the plaintiffs right to substantive due
process and to the privilege against self-incrimination. 285 Martinez,
the plaintiff, was riding his bicycle by the scene of a narcotics
investigation when he was stopped and frisked by police officers. An
altercation broke out and Martinez was shot several times, his
wounds severe enough to leave him permanently blind and paralyzed
from the waist down. A patrol supervisor, Chavez, accompanied him
to the hospital, and it is the interrogation that took place while
Martinez was in the emergency room that gave rise to the civil rights
suit.28
6
The due process claim, based on the allegation that Chavez
intentionally inflicted mental anguish on the plaintiff by refusing to
cease his questioning while Martinez was in severe pain and believed
he was dying, was remanded to the lower courts.287 The self-
incrimination claim, however, did not fare as well because of the way
a majority of the Court recast the rule.288
Martinez was never charged with a crime, and so the statements he
made while Chavez interrogated him in the emergency room were
never used as evidence against him at a criminal trial. 289 That led the
Court to consider whether the rule implementing the privilege is a
conditional one. "Statements compelled by police interrogations of
284. Id. at 767.
285. Id. at 765.
286. Id. at 763--64.
287. Id. at 776.
288. See id. at 773.
289. Id. at 764.
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course may not be used against a defendant at trial," Justice Clarence
Thomas wrote in his plurality opinion, "but it is not until their use in
a criminal case that a violation of the Self-Incrimination Clause
occurs." 290  Since Martinez was never tried, he suffered no
infringement to his right under the privilege.
That makes the rule truly a conditional one. If a police officer
coerces a statement from a suspect, and like in Chavez, future events
do not unfold so that the statement is used as evidence against him,
then the officer has not violated the privilege. On the other hand, if
the statement is used at trial, then the logical implication of Chavez is
not only that the defendant has been deprived of his right under the
privilege, but also that the officer who coerced the statement has
violated the rule.
Had Chavez meant to convey the message that the privilege simply
does not restrict the actions of the person who compels the statement,
but only the people who offer and allow it into evidence, there would
have been no need for the opinions constituting the majority to focus
on the fact that Martinez had not yet been tried. They simply would
have pointed out that he picked the wrong defendant. But what the
Court focused on was not the irrelevance of the privilege for those
who compel suspects to talk, but the fact that the violation is not
complete until the statements are used at trial.291
Justice Thomas's plurality opinion relied primarily on a textual
analysis of the privilege to justify the conclusion that a courtroom use
of the suspect's statement was a necessary ingredient.292 Since the
language in the Fifth Amendment restricted the application of the
privilege to criminal cases ("No person.., shall be compelled in any
criminal case"),293 for Justice Thomas the way to begin was to see if
290. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767. This part of the plurality opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Justice Souter wrote his own concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Breyer, in which he viewed the "basic" right protected by the privilege against self-incrimination to be
the exclusion of the statement at trial, and the question presented by Chavez to be whether an
"extension" of the bare guarantee was necessary to protect it against "the invasive pressures of
contemporary society." Id. at 777-78.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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what happened to Martinez occurred in the context of a criminal case.
For this, he turned to the dictionary. According to the definition he
found there, criminal cases require some formal initiation of legal
proceedings, not just police questioning. 294  Textualism, then,
compelled the Court to construe the privilege as a conditional rule.
This textualist view of the privilege, relying in part on a dictionary
published in 1990, would have been strange, indeed, to lawyers
practicing at the time that the privilege was made a part of the
Constitution.295 An eighteenth century lawyer would not have
thought the privilege against self incrimination was needed in order
to protect defendants from being compelled to testify against
themselves in their own criminal cases. That really was not a problem
that could have been on anyone's mind for the simple reason that
defendants, as interested parties, were uniformly disqualified from
testifying at all.296 The only places where compelled testimony could
have been worrisome were precisely in those forums that were
outside the common understanding of a criminal case-for example,
as a witness before a grand jury or in a civil case.
Indeed, precisely the argument Justice Thomas made was rejected
by the Court in 1892, in Counselman v. Hitchcock.297  The
Government argued there that a grand jury witness could not rely on
the privilege because "[i]t is only 'in a criminal case' that a witness
can refuse to answer. An investigation before a grand jury is in no
sense 'a criminal case.' ' 298 Counselman's response to this claim
reaffirmed the non-conditional nature of the rule:
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provision
can only be, that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness
294. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 215 (6th ed. 1990)).
295. For a discussion of the relationship between textualism and originalism, see Aileen Kavanagh,
Original Intention, Enacted Text and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JuRIS. 255, 295-96 (2002);
Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 205-17
(1980).
296. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574 (1961) ("Disqualification for interest was thus
extensive in the common law when this Nation was formed. Here, as in England, criminal defendants
were deemed incompetent as witnesses.") (citations omitted).
297. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
298. Id. at 562.
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against himself in a criminal prosecution against himself. It
would doubtless cover such cases; but it is not limited to them.
The object was to insure that a person should not be compelled,
when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testimony
which might tend to show that he himself had committed a
crime. The privilege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as
broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard.
299
Now, none of the members of the majority opinion on the privilege
issue in Chavez advocated requiring grand jury witnesses to give
incriminating answers. Justice Thomas recognized the continued
vitality of the principle that a witness could assert the Privilege
outside the context of a criminal case.30 0 But the cases that
recognized this principle, he asserted, were not direct applications of
the Constitution but prophylactic rules designed to "safeguard the
core constitutional right.
30 1
Two observations come to mind about this argument. First, it
sounds very odd coming from someone who was one of the two
dissenters in Dickerson v. United States.30 2 Dickerson was decided
only three years before Chavez, and it put the Court to the hard
choice of either admitting that Miranda was a prophylactic rule that
Congress could override or explaining why it had a sound
constitutional basis. 30 3 The majority, in the view of the dissenting
opinion of Justices Scalia and Thomas, never squarely answered this
question. But the two dissenters, both of whom joined not only there
but also in the pertinent part of the Chavez case, were not so reticent
in their views on the legitimacy of the Court's constructing
prophylactic rules. To give but a mild example:
[T]hat this Court has the power, not merely to apply the
Constitution but to expand it, imposing what it regards as useful
299. Id.
300. See Chavez, 538 U.S. at 772 n.3.
301. Id. at 761.
302. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
303. See id. at 436-37.
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"prophylactic" restrictions upon Congress and the States... [i]s
an immense and frightening antidemocratic power, and it does
not exist.
304
Second, prophylactic rules, legitimate or not, are entirely a creature
of the mid-1960s. °5 It entails some degree of historical revisionism
to attribute to the Court's writing opinions condemning the
compulsion of witnesses before grand juries, legislative hearings and
administrative proceedings, which date back at least to Chief Justice
John Marshall's 1807 circuit opinion in United States v. Burr,306 the
construction of a prophylactic rule rather than the announcement of
what they believed the Constitution itself required.
If it was not fidelity to history that drove the majority to the
conclusion that the privilege against self-incrimination must be a
conditional rule, then what explains the result? Well, making the
privilege conditional was one way to relieve the defendants in Chavez
of civil liability for failing to give the gravely injured suspect a
Miranda warning.
One can see how the prospect of a lawsuit every time a suspect
claimed he or she was questioned in violation of Miranda would have
been daunting. Chavez has the potential of reducing almost to a
nullity the class of potential plaintiffs who could successfully sue a
police officer for using coercion to elicit an incriminating statement.
Since the future consequence which defines the violation is use at
trial, how will Chavez apply to someone who successfully suppressed
his statement prior to trial? If all that happened is that the prosecutor
unsuccessfully tried to use the defendant's coerced statement, it is
hard to see the Chavez majority's finding a violation of the rule. That
means the only people who will have a viable case will be those who
made a statement in the face of police coercion, lost a suppression
304. Id. at 446 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
305. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 457 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Indeed, the
United States argues that 'prophylactic rules are now and have been for many years a feature of this
Court's constitutional adjudication.' That statement is not wholly inaccurate, if by 'many years' one
means since the mid-1960s.").
306. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
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motion, had the statement admitted at trial, and either were acquitted
or got their conviction reversed on the ground that the statement
should not have been allowed into evidence. There aren't many
lawyers who would want to confine their practices to this universe of
potential clients.
3. Government Interference with the Defendant's Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel
One of the corollaries of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
the rule that prevents the government from interfering with an
established attorney-client relationship. In the Morrison case
discussed in Part I.B.vi, the Court assumed that it violated the Sixth
Amendment for law enforcement officials to try to convince the
defendant to abandon her attorney and cooperate with them by
disparaging her lawyer.3
0 7
Another aspect of the lawyer-client relationship that has a
constitutional dimension is the sanctity of privileged communications
between the two. If the government listens in on a conversation about
the case between a defendant and her lawyer, does it violate the
Constitution? Again, the answer is that it depends-this time, it
depends on what the unwanted listener does with the information.
The Court confronted this issue in Weatherford v. Bursey.30 8
Weatherford was a Section 1983 civil rights action against an
undercover agent for the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division. 30 9 Weatherford had sat in on discussions between Bursey
and his attorney. The Bursey defense team was planning for an
upcoming trial charging Bursey with malicious destruction of
property for throwing a brick through the window of a Selective
Service office. Bursey and his lawyer believed Weatherford, who had
also been indicted for the same offense after participating in the brick
throwing incident, was a legitimate codefendant. They invited him to
307. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981).
308. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
309. Id. at 547.
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participate in their discussions, because they believed he could
provide information and ideas that would benefit Bursey's defense. 310
Because Weatherford wanted to maintain his undercover status so
that he could continue to develop information on criminal behavior
by other members of the anti-war movement at the local university,
he attended the meetings without, of course, revealing his affiliation
with the prosecution. 3 11 At these meetings, Bursey and his lawyer
discussed with Weatherford the possibility of there being an informer
in the midst of the group, but they never suspected how close he
really was. Since no one ever asked him, Weatherford never had to
deny his true affiliation.
312
Weatherford's plans to remain undercover were frustrated when
his affiliation with the prosecutor's office became known
inadvertently and the prosecutor decided to use him as an eyewitness.
He testified at Bursey's trial and was instrumental in obtaining the
conviction which led to Bursey's serving an eighteen-month
sentence. When Bursey got out, he sued the agent for depriving him
of the effective assistance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment
guaranteed.3 13
The trial court found that Weatherford never revealed any of the
details of the conversation between Bursey and his lawyer, either in
his testimony at trial or in his communications with the prosecutor.314
That made aggregation the key to Bursey's claim. If one aggregated
the undercover agent and the prosecutor for whom he worked and
who directed his actions, it would be an easy case. Even the United
States, in its amicus brief supporting Weatherford, conceded that it
would violate the Sixth Amendment if the government:
[R]eceives . . . privileged information pertaining to the defense
of the criminal charges . . . because the Sixth Amendment's
assistance-of-counsel guarantee can be meaningfully
310. Id. at 548.
311. Id. at 547.
312. Id. at 548.
313. Id. at 549.
314. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 548.
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implemented only if a criminal defendant knows that his
communications with his attorney are private and that his lawful
preparations for trial are secure against intrusion by the
government, his adversary in the criminal proceeding.
315
On the other hand, if the Court aggregated the actions of the
undercover agent over time, rather than across bureaucratic labels,
Bursey's claim looked a lot different. And that is what the Court did.
The opinion did not simply focus on Weatherford's actions actively
hiding his allegiance to the prosecution and invading the attorney
client relationship. It looked at his behavior after the fact to determine
if he violated the rule. It construed the Sixth Amendment rule to
prohibit not invading the attorney client relationship, but
communicating what was learned, either at trial or to the
prosecutor.
316
The Court explained the rationale for its conditional rule:
As long as the information possessed by Weatherford remained
uncommunicated, he posed no substantial threat to Bursey's
Sixth Amendment rights. Nor do we believe that federal or state
prosecutors will be so prone to lie or the difficulties of proof will
be so great that we must always assume not only that an
informant communicates what he learns from an encounter with
the defendant and his counsel but also that what he
communicates has the potential for detriment to the defendant or
benefit to the prosecutor's case.
3 17
Clearly, the Court saw nothing wrong with Weatherford's presence
at the meeting. Later in the opinion, it did point out that Weatherford
had not actively sought to join Bursey and his lawyer, but had been
invited and attended only in order to maintain his cover.318 However,
nothing in the rationale the opinion offered, which looked exclusively
315. Id. at 554 n.4.
316. Id. at 558.
317. Id. at 556-57.
318. Id. at 557.
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at Weatherford's behavior after the fact, would make this factor
determinative.
If one takes a different view of the effect of undercover agents
insinuating themselves into the bosom of the defense team, the logic
of a conditional rule is less attractive. Justice Marshall's dissent
considered the effect of condoning the placement of prosecution
witnesses into otherwise private meetings between a defendant and
defense counsel:
[E]ven if the witnesses cannot divulge the information to the
prosecution ... [they] are in a position to formulate in advance
answers to anticipated questions, and even to shade their
testimony to meet expected defenses. Furthermore, because of
these dangers defendants may be deterred from exercising their
right to communicate candidly with their lawyers if government
witnesses can intrude upon the lawyer-client relationship with
impunity so long as they do not discuss what they learn with the
prosecutor. And insofar as the Sixth Amendment establishes an
independent right to confidential communications with a lawyer,
that right by definition is invaded when a government agent
attends meetings of the defense team at which defense plans are
reviewed.
319
The dissent was also less willing to assume that defendants would
be in a position after the fact to learn that an informer had
communicated to the prosecutor the details of a privileged discussion.
Surely, it reasoned, it would be unlikely for the informer to offer up
such information. And, it would require a prosecutor of uncommon
virtue to report such an event, given the likely consequences not only
in terms of civil liability as in Weatherford, but also with respect to
the real possibility that it would prevent the case against the
defendant from going forward.32 °
319. Id. at 564 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
320. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 565.
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4. Identification Procedures, the Right to Counsel and Due
Process
If you see enough crime stories on television or film, you'll come
across a scene where the police take a suspect into custody and, in
order to sew up the case, have the victim view him in a lineup or take
a peek at him sitting in handcuffs in the back of a police car. When
the scene shifts to the trial, it typically includes the little bit of
manufactured drama when the victim takes the stand, looks around
the courtroom and then points to the guy sitting next to the defense
attorney as the person who committed the crime.
When these events occur in real life, it implicates two
constitutional doctrines. One is relevant if the identification
procedure occurred after the defendant has been formally charged
with a crime. If so, then the right to counsel has attached, and the
defendant is entitled under the Sixth Amendment to have a lawyer
present.3 2 1 The other stems from the possibility that the way the
police have arranged the encounter made it unnecessarily suggestive.
When that happens there is a substantial risk that the witness
mistakenly identified the wrong person. This raises a concern under
the Due Process Clause.322
The first of these constitutional rules, the one dealing with the right
to counsel, places a direct obligation on the police to respect the
suspect's right to counsel. The other one, dealing with suggestive
identification procedures, is conditional. The rule does not directly
govern the behavior of the police at all. The Supreme Court has
disaggregated the actors in the process so that the police do not
violate the Constitution by conducting an unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedure. Rather, it is the prosecutor at trial who does
so if he or she elicits testimony about what happened.
321. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 683 (1972) (quoting Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272
(1967) ("[A] post-indictment pretrial lineup at which the accused is exhibited to identifying witnesses is
a critical stage of the criminal prosecution; that police conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in
the absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth [and Fourteenth] Amendment right to counsel
and calls in question the admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications of the accused by witnesses
who attended the lineup.").
322. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967).
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The Supreme Court announced both the right to counsel and due
process doctrines governing identification procedures on the same
day in 1967, in a trilogy of cases: United States v. Wade,323 Gilbert v.
California,324 and Stovall v. Denno.325 The first two dealt with the
consequence of the police's conducting a lineup or a show-up without
affording the defendant the right to have an attorney present.326 Wade
made clear that the Sixth Amendment was violated at the lineup
itself:
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice,
intentional or not, in the pretrial lineup, which may not be
capable of reconstruction at trial, and since presence of counsel
itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful
confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the
post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution at
which he was 'as much entitled to such aid [of counsel] ... as at
the trial itself.'3
27
If any doubt remained about whose conduct the Sixth Amendment
addressed in the identification context, Gilbert laid it to rest:
[P]olice conduct of such a lineup without notice to and in the
absence of his counsel denies the accused his Sixth [and
Fourteenth] Amendment right to counsel and calls in question
the admissibility at trial of the in-court identifications of the
accused by witnesses who attended the lineup.328
While Wade and Gilbert established a rule that applied to the police,
there were implications for what happened in the courtroom as well.
323. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
324. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
325. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
326. A lineup involves placing the suspect among a group of other people and having the witness
view the group. A show-up, on the other hand, is a one on one confrontation between the suspect and the
witness.
327. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37.
328. Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272.
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If the prosecutor attempted to introduce evidence of a tainted
identification at trial, it called for the remedy of exclusion as a way of
ensuring police compliance with the Sixth Amendment:
Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such testimony can be an
effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities will
respect the accused's constitutional right to the presence of his
counsel at the critical lineup.
329
Stovall required the Court to consider the due process implications
of an identification procedure, because the Sixth Amendment rule the
Court adopted in Wade and Gilbert was not an available tool.
330
Stovall came to the Court as a habeas corpus case, unlike Wade and
Gilbert, and as a result could benefit from the Sixth Amendment rule
the latter two announced only if it would be given retroactive effect.
The Court concluded that it would not,331 but went on to consider if
the confrontation between Stovall and the witness was "so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken
identification" that it denied the defendant due process of law.
332
"This is a recognized ground of attack upon a conviction," the Court
announced, "independent of any right to counsel claim." 333 In a very
brief discussion, the Court concluded that the identification was not
unnecessarily suggestive, despite the fact that the encounter was a
one-person show-up. This was so, the Court explained, because the
circumstances the police confronted left them no reasonable
alternative. The identifying witness was the victim of a brutal knife
attack and was on the edge of death in a hospital room. A more
impartial procedure, like a lineup, simply was not possible.3
34
329. Id. at 273; see also Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297 ("Wade and Gilbert fashion exclusionary rules to
deter law enforcement authorities from exhibiting an accused to witnesses before trial for identification
purposes without notice to and in the absence of counsel.").
330. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 296.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 302.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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In the years immediately following Stovall, there was reason to
believe its due process rule applied to the police, just as did Wade's
right to counsel rule. In a case that came to the Court five years later,
Kirby v. Illinois, 335 holding that suspects subject to identification
procedures prior to the formal initiation of charges had no right to
counsel, the plurality opinion for the Court described Stovall that
way: "The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments forbids a lineup that is unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification." 336 It is the police,
after all, who conduct lineups. So it was reasonable to take away
from Kirby the idea that it was the police to whom the due process
rule of Stovall was directed.
The resolution of this issue had some practical consequences. If
Stovall applied directly to the police, then it bolstered an
interpretation that created a per se rule prohibiting unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedures without regard for factors that
might indicate the identification was nevertheless reliable, such as the
amount of time the witness had to observe the person committing the
crime. On the other hand, if Stovall merely regulated the type of
evidence the prosecutor could introduce, then it would be much
easier to incorporate into the rule these sorts of reliability factors.
This issue came to a head in Manson v. Brathwaite.3 7 Arrayed
before the Court were the two choices. As the majority saw them, the
advantage of the per se approach was "the elimination of evidence of
uncertain reliability, deterrence of the police and prosecutors, and the
stated 'fair assurance against the awful risks of misidentification. '
' 338
The other alternative, to permit evidence of a suggestive
identification if it possessed "certain features of reliability," had the
335. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
336. Id. at 691.
337. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977). The Court also considered this issue earlier, in Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1972), and indicated that the majority would not accept a rule that did
not take into account factors that might make an unnecessarily suggestive identification reliable. But
Biggers involved a pre-Stovall identification, and the opinion hinted that a different result might be
appropriate for post-Stovall situations. Neil, 409 U.S. at 199; see also Manson, 432 U.S. at 107 ("One
perhaps might argue that, by implication, the Court suggested that a different rule could apply post-
Stovall.").
338. Manson, 432 U.S. at 110.
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attraction of serving "to limit the societal costs imposed by a sanction
that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and evaluation by
the trier of fact." 339 While the majority recognized that the per se
approach would be a better vehicle for shaping police behavior in the
direction of avoiding unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedures, 340 its view of the audience to whom the Due Process
Clause was directed dictated its choice:
Unlike a warrantless search, a suggestive preindictment
identification procedure does not in itself intrude upon a
constitutionally protected interest. Thus, considerations urging
the exclusion of evidence deriving from a constitutional violation
do not bear on the instant problem. See United States ex rel.
Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 406 (CA 7 1975).34 1
The cite to the Seventh Circuit case was from an opinion that Justice
Stevens wrote before he joined the Court. In it, he explained:
[A] showup does not itself violate any constitutional right of the
suspect. Unlike a warrantless search, which may violate a
constitutionally protected interest in privacy, the identification of
a suspect-whether fair or unfair--does not necessarily affect
any constitutionally protected interest of the suspect. The due
process clause applies only to proceedings which result in a
deprivation of life, liberty or property. The due process issue,
therefore, does not arise until testimony about the showup--or
perhaps obtained as a result of the showup-is offered at the
criminal trial. If that evidence is unfairly prejudicial, the trial
judge may have a constitutional obligation to exclude it, or
possibly to mitigate its impact by an appropriate cautionary
instruction to the jury. But if a constitutional violation results
339. Id.
340. Id. at 112.
341. Id. at 113 n.13.
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from a showup, it occurs in the courtroom, not in the police
station.
342
Justices Marshall and Brennan were the only dissenters. They
clearly did not want a conditional rule. As they saw it:
Stovall... established a due process right of criminal suspects to
be free from confrontations that, under all the circumstances, are
unnecessarily suggestive. The right was enforceable by exclusion
at trial of evidence of the constitutionally invalid
identification.
343
Brathwaite thus made Stovall a conditional rule. The police
themselves could not violate it. They merely set the table for what a
prosecutor might do. Aside from affecting the contour of the rule
itself, as in Brathwaite, there was another practical consequence. This
characterization of the rule means that a suspect who has been
wrongfully convicted on the basis of an impermissibly suggestive
identification procedure the police arranged cannot sue the police for
a civil rights violation, since there is no underlying constitutional rule
regulating the police.3
44
5. The Due Process Right of a Defendant to Present Exculpatory
Evidence at Trial
The Sixth Amendment is the part of the Bill of Rights that appears
to be the most relevant to the question of what limitations a judge
may place on a defendant's efforts to place evidence before the jury.
On its face, the Amendment's Confrontation Clause looks like the
provision that should govern any dispute over the the scope of the
342. United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 406 (7th Cir. 1975).
343. Manson, 432 U.S. at 120; see also id. at 122 ("Where the prosecution sought to use evidence of a
questionable pretrial identification, Stovall required its exclusion, because due process had been violated
by the confrontation, unless the necessity for the unduly suggestive procedure outweighed its potential
for generating an irreparably mistaken identification.").
344. See, e.g., Wray v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2007).
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cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. 345 And if an issue arose
about the relevance of questions a defense attorney could ask on
direct examination, one would think the judge should turn to the
Amendment's provision dealing with the right to compulsory process
for an answer. 346 In Chambers v. Mississippi,347 however, the Court
confronted a case presenting a combination of these two problems
and concluded that taken together, they amounted to a violation of the
Due Process Clause. In reaching this result, the Court relied on a
conditional rule that depended on the coexistence of two events, one
of which followed the other.
Chambers was convicted of murdering a police officer. Key to his
defense strategy was presenting the jury with evidence that someone
else, McDonald, did it.348 McDonald had admitted the crime to
Chambers's attorney but later disavowed the confession, saying he
was cajoled into it by a promise that he would be able to share in the
proceeds of a civil suit that Chambers would bring against the
town. 349 However, he also repeated the confession to several other
witnesses. 35 At trial, the prosecution did not present McDonald as a
witness, since he did not purport to have anything relevant to say
about why the jury should convict Chambers. It was the defense that
called McDonald to the stand, and through him introduced his
confession to the attorney into evidence. However, on cross
examination, McDonald repudiated the confession. When
Chambers's attorney asked the trial judge to permit him to examine
McDonald on redirect as a hostile witness, the judge refused, relying
on a Mississippi evidentiary doctrine, the "voucher" rule, which
prevented the proponent of a witness from impeaching him or her.
351
This ruling effectively prevented Chambers from confronting
345. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.").
346. Id. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.").
347. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 284.
348. Id. at 289.
349. Id. at 288. Chambers had been shot in the aftermath of the melee that resulted in the police
officer's killing.
350. Id. at 292.
351. Id. at 295.
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McDonald with the incriminating statements he made to other
witnesses or challenging his renunciation of the confession. 352
Chambers was also thwarted in his effort to present the testimony of
three of the witnesses to whom McDonald had admitted shooting the
officer. The judge sustained an objection to this testimony on hearsay
grounds, since Mississippi recognized only statements against
pecuniary, not penal, interest as an exception.
353
The Supreme Court found that what had happened in Chambers's
trial violated the Constitution.354 But it was not the parts of the Bill of
Rights that most narrowly addressed the two problems about which
Chambers complained, his inability to cross examine McDonald or to
present the testimony of his three witnesses. The Court did not rely
on either the Confrontation Clause or the Compulsory Process Clause
as the basis for its decision. The reason was that Chambers had never
preserved a federal claim in the state court system on either of these
two grounds. The only federal claim that he did properly present to
the Supreme Court was a post trial assertion that his conviction
denied him the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.355 It was, in other words, a general due process claim.
Given the context in which the federal question came to the Court,
the Justices had to consider "the cumulative effect of [the] rulings in
frustrating [Chambers's] efforts to develop an exculpatory
defense. 3 56 This had the effect of making the claim a conditional
one, because it could only have been raised after the conclusion of all
of the evidence. 3
57
The Court did separately discuss what was wrong with the two
types of rulings the trial judge made. It called the voucher rule
"archaic and irrational," 358 and rejected the state's argument that
352. Id. at 291.
353. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 292.
354. Id. at 285.
355. Id. at 290 n.3. The Court's later views of the Due Process Clause make it very unlikely that it
would use it as a vehicle for addressing concerns such as these. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.
342, 352 (1990) ("Beyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process
Clause has limited operation.").
356. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 290 n.3.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 296 n.8.
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McDonald's testimony was not adverse to Chambers.359 However,
the opinion never took the final step of declaring that the trial judge
violated the Constitution at the time he made the ruling limiting the
questioning of McDonald. "We need not decide," Justice Powell
wrote for the Court, "whether this error alone would occasion
reversal since Chambers's claimed denial of due process rests on the
ultimate impact of that error when viewed in conjunction with the
trial court's refusal to permit him to call other witnesses."
360
It was harder for the Court to condemn as severely the trial judge's
ruling preventing Chambers from calling the witnesses who would
have testified that they overheard McDonald confess to the crime.
That ruling was based on the hearsay doctrine, in particular the
feature of Mississippi evidence law that refused to recognize an
exception for statements against penal interest.361 At the time that
Chambers came to the Court, federal law, on the authority of
Donnelly v. United States, also refused to recognize this hearsay
exception.362 Nevertheless, the Chambers Court concluded that the
circumstances of the hearsay statements before it "provided
considerable assurance of their reliability,"363 and that "the hearsay
rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of
justice. '364 But yet again, it refused to announce a non-conditional
rule:
We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence, coupled
with the State's refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine
McDonald, denied him a trial in accord with traditional and
fundamental standards of due process. In reaching this judgment,
we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does
our holding signal any diminution in the respect traditionally
accorded to the States in the establishment and implementation
359. Id. at 297.
360. Id. at 298.
361. Id. at299.
362. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273-74 (1913).
363. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300.
364. Id. at 302.
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of their own criminal trial rules and procedures. Rather, we hold
quite simply that under the facts and circumstances of this case
the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a fair trial.365
As the holding in Chambers depended on the conjunction of two
events, it is hard to see how the rule could be anything but
conditional. The opinion went out of its way to say that neither of the
two state court rulings that it considered independently violated due
process. Since trials are sequential affairs, whichever ruling comes
first, one has to wait for the other shoe to drop in order to say that
Chambers condemns what has happened.
II. EVALUATING CONDITIONAL RULES
A. The Negative Side of Conditional Rules
1. The Effect in Shaping Behavior
Conditional rules are difficult to apply before all of their
constituent events have taken place. Chambers v. Mississippi
illustrates this conundrum.366 The case gives little guidance to trial
judges and lawyers who have to know in advance what evidence the
Constitution renders admissible despite the existence of state
evidence prohibitions. Lower courts have differed over whether
Chambers contains two nonconditional rules that trial judges can
apply in advance of an attempt to introduce evidence (in ruling on the
admission of statements against penal interest, 367 or an attempt by a
proponent of a witness to impeach his or her credibility368) or a
365. Id. at 302-03 (emphasis added).
366. See Chambers, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
367. See Skillicom v. Luebbers, 475 F.3d 965, 970 (8th Cir. 2007) ("In Chambers, the Supreme Court
held that a defendant has a constitutional right to proffer exonerating statements, that would otherwise
be hearsay, if they were made under circumstances providing 'considerable assurance of their
reliability."') (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300 (1973); Washington v. Renico, 455
F.3d 722, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2006); Su Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2004); United States
v. Camuti, 78 F.3d 738, 743 (1st Cir. 1996).
368. Cikora v. Dugger, 840 F.2d 893, 898 (11 th Cir. 1988) ("[The Supreme Court held in Chambers
... , that a state trial court denied Chambers due process when it refused to allow Chambers to show to
the jury that another person had repeatedly confessed to the crime. The state trial judge excluded this
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contextually based ruling that combines the effect of the excluded
evidence on the ability of the defendant fairly to present his case.
36 9
The confusion is understandable. One ordinarily thinks of Supreme
Court decisions as useful vehicles for providing guidance on how to
avoid a similar problem in the future. There is, concomitantly, an
inevitable pressure to try to find in any decision a rule that one can
actually apply. However, if one recognizes that Chambers used a
conditional rule, it has little value as a guide to behavior useful to a
trial judge. It is perhaps this difficulty that led Professor Peter
Westen, a prominent evidence scholar and the lawyer who
represented Chambers in the Supreme Court,370 to write shortly after
the case came out that "it is difficult to derive a clear standard from
Chambers,"371 and led Justice Scalia to express doubt that one could
meaningfully extract any holding from the case.
372
What made Chambers v. Mississippi such a difficult case revealed
one of the reasons that an appellate court may prefer to announce a
conditional rule. If a court wanted to reverse a conviction without
having to create a precedent for how state actors should exercise
power in the future, incorporating a prejudice requirement into the
rule is a good way to do it. This, in fact, is how Professor Westen
373
and Justice Scalia374 have portrayed Chambers.
testimony because Chambers had called that person as his witness, and Mississippi rules of evidence did
not permit defendants to cross-examine their own witnesses."); Sharlow v. Israel, 767 F.2d 373, 376 (7th
Cir. 1985).
369. See United States v. Walling, 486 F.2d 229,238 (9th Cir. 1973).
370. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71,151 n.383 (1974).
371. Id. at 151; see also Janet C. Hoeffel, The Sixth Amendment's Lost Clause: Unearthing
Compulsory Process, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 1275, 1301 (2002) ("[O]ne would be hard-pressed to locate a
single case that cites Chambers as precedent for its holding. Chambers also offered no solid advice on
the method a court could use for tackling the clash of the Constitution and evidentiary rules."); David
Robinson, Jr., From Fat Tony and Matty the Horse to the Sad Case of A. T.: Defensive and Offensive Use
of Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Cases, 32 Hous. L. REv. 895, 929-30 (1995) (the Chambers rule
remains unclear).
372. See Montana v. Englehoff, 518 U.S. 37, 53 (1996) ("[T]he holding of Chambers-if one can be
discerned from such a fact-intensive case-is certainly not that a defendant is denied 'a fair opportunity
to defend against the State's accusations' whenever 'critical evidence' favorable to him is excluded, but
rather that erroneous evidentiary rulings can, in combination, rise to the level of a due process
violation.").
373. Westen, supra note 370, at 152 ("[T]he Court may simply have meant that it was deciding the
case on its facts. The Court, when it enters uncertain and unexplored territory, frequently limits its
judgment to the particular facts under consideration. This permits it to indicate what it believes to be the
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Rules, however, serve as more than vehicles for justifying why
courts can reverse criminal convictions. They also act as a
mechanism to guide the behavior of those who are their target.
Indeed, the primary purpose of a rule has to be to affect behavior,
otherwise it is not a rule.375 Whether a rule limits the way a police
officer exercises her authority to seize an individual on the street,
requires a judge to allow a defendant to litigate in the absence of the
jury the issue of whether the defendant's confession was not
voluntary, or directs an appellate court to automatically reverse a
conviction if the defendant was denied the right to have a lawyer
represent him at trial, it must provide some meaningful guidance on
how to exercise power under a grant of government authority.
However, conditional rules, to put it simply, are lousy at guiding
behavior. Indeed, when legislative bodies, administrative agencies, or
advisory groups promulgate rules to guide the behavior of
government actors, they do not put them in a conditional format. The
rules of professional responsibility that govern prosecutors do not
incorporate a prejudice requirement in describing the obligation to
reveal exculpatory evidence. 376 Court rules dealing with severance do
not instruct judges facing a potential Bruton problem to withhold
judgment because in the latter stages of the trial the codefendant who
confessed may take the stand and eliminate the Confrontation Clause
problem.377 And police manuals do not instruct officers to draw their
guns on suspects without any reason to believe they have committed
a crime, hoping that the suspect will run away rather than submit.378
correct result without committing itself to a definitive rule for unforeseen variants of the immediate case
374. Englehoff, 518 U.S. at 52 ("Chambers was an exercise in highly case-specific error correction.").
375. See Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1191,
1194 (1994) ("[A] 'rule' is a prescription for conduct, applicable to a range of actors, which is designed
to promote an end or protect a right, but does not simply recite its objective."); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 786 (1989) (stating that rules must be capable of
being understood and followed by those to whom they are addressed); Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal
Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786, 788 (1967) ("All rules are directed
toward conduct ... ").
376. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006).
377. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(b).
378. See BOSTON POLICE DEP'T RULES AND PROCEDURES R. 303, § 5 (2003) ("Officers shall not
point firearms at persons except when reasonably justified under the circumstances.").
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Conditional rules do not make sense in these contexts because they
do not tell the people who look to the rules for guidance how to act at
the time they must make decisions about their behavior. Nor do they
make sense as part of the Constitution. Those sections of the Bill of
Rights that regulate the criminal justice system were the result of a
fear of the potential misuse of government power.379 The Bill of
Rights, and in particular the Due Process Clause, was a direct
descendant of that mother of all constitutional limits on the exercise
of force that is the criminal law, the Magna Carta,380 a document with
which all educated people in 18th century America would have been
acquainted. 381 The Magna Carta was both a political manifesto and a
statement of rules that the King had to obey to ensure that he would
not engage in abusive behavior in the future. 3 82 This notion that an
important function of a fundamental declaration of rights was to
guide the future behavior of those with the power to threaten those
rights would naturally have been part of the world-view of the
Framers. Clear, easy to apply rules were, in their view, best suited to
this end.383 Conditional rules are not an appropriate way to address
this concern.
Rules, of course, are not always easy to apply for the actors who
must look to them for guidance. Questions of interpretation are an
inherent problem. Making a rule conditional, however, detracts
significantly from a rule's ability to affect the behavior of those to
whom it is directed. And that is true whether you think that the
people the rules are designed to limit view them as aspirations or
hindrances.
379. Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197,
201 (1993) ("[Tlhe central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and
discretion."); Ronald J. Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature of the Fourth
Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 558 (1978) ("Sensitivity to the dangers of unchecked power
and totalitarianism arose in the years immediately preceding the American Revolution.").
380. Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941, 948 ("The ancestry
of the due process clause is universally traced to chapter 39 of the Magna Carta . .
381. Seeidat969.
382. Id. at 949.
383. John 0. McGinnis, The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 49, 77 n.1 17 (1996) ("[T]he Framers were practical thinkers who understood that the
Constitution had to draw clear distinctions capable of fairly mechanical application even if these
distinctions did not capture the complexity of each individual situation.").
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Imagine how a conditional rule looks from the vantage point of a
government official who does not internalize what she understands to
be the constitutional limits on her power. When faced with a choice
about how to act in a situation governed by a rule, she simply makes
a utilitarian calculation about whether the benefit she will receive,
either institutionally or personally, if she violates the rule, outweighs
the potential disadvantage of whatever sanction a rule violation
entails. The negative consequence that this Holmesian "bad
official" 384 must take into consideration depends, of course, not only
on how much she wants to avoid it but also on the probability that it
will ever come to pass.385 By adding into the definition of the rule
some future consequence that may never occur, by necessity it lowers
the probability that a sanction will be imposed.
Take, for example, the conditional rule dealing with the
prosecutor's obligation to reveal exculpatory evidence. How does the
conditional Brady rule affect this type of prosecutor? Perhaps she has
in her hands a piece of exculpatory information, say the fact that a
key witness was the beneficiary of a promise to drop pending charges
against him in return for his testimony, that she does not want to turn
over to the defense. The existence of a prejudice requirement as part
of the rule means that the incentive to disclose the information is
diminished, in some proportion, by the degree to which she foresees
the defendant's being unable to establish prejudice. The correlation
may be not proportional, but it is certainly positively correlated.386
There are a lot of ways that this prosecutor could realistically
believe that the defendant would ultimately fail to establish prejudice.
384. See Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897)
("The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do
not keep it-and nothing else.").
385. Cf Walter F. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution As a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1532, 1563 (1972) ("In the absence of the exclusionary rule, the law enforcement officer and the
public generally are enticed to view the Constitution as Justice Holmes' 'bad man' viewed the obligation
of contracts.").
386. See United States v. Agurs, 27 U.S. 97, 117 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he [majority's] rule
reinforces the natural tendency of the prosecutor to overlook evidence favorable to the defense, and
creates an incentive for the prosecutor to resolve close questions of disclosure in favor of
concealment."); George C. Thomas I1, History's Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV.
543, 544; Michael E. Gardner, Note: An Affair to Remember: Further Refinement of the Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 68 Mo. L. REV. 469, 479 (2003).
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The most likely is if the defendant pleads guilty, as do ninety percent
or so of all those charged with a crime. If the case is pled out, a
common view of Brady insulates the prosecutor from any sanction
for withholding the information:
Because a Brady violation is defined in terms of the potential
effects of undisclosed information on a judge's or jury's
assessment of guilt, it follows that the failure of a prosecutor to
disclose exculpatory information to an individual waiving his
right to trial is not a constitutional violation.
387
Even if the case goes to trial, the conditional nature of the rule
makes it difficult for the defendant to establish prejudice. In the
relatively rare likelihood that the defendant is acquitted, there is
literally no Brady violation about which to complain. Since Brady's
prejudice requirement looks to the probability of a more favorable
outcome had the prosecutor not hidden the exculpatory evidence, a
defendant who benefits from the most favorable outcome possible
cannot point to a better result. The venal prosecutor's effort may have
been in vain, but at least the loss at trial insulates her from any charge
that she violated the defendant's constitutional rights.
388
In the more common event that the trial ends in conviction, the
psychological phenomenon known as hindsight bias makes it difficult
to prove prejudice. Hindsight bias is the tendency to view something
that has already happened as having been inevitable. 389 Since
resolving a claim of a Brady violation can realistically only take
place after the trial has occurred, convictions are the inevitable
context in which these decisions are made. When judges are called
upon to decide whether a Brady violation has occurred after a
387. Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361-62 (5th Cir. 2000); see also McKune v. City of Grand
Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 907 (6th Cir. 1988) (no Brady violation where charges were dropped); Nygren v.
Predovich, 637 F. Supp. 1083, 1087 (D. Colo. 1986) (no Brady violation where charges were
dismissed).
388. See Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1999) (no Brady violation where defendant
acquitted).
389. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal
Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 317.
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conviction, they already know the result of the trial. It is difficult to
get a judge to agree that there was a reasonable probability that a
guilty verdict would not have occurred if only the prosecutor had
revealed the exculpatory information in a timely way.
390
Even from the perspective of a prosecutor who wants to abide by
the restriction of the Brady rule, its conditional nature creates an
environment that fosters instances where exculpatory information is
withheld.39' While Brady is defined ex post, prosecutors have to
make decisions about how to avoid Brady violations ex ante. By
giving them the responsibility for identifying the occasions on which
they must limit their own power, the Brady rule puts them in a
position of doing a job which sets them at cross purposes with
themselves.
Few, if any, law-abiding prosecutors would try to convict someone
whom they believed innocent. That being the case, every time a
prosecutor has to make a decision about whether to turn over Brady
material, what is at stake is doing what the Constitution may require
at the cost of increasing the chance that a defendant who deserves to
be punished will be acquitted. Despite the universal platitude after
every not guilty verdict that the prosecutors' office seeks only justice
and justice is served by acquittals as well as convictions, losing is
never in the real interest of a line prosecutor. Since the Brady
doctrine requires prosecutors to evaluate not only the way that a jury
might be affected by a piece of information but the overall impact of
that information in the context of the entire case the prosecutor
expects to present, it is easy to see how the significance of something
that is marginally exculpatory on its face may fail to receive an
objective evaluation. No social psychologist would be surprised to
learn that prosecutors are no better than anyone else in avoiding the
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, the psychological mechanism
390. See id. at 322.
391. Cf Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibrium, 99 COLuM. L. REv. 857,
911 (1999) (noting that while a government official's view of the requirements of a constitutional rule
plays a role in compliance, respect for individual rights is less likely when remedies are lacking).
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that downplays the significance of information that conflicts with a
preexisting opinion.
392
Justice Marshall illustrated this point in his dissenting opinion in
Bagley, as support for his criticism of the majority's making the
Brady rule conditional.393 Justice Marshall recounted an incident five
years after the Brady opinion became law, when a large group of
New York state prosecutors was asked if they would reveal to
defense counsel the fact that one eyewitness to a bank robbery had
definitively said the defendant was not the culprit if there were five
other witnesses who made a positive identification. Now, at the time
this group was asked their opinion, it was not at all clear that the
Brady rule was conditional. Agurs had not yet been decided and it
was Agurs that recast the rule to require prejudice. However, even in
that environment, only two prosecutors indicated that they would turn
the information over to the defense.
394
Even without the effect of cognitive dissonance, putting a rule in
conditional form makes it harder for the actors who are subject to its
mandate to determine exactly what they may and may not do.
Whether they have to make a judgment about the potential prejudicial
effect of their decisions, or anticipate the reaction of the person
whose rights are implicated by them, or predict how they or others
with whom they act in concert will behave in the future in light of the
decision they make in the present, there is another layer of
complexity involved. Actors with a stake in the outcome are
particularly poor candidates to make this assessment.
395
Even trial judges, who presumably do not have an interest in the
outcome, are more likely to engage in behavior that is subject to a
conditional rule than one put in a non-conditional format. Justice
392. Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of Brady v.
Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 643,655 (2002).
393. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
394. Id. at 697.
395. Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, I BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 121 n.9
(2006) ("[S]ubtle but powerful psychological factors skew the perceptions and judgments of persons ...
who have a stake in the outcome of those judgments.") (quoting Revision of the Commission's Auditor
Independence Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 7919, 65 Fed. Reg. 76008, 76016 (Dec. 5,
2000)).
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White apparently thought so. In his concurring opinion in Delaware
v. Van Arsdall,396 he agreed with the government's contention that
the Confrontation Clause rule that prevents judges from prohibiting
cross examination designed to show the bias of a prosecution witness
should be a conditional one that incorporates an "outcome
determinative" prejudice requirement. 397 His rationale for wanting the
rule to be conditional was the effect he thought it would have on the
behavior of trial judges. Making the rule non-conditional, he
believed, would "undermine [their] authority . . . to restrict cross-
examination." 398  The non-conditional rule that Van Arsdall
propounded, in Justice White's view, would, in close cases, influence
trial judges to "permit the examination rather than risk being guilty of
misunderstanding the constitutional requirements of a fair trial.q
3 99
2. Vehicles for Ex Ante Prevention
Conditional rules are not only ineffective as instruments to control
behavior. They also present a barrier to a court's using the rule as a
basis for action designed to avoid violations in the future.
The conditional rules where this phenomenon arises are the ones
that incorporate a requirement of prejudice. The Strickland rule is a
good example.400 A defendant cannot establish a violation of the rule
requiring effective assistance of counsel unless he raises a reasonable
probability that the shortcoming about which he complains adversely
affected the result. Given the contextual judgment that the rule
requires, the only practical way to apply it is after the fact. But that
does not mean it is impossible to spot in advance institutional
structures and individual practices that are highly likely to result in
violations of the rule when it comes time to make the post hoc
evaluation. The conditional nature of the Strickland rule, however,
makes it difficult to ask a court to entertain an ex ante claim.
396. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
397. Id., 473 U.S. at 685 (White, J., concurring).
398. Id. at 686.
399. Id.
400. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,686 (1984).
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Say you are a defendant in the middle of your trial and you believe
that your defense attorney's performance has failed to meet the
constitutionally mandated standard. In all but the rarest examples
where it is clear that the lawyer's shortcoming will inevitably and
fatally taint the verdict, your complaint will have to wait until you are
convicted. As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals put it in
holding that Strickland claims must await the conclusion of the trial:
The problem with applying the Strickland test in the middle of an
ongoing trial is that the "result" or "outcome" of the proceeding
has yet to be determined. Thus the trial court would be required
to assess prospectively the likely prejudicial effect of counsel's
alleged errors before it has had an opportunity to hear all the
evidence in the case, and before the jury, if there is one, has even
begun to deliberate.4 °'
Defendants seeking to use Brady as the source for having a court
order the prosecution to deliver material that is facially exculpatory
prior to trial will encounter a similar problem. In the Second Circuit,
for example, a District Judge may not order the government to
produce Brady material upon request by the defendant, because the
conditional nature of the rule does not create the opportunity for the
judge to enforce a constitutional mandate before the requirement of
prejudice is met:
401. Johnson v. United States, 746 A.2d 349, 354 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A related problem can arise when
a defendant, prior to the conclusion of the case, seeks to have the trial court supply some remedial relief
for the defense attorney's ineffective representation in plea negotiations. See Thomas v. Reyes, 153 P.3d
1040 (Ariz. 2007). For example, in Thomas, defense counsel failed to convey a plea offer to her client in
time to meet the prosecutor's deadline. The defendant discovered this lapse prior to trial and sought to
have the judge apply a state law remedy for ineffective assistance of counsel in plea negotiations that
required the prosecutor to reoffer the plea. The court concluded, however, that the defendant could not
establish that his right to effective assistance of counsel had been violated prior to trial since it was
possible that he would eventually be acquitted or receive a sentence no less favorable than the plea offer.
See also United States v. Gray, 382 F. Supp. 2d 898, 910 (E.D. Mich. 2005) (stating that a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel relating to plea negotiations, is "grossly premature" before "conviction
and sentencing").
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Although the government's obligations under Brady may be
thought of as a constitutional duty arising before or during the
trial of a defendant, the scope of the government's constitutional
duty-and, concomitantly, the scope of a defendant's
constitutional right-is ultimately defined retrospectively, by
reference to the likely effect that the suppression of particular
evidence had on the outcome of the trial.
402
• . . It is not feasible or desirable to specify the extent or
timing of [the] disclosure Brady and its progeny require, except
in terms of the sufficiency, under the circumstances, of the
defense's opportunity to use the evidence when disclosure is
made.4
03
The conditional nature of a rule not only makes it difficult for a
court to address the problem in a particular case ex ante; it also stands
as a barrier to claims for institutional reform. For example, the way
that some jurisdictions have structured the provision of defense
services for indigent defendants in criminal cases raises serious
doubts about its ability to meet the constitutional standard of
reasonably effective counsel. Jurisdictions that starve their defender
programs of resources and overload their attorneys are likely to
spawn cases that would meet the Strickland prejudice test after the
fact. But, prior to a conviction, criminal defendants facing pending
charges lack standing to use Strickland as the basis for asking a court
to order the changes necessary to avoid the risk. As one court
explained:
Here, [a criminal defendant facing a pending charge] seeks to
enjoin the Marion County public defender system because it
effectively denies indigents the effective assistance of counsel.
However, a violation of a Sixth Amendment right will arise only
after a defendant has shown he was prejudiced by an unfair trial.
402. United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2001).
403. Id. at 142 (quoting Leka v. Portundo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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This prejudice is essential to a viable Sixth Amendment claim
and will exhibit itself only upon a showing that the outcome of
the proceeding was unreliable. Accordingly, the claims presented
here are not reviewable under the Sixth Amendment as we have
no proceeding and outcome from which to base our analysis.
404
3. Misleading Messages
Conditional rules send a misleading message to the public about
what sort of protection they can expect when dealing with officials in
the criminal justice system. All but the most sophisticated observers
of the Supreme Court are likely to come away with the impression
that it is the predicate behavior itself that the Constitution prohibits
and not the predicate plus whatever future event serves to complete
the violation. That was part of the difficulty with Chambers, where
the audience construing the message consisted of appellate judges.
The problem is much more severe when it is the general public.
Consider, for a minute, the one rule in constitutional criminal
procedure that likely has the most widespread currency in popular
culture, the Miranda rule. It is fair to conclude that most people think
that Miranda is a direction to the police that when they interrogate a
suspect in their custody, they have to deliver the familiar four-part
warning. 4°5 However, now that the Court has made the privilege
against self-incrimination conditional, if the public is truly to
understand Miranda's effect on the police, they have to be aware that
Miranda violations don't occur in the police station but in the
courtroom.
404. Platt v. State, 664 N.E.2d 357, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), cert. denied sub nom, Platt v. Indiana,
520 U.S. 1187 (1997); see also People v. District Court of El Paso County, 761 P.2d 206, 209, 211
(Colo. 1988) (holding that it was error for trial judge to rule prior to trial that low fees paid to appointed
counsel denied defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel since the defendant had no way of
establishing prejudice). See e.g., Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (1 1th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 957 (1990), rev'd on abstention grounds sub nom ("[T]he Strickland standard [is]
inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective relief."); Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11 th Cir.
1992).
405. My thirty-five years' experience as a defense attorney have exposed me to many clients who
were so ingrained in the concept that Miranda is a rule directed to the police that they were irate at not
being given a Miranda warning, despite never being questioned.
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The full implication of the misleading nature of talking about one's
Miranda rights was made clear in a case the Court decided the year
after Chavez, United States v. Patane.40 6 In Patane, the Court refused
to apply the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine and suppress a
pistol the police found as a result of interrogating a suspect without
giving him a complete Miranda warning.4 °7 While conceding that the
defendant's statements were not admissible at trial as a result of the
Miranda violation, the prosecutor did propose to introduce the pistol
into evidence.4 °8
Justice Thomas, the author of Chavez, wrote for the plurality
decision that held the introduction of the pistol would not violate the
Constitution: "The Miranda rule is not a code of police conduct, and
police do not violate the Constitution (or even the Miranda rule, for
that matter) by mere failures to warn., 4 09 The statement in the
parenthesis is startling in its implication. It means that even deliberate
decisions by the police to question a suspect without obeying
Miranda's dictate do not, under this view, violate the Miranda rule.
"Potential violations occur, if at all," Justice Thomas continued in
Patane, "only upon the admission of unwarned statements into
evidence at trial." 410
Now, it would be unrealistic to expect members of the public to
understand the debate over whether Miranda is a prophylactic rule or
one that the Constitution directly requires. But it is certainly fair to
conclude that a casual observer of the criminal justice system would
think Miranda means something more than just a direction to the
prosecutor about when the state may admit statements that resulted
from custodial interrogation.
Consider how this will appear to someone taken into police
custody who has a layman's familiarity with the Miranda warnings.
It is unlikely that he will know that Patane has given the police the
imprimatur to ignore Miranda. According to Patane, police can
406. See generally United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
407. Id. at 631-32.
408. Id. at 643.
409. Id. at 637.
410. Id. at 641.
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question a suspect without giving him a Miranda warning, and
presumably they are just as free to question someone who has
received one but who says that he wants to assert his right to remain
silent or right to have a lawyer present.
411
How would we expect a conscientious police officer to react if a
suspect sought to end an interrogation by asserting what we now
know is inaccurately called one's Miranda rights? Since continuing
the interrogation violates neither the Constitution nor the Miranda
rule, it would be foolish to stop. Stopping ensures the police end up
with neither a statement nor a lead to any physical evidence. So, the
reasonable, and legitimate, thing to do is to continue.
Well, to a suspect who is not versed in the conditional nature of
Miranda, it can only appear that the police who control the
environment in which he finds himself are lawless. The police will
know that they are staying within the limits of a conditional rule. The
suspect almost certainly will not. One may defend this "acoustic
separation' ' 12 on the ground that it is socially desirable for police to
gain access to physical evidence that a suspect has committed a
crime. But, it can only be gained at the cost of deception. It says
something about our system of criminal justice if a doctrine
describing the rights of individuals is designed to be effective by
hiding from those whom it is supposed to protect, the true dimension
of the protection.
Conditional rules can be misleading not just for outsiders, but for
insiders also. Criminal trial lawyers talk about Brady material prior to
trial, when the concept must act as a guide to what the prosecutor
must actually do, without realizing that until the trial is over, in a
strictly accurate sense there is no such thing. As a result, a prosecutor
may deny having Brady material despite knowing that the state has in
its possession information that is exculpatory on its face, so long as
the prosecutor does not believe that the information would be
significant enough in the overall context of the evidence to affect the
411. Id.
412. See generally Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REV. 625 (1984).
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result. This may seem to be a metaphysical distinction that only the
congenitally hyper-technical or deceptive may use. But it is a
perfectly legitimate way to translate the Court's doctrine into
practical terms. At least, that is what Justices Thomas and Scalia
would have us believe, from their dissent in Banks v. Dretke.413
One of the questions the Court had to resolve in Banks was
whether the defendant had sufficient cause to excuse his failure to
present his Brady claim to the state courts. Banks's ability to offer
evidence in federal court to support the Brady claim depended on
whether he could establish that the fault for not presenting it to the
state courts lay with the State and not with his laxity or neglect.
414
At issue was the prosecutor's failure to turn over to Banks prior to
trial information that one of the state's key witnesses was not only a
paid police informant but had encouraged, at the behest of his police
masters, a course of action that the prosecutor relied on in the penalty
phase of the trial to convince the jury to sentence Banks to die. 415 In
his state collateral attack on his conviction, Banks alleged "'upon
information and belief that 'the prosecution knowingly failed to turn
over exculpatory evidence as required by Brady.' '416 The state
explicitly denied this claim and as a result, Banks never pursued the
investigation in this stage of the case that later on led him to discover
the facts about the witness's relationship to the police.
The majority found that the prosecutor's deceptive answer to
Banks's allegation in his state collateral attack was among the factors
supporting their conclusion that he established cause for failing to
present the new evidence that he wanted the federal court to consider.
Justice Thomas, on the other hand, was far more willing to assume a
semantically fastidious prosecutor than was the majority:
[T]he State could have been denying only that it had failed to
turn over evidence in violation of Brady, i.e., that any evidence
the prosecution did not turn over was not material (a position
413. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 706-11 (2004).
414. Id. at 675-76.
415. Id. at 698.
416. Id. at 682 (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999)).
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advanced by the State throughout the federal habeas process)....
[S]trictly speaking, there is never a real 'Brady violation' unless
the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable
probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a
different verdict.
417
Lawyers, like laymen, have to learn to think about rules like Miranda
and Brady in conditional terms.
There is another way in which the conditional nature of a rule
contributes to confusion. Greer v. Miller 418 illustrates the problem.
Greer was the case that held a prosecutor does not violate a
defendant's rights simply by asking a question on cross examination
about whether the defendant remained silent after receiving a
Miranda warning, so long as the defendant does not react by
supplying the answer. The Court held that this behavior did not
violate the rule it had earlier announced in Doyle v. Ohio.4 19 Doyle
was based on a conclusion that it was fundamentally unfair to use as
evidence a defendant's invited silence after a Miranda warning, in
part because the defendant's failure to talk to the police was too
ambiguous to serve as reliable proof of guilt.
After Greer disposed of the claim based on Doyle, it went on to
consider whether, despite the fact that the prosecutor never violated
the Doyle rule because the defendant never answered the question,
the prosecutor's behavior nevertheless "so infec[ted] the trial with
unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process. ' '42° As examples of such cases, the Court cited Agurs,421 as
well as Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,422 a case in which the prosecutor
deliberately misled the jury in his final argument to convey the false
impression that the defendant had unsuccessfully tried to plead guilty
to a lesser charge. 423 In considering this question, the Court posed the
417. Banks, 540 U.S. at 710 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
418. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987).
419. Id. at 756-57; Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
420. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
421. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)).
422. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765 (citing Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 639).
423. Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 639.
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problem this way: "Although the prosecutor's question did not
constitute a Doyle violation, the fact remains that the prosecutor
attempted to violate the rule of Doyle by asking an improper question
in the presence of the jury.' 24
Consider, for a minute, exactly what the Court is saying the
prosecutor did that potentially is so unfair that it might conceivably
have tainted the trial. Why, the Court tells us, the prosecutor
"attempted to violate the rule of Doyle." It is, however, a little
disingenuous to talk about the prosecutor's action as an attempted
Doyle violation. Prosecutors, by themselves, do not have the ability
to violate Doyle. Violations only occur when the witness answers the
prosecutor's question and the judge allows the jury to consider the
answer as part of the evidence. It's a little like charging someone
with an attempt to commit a conspiracy. Such behavior may
constitute a completely separate wrong, like solicitation, but it
requires some category bending to fit it into the contours of an
attempt.425
If the label of "attempted Doyle violation" isn't quite accurate, it
does serve a purpose. It makes one think that the Court vigilantly
disapproves of what the prosecutor did, while communicating, with a
wink to those in the know, that not only will no one do anything
about it if either the judge or the defense attorney steps in to prevent
the tainted answer from appearing but that simply asking the question
does not, by itself, violate the defendant's constitutional rights or any
rule limiting the prosecutor's power.
4. The Problem of Prejudice
There are two additional objections unique to all of the conditional
rules that rely on prejudice as the consequence that identifies a
violation of the Constitution. For one thing, the Court has been
remarkably inconsistent in deciding when prejudice is a component
of an underlying constitutional right. For another, they ignore all of
424. Greer, 483 U.S. at 765.
425. Cf Lorenz, Conspiracy in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code: Too Little Reform, 47 TUL. L.
REv. 1017, 1031 (1973) (noting the "theoretical conflicts inherent in an 'attempted conspiracy').
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the process values inherent in the Constitution, shunning them in
favor of accuracy.
a. Inconsistency
In the first conditional rule case, Snyder v. Massachusetts,426 the
Court explained that where a rule is neither explicitly mentioned in
the Constitution nor obviously fundamental, one can only define the
rule in situational terms by looking at the overall fairness of the entire
427proceedings. 42 This rationale, however, has hardly led to coherent
results.
The Supreme Court has found in the Due Process Clause a wide
variety of freestanding rules, not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution, that are not conditional. Due process is the basis for a
rule that bans the introduction of evidence that the defendant was
silent after receiving a Miranda warning,428 prohibits a jury
instruction that shifts the burden of proof to the defendant,429 requires
the application of the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
430
bars the use of coerced confessions as evidence, 431 mandates that
judges first determine the question of a confession's voluntariness,432
requires judges to be impartial,433 insists that discovery in criminal
cases be reciprocal if the defendant has to reveal information to the
426. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
427. Id. at 116-18. In Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974), the Court held that an isolated
remark in a prosecutor's closing argument suggesting that the defendant unsuccessfully tried to plead
guilty to a lesser charge did not violate due process because it did not prejudice the defendant. Id. The
Court adopted the same reasoning as it did in Snyder, though without citing it: "This is not a case in
which the State has denied a defendant the benefit of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, such as
the right to counsel, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) or in which the prosecutor's remarks so
prejudiced a specific right, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, as to amount to a
denial of that right. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). When specific guarantees of the Bill of
Rights are involved, this Court has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way
impermissibly infringes them. But here the claim is only that a prosecutor's remark about respondent's
expectations at trial by itself so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process. We do not believe that examination of the entire proceedings in this case supports
that contention." Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643.
428. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
429. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702 (1975).
430. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
431. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958).
432. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 389 (1964).
433. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
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prosecution,434 and prevents judges from intimidating witnesses.435
None of these rules incorporates a showing of prejudice. Indeed, in
none of these cases was there even a discussion about this issue,
much less a convincing rationale for why cases are sorted into one
category or another.
436
One can see the malleability of the criteria a Justice can use to
determine whether a rule requires a prejudice component or not by
looking at the dilemma Justice Scalia faced in United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez.437 The issue in Gonzalez-Lopez was whether a
defendant who claimed he had been denied the right to have counsel
of his own choosing appear for the defense also had to show
prejudice. The defendant in Gonzalez-Lopez had the money to hire
his own lawyer, but the trial judge improperly refused to allow the
lawyer to appear pro hac vice, forcing the defendant to hire a local
lawyer to represent him.
The government's brief in the Supreme Court argued that a
"defendant who claims that he was improperly deprived of counsel of
choice must establish prejudice in order to overturn his
conviction. 438 In supporting this contention, the brief quoted from
one of Justice Scalia's opinions, Mickens v. Taylor: "defects in
assistance [of counsel] that have no probable effect upon the trial's
outcome do not establish a constitutional violation.'A39
434. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1973).
435. Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 97-98 (1972).
436. Cf Stacy & Dayton, supra note 60, at 119 ("[Tlhe Court has not articulated a convincing
rationale for distinguishing when courts ought to define a right to obtain or present evidence at trial in
terms of a strict outcome-oriented prejudice test from when they ought to use a lesser prejudice test,
subject to post-trial harmless error review."); Michael T. Fisher, Note, Harmless Error, Prosecutorial
Misconduct, and Due Process: There's More to Due Process Than the Bottom Line, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1298, 1304 (1988) ("Courts have employed inconsistent approaches to define due process violations that
stem from prosecutorial misconduct. For some types of prosecutorial misconduct, the courts have
applied an outcome-determinative analysis; for other types of misconduct, courts have applied more
traditional concepts of fairness to define due process violations and reserved outcome-determinative
analysis for use as a harmless error test. No rationale has been set forth to justify the coexistence of two
such inconsistent approaches.").
437. See generally United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006).
438. Brief for Petitioner at 8, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (No. 05-352),
2006 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 261.
439. Id. at 14 (quoting Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002)).
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Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in Gonzalez-Lopez, rejecting the
argument that this part of the right to counsel had a prejudice
component: "the right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice,
not the right to a fair trial; and that right was violated because the
deprivation of counsel was erroneous. No additional showing of
prejudice is required to make the violation 'complete.'"40
One might well ask why this is so. If the violation of the Sixth
Amendment is complete when a judge prevents a defendant's
attorney of choice from appearing at trial, why is it that in the Sixth
Amendment contexts that Strickland and Mickens present the
violation is not complete until all of the evidence is in and prejudice
rears its ugly head? After all, the right to counsel, unlike the rule
announced in Snyder, is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.
44 1
Justice Scalia's explanation was to find a new way to characterize
the Sixth Amendment's concern for the effective assistance of
counsel. Strickland and Mickens, he said, were both derived from a
due process case, McMann v. Richardson,442 which first articulated
the proposition that "the right to counsel is the right to the effective
assistance of counsel." 4 3 McMann dealt with the validity of a guilty
plea in the face of a contention by the defendant that the procedure
the trial court used at the time to determine the voluntariness of a
confession had subsequently been declared unconstitutional.
444
McMann held that so long as the defendant had been represented by a
lawyer who was reasonably effective in evaluating the admissibility
of the confession, there was no constitutional violation in accepting
the defendant's guilty plea.445 Having traced the first concern with
440. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146.
441. In another case based on a specific provision of the Constitution, Delaware v. Van Arsdall, the
Court rejected the government's argument that there should be a prejudice component to the rule of the
Confrontation Clause that a judge must allow the defendant to cross examine a prosecution witness for
bias. The Court's explanation was that the focus of the Confrontation Clause was "on individual
witnesses" rather than the fairness of the trial as a whole. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679-
80 (1986) ("It would be a contradiction in terms to conclude that a defendant denied any opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses against him nonetheless had been afforded his right to '[confrontation]'
because use of that right would not have affected the jury's verdict.").
442. See generally McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
443. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 771 n.14).
444. McMann, 397 U.S. at 766.
445. See id. at 770 n.13.
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the quality of a lawyer's performance to a due process case dealing
with the validity of a guilty plea, Justice Scalia went on to try to show
its relevance for a Sixth Amendment case about the right to an
attorney of one's choice:
Having derived the right to effective representation from the
purpose of ensuring a fair trial, we have, logically enough, also
derived the limits of that right from that same purpose. The
requirement that a defendant show prejudice in effective
representation cases arises from the very nature of the specific
element of the right to counsel at issue there-effective (not
mistake-free) representation. Counsel cannot be "ineffective"
unless his mistakes have harmed the defense (or, at least, unless
it is reasonably likely that they have). Thus, a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not
"complete" until the defendant is prejudiced.446
The rabbit pulled from the hat in this explanation is the very
second word: "derived." If "derived" means the Sixth Amendment
doctrine depends for its legitimacy on the earlier recognition of the
due process principle, then it makes sense that the limits placed on
the latter apply as well to the former. But the Sixth Amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel exists quite independently of the
Due Process Clause. It isn't so much "derived" from the latter as it is
"suggested by" it. That being so, there is no reason why the due
process necessity of including a prejudice component must be
imported into the Sixth Amendment's specific provision of the
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. The values that underlie
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel
exist quite apart from the due process concerns that underlie the
limits that surround a defendant's ability to attack a guilty plea
conviction.
The end result of Justice Scalia's peregrination seems to boil down
to something like this. Requiring a defendant with money to sit
446. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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through a trial where her lawyer performed magnificently infringes
on a Sixth Amendment value if the lawyer is not the one whom she
would have hired except for the court's erroneous disqualification.
But, requiring an indigent defendant to sit through a trial where a
lawyer appointed by the court performs so poorly that it violates all
professional standards does not offend the Sixth Amendment unless
some other lawyer would have not only performed in a professionally
competent way, but likely would have gotten a more favorable result.
b. Narrow Focus
The conditional rules that rely on prejudice are narrowly focused
on protecting only one of the possible values that the underlying
provision might serve. They each presuppose the sole reason served
by the rule is its effect in assisting the trial process accurately to
identify those individuals who committed the crimes with which they
are charged. Nothing else seems to matter.
There is no denying the importance of accuracy in the criminal
trial process. But the single-minded focus on accuracy of a
conditional rule relying on prejudice denigrates other values that one
might find implicated in the underlying constitutional provision.
44 7
This is a theme that was sounded by the dissent in the very first
conditional rule case, Snyder.448 Justice Roberts wrote for the four
members of the Court who opposed making the rule governing the
presence of a defendant at a viewing conditional:
[W]here the conduct of a trial is involved, the guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not that a just result shall have been
obtained, but that the result, whatever, it be, shall be reached in a
fair way. Procedural due process has to do with the manner of
the trial; dictates that in the conduct of judicial inquiry certain
fundamental rules of fairness be observed; forbids the disregard
447. For example, the due process right to be free from an undue delay in the indictment process may
also protect an individual from "[t]he anxiety and concern attendant on public accusation" before the
formal initiation of criminal charges. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 330-31 (1971) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
448. See generally Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
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of those rules, and is not satisfied though the result is just, if the
hearing was unfair.
449
Fairness for its own sake, without regard for the degree of fit
between the end result and empirical truth, not only evinces respect
for the individual dignity of the defendants whom the state proposes
to deprive of life or liberty. It stands as a beacon of the state's
commitment to a certain standard of behavior. Where the reality as
well as the perception of such a commitment prevails, the system can
command a sense of legitimacy from the community that is not
otherwise obtainable.
450
Of course, an appellate court can preserve the value of accuracy
without making a rule conditional by taking advantage of the
harmless error doctrine. However, by resolving a case on the basis of
a conditional rule that incorporates a prejudice requirement, the Court
renders the harmless error doctrine irrelevant. In any case where
prejudice exists as part of the rule, a determination that the rule was
violated will by necessity meet the less stringent harmless error test.
Aside from the standard used to determine the effect on the outcome,
the fundamental difference between a conditional rule and the
harmless error test is the allocation of the burden of proof. When the
prejudice inquiry is built into the definition of the rule, the defendant
bears the burden of proof on the issue.451 If the rule was not
conditional, and a court looked at the question of prejudice as part of
449. Id. at 137.
450. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 207 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]he right against
ineffective assistance of counsel has as much to do with public confidence in the professionalism of
lawyers as with the results of legal proceedings."); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 751 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986)) ("[Tlhe right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice in
which the perception as well as the reality of fairness prevails.").
451. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 173-74 (2002) (defendant has burden of proving attorney's
conflict of interest had an adverse effect); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (defendant
has burden of proving there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 694 (1984) (defendant has burden of proving "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional [conduct], the result of the proceedings would have been different"); United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982) (defendant has burden of proving a reasonable likelihood
that witness' testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact).
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a harmless error analysis, then the prosecutor would have to establish
that the verdict would not have been different.452 Relieving the
prosecutor of the burden will often foreordain the result of the
case.453 Using a conditional rule that incorporates prejudice is a way
for a court to be able to affirm. more convictions than would be
possible under a harmless error regime.
454
B. The Case for Conditional Rules
If conditional rules have such serious drawbacks as means of social
control, institutional reform, and public understanding, what explains
their prevalence across such a wide range of constitutional
provisions? To answer that question, let's try to identify the
conditions under which it would make sense to craft a rule in
conditional format.
First, focus on the predicate behavior that triggers the rule. If you
view the behavior by itself as either benign or even socially useful,
but want to control it only in the event that it causes some easily
identified adverse consequence, then it would make sense to make
the rule conditional. Another aspect of the predicate behavior that
would make a conditional rule attractive is if you can't identify with
any degree of precision what it is about the behavior that you object
to but you can identify the consequence that you want to avoid. And,
you would prefer a conditional rule if there is some unwanted
collateral consequence like civil liability or the imposition of an
unbearable drain on existing resources, which would be associated
with the predicate behavior if it were not subject to a conditional rule.
452. O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 440 (1995) (prosecutor bears burden of proof to show
harmless error in habeas corpus cases); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (same on direct
review).
453. Cf. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 503 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A]llocation of the
burden of proof foreordains the results.").
454. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 754 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (requiring the defendant to
show prejudice "unfairly shifts the burden of proving harm from this constitutional deprivation to the
excluded criminal defendant, who was in no way responsible for the error and is least able to
demonstrate what would have occurred had he been allowed to attend"); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 696
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (applying harmless error rather than making the rule conditional is more
protective of the defendant).
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Next, think about the future consequences that complete the
violation. The easier it is for the actors subject to the rule and the
people whom the rule is intended to protect to identify situations in
advance when these consequences will occur, the more attractive a
conditional rule will be. And, the more certain you are that the only
reason to condemn the predicate behavior is because it results in the
future consequence, the better fit you'll have with a rule in
conditional format.
And last, since the context in which we are considering conditional
rules is that of constitutional interpretation, the language of the
Constitution may compel the choice of a conditional rule.
i. The Utility of the Underlying Behavior
Estelle v. Williams,455 the prison clothes case, California v. Hodari
D. ,456 the Fourth Amendment seizure case, United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal,457 the compulsory process case, and Weatherford
v. Bursey,45 8 the intrusion on the attorney-client relationship case, all
share one feature. In each, the rule that governed the underlying
predicate behavior was one that the Court undoubtedly saw as having
the potential to prohibit behavior that the Court thought socially
useful. Thus, Estelle made the assumption that many defendants
prefer to appear in court in prison clothes in order to garner the jury's
sympathy.459 In Hodari D., Justice Scalia editorialized on how
beneficial it was to an orderly society for everyone to cooperate with
a police officer's direction to stop. 460 In Valenzuela-Bernal, the Court
stressed the obligation of the executive to control illegal immigration
and pointed out that prompt deportation is often the most effective
means of securing the border.461 And in Weatherford, the Court
"recognized the unfortunate necessity of undercover work and the
455. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
456. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
457. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
458. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
459. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 508.
460. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627.
461. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 864.
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value it often is to effective law enforcement. We have also
recognized the desirability and legality of continued secrecy even
after arrest. 'A
62
In each case, making the rule conditional has the effect of not so
subtly encouraging the underlying conduct by sanctioning it so long
as the future action that makes it unconstitutional never comes to
pass.
ii. A Reluctance to Specify Rules of Behavior
The psychologist Abraham Maslow is credited as the source of the
insight that if the only tool you have is a hammer, it is very attractive
to view every problem you come across as a nail.463 Well, if your
whole institutional perspective is to evaluate a process after all of the
relevant events have taken place and determine if the result is
legitimate or not, the post hoc perspective that you enjoy may very
well color your view of the type of rule you announce to justify your
result.
For the Supreme Court, every problem that comes to it for action
presents itself in the form of a judgment to be affirmed or reversed.
The Court could perform that function without announcing any rules
whatsoever. Of course, that would hardly be a responsible way for
the Court to carry out its institutional role of the constitutional
interpreter of last resort. The Court does write opinions that explain
the reasoning behind the result.464 But writing opinions sets two tasks
before the Court. One is to explain why they reached the result that
they did. The other, and harder, task is to explain to those who look
to the Court for guidance how to avoid the problem in the future.
That requires the Court to know more about the job of being a police
462. Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 557.
463. See Katherine Rosenberry, Organizational Barriers to Creativity in Law School and the Legal
Profession, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 423, 424 (1988) (citing Abraham Maslow, Famous People Quotations,
http://quotations.about.com/od/stillmorefamouspeople/a/AbrahamMaslowl.htm (last visited Nov. 11,
2009)).
464. The practice of appellate courts announcing the reason for their decisions is one that has an
ancient lineage. See Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial
Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L. Q. 186, 190 (1958). The first published opinion of the Supreme Court
was Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. 402 (1792).
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officer, prosecutor, defense attorney, or trial judge than the Court
may feel comfortable with. And so, it may be attractive to explain the
outcome of a case by applying a conditional rule that frees the Court
from the job of providing any guidance for the future.
In both the ineffective assistance of counsel cases and the
exculpatory evidence cases, the Court's choice of a conditional rule
requiring prejudice is largely a function of the Court's reluctance to
identify the predicate behavior that would violate the rule. Strickland
v. Washington465 bemoaned the infinite number of circumstances that
466 467might define adequate representation, 6 and United States v. Agurs
stressed the indeterminacy of the standard that prosecutors had to use
to evaluate the evidence in their files.468
By incorporating into the definition of each rule a prejudice
component, the Court has drastically limited the occasions when it
would be called upon to make a judgment about whether the
predicate behavior triggered the rule. It can simply deny relief by
concluding that the defendant has not been able to establish
prejudice. And even in those cases where it concludes that the rule
has been violated, it does not have to do so by categorically
condemning the predicate behavior. All it need do is to make a
contextual judgment from which it may be difficult to generalize.
iii. Pragmatic Considerations
In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,469 which dealt with the
prosecutor's deporting a potential defense witness, Chavez v.
Martinez,4 70 the case that held that the privilege against self-
incrimination is only relevant at trial, and in Scott v. Illinois,47 1 the
465. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
466. See id. at 688-89, 693 ("No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of
legitimate decisions regarding how to best represent a criminal defendant.. . . Representation is an art,
and an act or omission that is unprofessional in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another.").
467. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
468. Id. at 108 ("[W]e are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard.").
469. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
470. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
471. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1978).
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right to misdemeanor counsel case, the Court explicitly referred to
resource constraints as one factor influencing the choice of a
conditional rule.
In Valenzuela-Bernal, the government argued that a non-
conditional rule would create havoc:
Because of budget limitations and the unavailability of adequate
detention facilities, it is simply impossible as a practical matter
to prosecute many cases involving the transportation or
harboring of large numbers of illegal aliens, where all the aliens
must be incarcerated for a substantial period of time to avoid
dismissal of the charges, even though the prosecution's case may
be overwhelming. As a consequence, many valid and appropriate
prosecutions are foregone.
472
The Court was obviously concerned about this aspect of the case,
noting that "the detention of alien eyewitnesses imposes substantial
financial and physical burdens upon the Government, not to mention
the human cost to potential witnesses who are incarcerated though
charged with no crime.'
473
In Chavez, Justices Souter and Breyer joined in a concurring
opinion supporting the concept that the privilege against self
incrimination establishes a conditional rule, and specifically referred
to another kind of resource problem that they saw bound up in the
case before them-the prospect of costly civil litigation:
The most obvious drawback inherent in Martinez's purely Fifth
Amendment claim to damages is its risk of global application in
every instance of interrogation producing a statement
inadmissible under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment principles,
or violating one of the complementary rules we have accepted in
aid of the privilege against evidentiary use. If obtaining
472. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 865 (quoting Brief for the United States at 21-22, United States
v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (No. 81-450)).
473. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 865.
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Martinez's statement is to be treated as a stand-alone violation of
the privilege subject to compensation, why should the same not
be true whenever the police obtain any involuntary self-
incriminating statement, or whenever the government so much as
threatens a penalty in derogation of the right to immunity, or
whenever the police fail to honor Miranda? Martinez offers no
limiting principle or reason to foresee a stopping place short of
liability in all such cases.474
And in Scott, the Court was concerned that requiring counsel in
misdemeanor cases pursuant to a non-conditional rule would "impose
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse
States."
, 75
Resource constraints of another type may also explain the Court's
decision in Mickens v. Taylor,476 the case that made the conditional
rule for attorney conflict of interest cases where no one specifically
objected to the conflicted lawyer's representation of the defendant.
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor noted that:
If [the rule] were otherwise, the judge's duty would not be
limited to cases where the attorney is suspected of harboring a
conflict of interest. The Sixth Amendment protects the defendant
against an ineffective attorney, as well as a conflicted one. It
would be a major departure to say that the trial judge must step
in every time defense counsel appears to be providing ineffective
assistance, and indeed, there is no precedent to support this
proposition.
4 77
Given the magnitude of the problem of ineffective lawyers, which
would extend not only to those cases that are tried but also to the
vastly larger number that are resolved on the basis of a guilty plea, it
474. Chavez, 538 at 778-79 (Souter, J., concurring).
475. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
476. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002).
477. Id. at 179 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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may have been a daunting prospect to require trial judges to become
actively involved in trying to remedy the problem beforehand.
iv. Constitutional Language: The Text Made Me Do It
If the language of a constitutional provision were worded so that
the only thing it did was to command the government to respond in a
certain way if one of its agents committed a particular act, then it
would make sense to construct a conditional rule to implement it. The
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has this character: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.'A78
The Takings Clause imposes two rules on the government, one of
which is non-conditional and one which is conditional. In a non-
conditional format, it prohibits the government from ever taking
property for a private purpose. 48  However, the government may
seize private property for any public use without any constitutional
restriction, subject to the future condition that it pay just
compensation. 4 81 This second rule is clearly conditional. It creates a
regime where a government official may make the decision about
whether to take a citizen's property unconcerned with and indeed not
authorized to make payment. Whether the taking violates the
Constitution depends on what happens later on, in the payment
stage.482
478. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
479. See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003) ("While it confirms the
state's authority to confiscate private property, the text of the Fifth Amendment imposes two conditions
on the exercise of such authority: the taking must be for a 'public use' and 'just compensation' must be
paid to the owner.").
480. Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) ("[O]ne person's property may not be
taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation be paid.").
481. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314-17 (1987)
("[A]s the Court has fiequently noted, this provision does not prohibit the taking of private property, but
instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.").
482. One could recast this rule into a non-conditional format regulating the primary behavior of the
official who took the property. The Takings Clause could have said, "No private property shall be taken
for public use unless the state has paid its owner reasonable compensation." In this form, it would be
reasonable to create a legal regime that required payment of reasonable compensation in advance of the
taking, or at the very least would impose some obligation on the government official who took the
property to ensure that reasonable payment was forthcoming.
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It is possible to view the Due Process Clause in the same way.
Carefully parsing the phrase "No person shall... be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law 'A8 3 might lead one to
conclude that it created only a conditional rule that simply focused on
the consequence of government action, but left the government's
agents free to do what they wished so long as their behavior did not
result in the loss of someone's life, liberty or property. In fact, such
an extreme reductionist view of the Due Process Clause is not
altogether uncommon. A Second Circuit case, Zahrey v. Coffey, 484 is
an illustration.
Zahrey was a Section 1983 case against an Assistant United States
Attorney who allegedly conspired to fabricate evidence that he used
to prosecute the plaintiff, a police officer, on conspiracy to commit
robbery and other charges. 485 The ultimate source of the right the
plaintiff relied on was the Due Process Clause, the basis for the
Supreme Court's cases holding that a prosecutor may not knowingly
use false evidence to obtain a conviction.486 The problem for the
plaintiff, though, was that he was not trying to set aside a guilty
verdict, since his trial ended in an acquittal. He was suing for a
violation of his civil rights. But where was the violation if at the end
of the trial he walked away a free man?
In answering this question, the Zahrey court reasoned that
whatever the Due Process Clause requires, it does not rise to the level
of a constitutional command until someone loses his or her life, or is
incarcerated or fined as a result of what had happened:
The manufacture of false evidence, 'in and of itself,' ... does not
impair anyone's liberty, and therefore does not impair anyone's
constitutional right .... If, for example, a prosecutor places in
evidence testimony known to be perjured or a trial judge makes a
racially disparaging remark about a defendant, no deprivation of
483. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
484. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000).
485. Id. at 346.
486. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942);
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
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liberty occurs unless and until the jury convicts and the
defendant is sentenced . . . . If the trial was aborted before a
verdict, it could be said . . . that no constitutional right was
violated.
487
Under this view of the Due Process Clause, everything it requires of
government officials is conditional, subject to a defendant losing the
trial and eventually suffering a loss of life, liberty or property.488
Could it be that the Constitution would tolerate a trial process that
completely ignored all of the rules that emanate from the Due Process
Clause so long as the result was something other than a conviction?
There is a historical precedent for a system that comes close to this:
trial de novo. In early America, this method of handling minor
criminal cases was a feature of the criminal justice systems in all of
the New England states as well North Carolina.489 It was a way of
providing rough justice administered by a local magistrate, often not
formally trained in the law, whose decisions to convict could be
nullified by a defendant's choice to have a trial de novo in front of a
circuit riding professional judge.490 Trials in the first tier of a de novo
system were not expected to provide all of the trappings of due
process. If defendants wanted the panoply of protections the law
487. Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 348, 350; see also Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 744 (1st Cir.
1980) ("We do not see how the existence of a false police report, sitting in a drawer in a police station,
by itself deprives a person of a right secured by the Constitution and laws."). The Zahrey court was
uneasy about refusing to label the type of unseemly action the complaint alleged as constitutionally
unobjectionable in the absence of a deprivation of liberty. It finessed this problem by referring to a
prosecutor fabricating evidence in her investigative role as something that "violates the standards of due
process," id. at 356 (emphasis added), and calling a resulting loss of liberty "a denial of a constitutional
right." Id. The opinion never explained what it means to violate a standard. If the court meant that
standards were requirements, then it is hard to reconcile with its reliance on language from one of
Justice Scalia's concurring opinions that there is "no authority for the proposition that the mere
preparation of false evidence, as opposed to its use in a fashion that deprives someone of a fair trial or
otherwise harms him, violates the Constitution." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 273, 280 (1993)).
488. It is possible for criminal defendants to suffer a loss of liberty prior to trial, as a result of being
held on bail. This, in fact, is what happened in Zahrey and it was the pretrial confinement that gave the
plaintiff the factual predicate on which to base his due process claim. Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 348.
489. David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal": The History of Review in American Criminal Courts,
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518,539 (1990).
490. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON JURIES OF SIX TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE DISTRICT COURT
DEPARTMENT, ELIMINATION OF THE TRIAL DE Novo SYSTEM IN CRIMINAL CASES 11 (1984).
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provided, they could simply appeal for trial de novo where they
would get all of the formal protection of the law. It was, in essence, a
system based on an idea very similar to the conditional rules that the
Zahrey court thought embedded in the Due Process Clause.
While the analogy to trial de novo is appealing on its face, it
ignores history. The federal system never adopted trial de novo. In
fact, a point in controversy over the ratification of the Constitution
was the possibility the anti-federalists raised that Article III's grant of
appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court might allow it to hold a
trial de novo in criminal cases.49 1 Even more telling is the way that
the Court has dealt with arguments over the years that constitutional
limitations do not apply in the first tier of a system of trial de novo
simply because the state eventually offers the defendant a trial that
contains the protection missing from the original proceeding. In the
nineteenth century, Callan v. Wilson considered whether the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury applied to the first tier of the
trial de novo system in the local courts of the District of Columbia.492
The government argued that so long as the defendant was given free
access to a jury in the second stage of the de novo process, the
District was free to shape the first tier trial free of this particular
constitutional restraint.4 93 The Court rejected the argument out of
hand.49
4
Callan, of course, did not rest on the Due Process Clause.
Therefore, its rejection of a conditional interpretation of the right to a
jury does not directly address the point on which the Zahrey court
rested its view: the fact that the language of the Clause specifically
491. Rossman, supra note 489, at 554.
492. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 548 (1888).
493. Id.
494. Id. at 556 ("[A] judgment of conviction, not based upon a verdict of guilty by a jury, is void. To
accord to the accused a right to be tried by a jury, in an appellate court, after he has been once fully tried
otherwise than by a jury, in the court of original jurisdiction, and sentenced to pay a fine or be
imprisoned for not paying it, does not satisfy the requirements of the Constitution."). Ludwig v.
Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976), upheld the Massachusetts trial de novo system against a similar
claim, but left Callan in place for two reasons. The first was because the right to a jury in federal court
had a basis in Article m11, which did not apply to the states, as well as in the Sixth Amendment. The
second was because the Massachusetts system allowed a defendant to circumvent the first trial by
admitting to sufficient facts to support a guilty finding. Id. at 629-30.
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refers to deprivations of life, liberty and property rather than to the
means by which the state might accomplish those ends. However, the
Court revisited this issue under the rubric of the Due Process Clause
in Ward v. Village of Monroeville.495 Ward dealt with whether the
village mayor could act as the judge in the local criminal court in
light of the fact that the fines the court collected formed a major part
of the village's income. Whatever restrictions the Constitution placed
on the use of a judge with a stake in the outcome of a criminal case
stem directly from the Due Process Clause.496 The government raised
the same argument as in Callan-that the prospect of a trial de novo
in front of an impartial judge was sufficient to meet the demands of
the Constitution. 497  The Court again summarily rejected the
suggestion: "[The] State's trial court procedure [is not]
constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers
a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a
neutral and detached judge in the first instance.'4 98
Although these two Supreme Court decisions do not spell out the
rationale for rejecting a conditional view of the constitutional rules
that apply to the system of trial de novo, the results the Court reached
fit with the way that the Framers of the Constitution likely conceived
of the nature of the rights they enshrined in the first ten
amendments. 499  The parts of the Constitution that regulate the
495. See Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58 (1972).
496. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (It is a violation of due process for a judge to have a
financial stake in the outcome of the trial.).
497. Brief for Respondent at 14, Ward v. Viii. of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (No. 71-496), 1972
WL 136240 ("Respondent Village of Monroeville respectfully submits that the existing right to a trial de
novo in a county court or a municipal court is a sufficient fair trial guarantee for any defendant who
believes that his individual case was not fairly tried in mayor's court.").
498. Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62.
499. In particular, the original understanding of the Due Process Clause was very likely more
consistent with a focus on specific rules that the government had to follow, rather than a contextual
assessment of the fairness of the process after it had concluded. "The gist of the Due Process Clause, as
understood at the founding and since, was to force the Government to follow those common-law
procedures traditionally deemed necessary before depriving a person of life, liberty, or property." Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As noted historian Leonard Levy wrote,
"The history of due process shows that it did mean trial by jury and many of the other traditional rights
of accused persons that were specified separately in the Bill of Rights. Its framers were in many respects
careless, even haphazard, draftsmen. They enumerated particular rights associated with due process and
then added the due process clause itself, probably as a rhetorical flourish, a reinforced guarantee, and a
genuflection toward traditional usage going back to medieval reenactments of Magna Carta." LEONARD
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criminal justice system were the result of a deep mistrust of the
central government.500 The Bill of Rights was designed to limit the
new federal entity the Constitution created. It was much more
congenial to this objective, and to the notion of rights that was
common at the time, for the Constitution to regulate government
behavior rather than simply guard individuals against illegitimate
results. The Anglo-American conception of rights was more
concerned with the limitation of government power rather than
vindicating individual injuries: "In the eighteenth century ... many
authorities would still have held that the primary holders of rights
were not individuals but rather the collective body of the people. The
real issue was.., to protect the people at large from tyranny.' 50 1
Even under a conception of rights that focuses on the individual,
however, the Zahrey model of due process creates a problem. It
essentially treats the Due Process Clause as a collection of liability
rules, allowing government actors, like the village judge in
Monroeville, to ignore the protections the rules announce so long as
the government is willing to pay a price later on, for example by
W. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 66 (1972). This view of the
Due Process Clause is also consistent with the way the Supreme Court interpreted it in the first case
applying it in the context of the criminal process. See generally Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884). In Hurtado, the Court had to decide whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment required the states to initiate criminal proceedings with a grand jury indictment. Id. at 520.
In the pre-incorporation era, cases like Hurtado imposed on the states only those rules so fundamental
that they represented, in the words Justice Cardozo first used in Snyder, the "immutable principles of
justice." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 108 (1934). As a result, Hurtado recognized that the
Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, which is directed to the states, imposed the same
limitations on the exercise of government power as did the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
which constrains the federal government. Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 535-36.
Although Hurtado concluded that the requirement of a grand jury indictment was not a part of
due process, it did explain something about what the concept meant. See id. at 536. It prohibited specific
exercises of government power, not just procedures that in retrospect were not fair: "acts of attainder,
bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring
one man's estate to another, legislative judgments and decrees, and other similar special, partial and
arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of legislation." Id. Due process, Hurtado said, "refers to
certain fundamental rights .... If any of these are disregarded in the proceedings by which a person is
condemned to the loss of life, liberty, or property, then the deprivation has not been by 'due process of
law."' Id. That is not language describing a generalized guarantee of fairness. It talks of concrete rights.
500. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 159-62 (1988)
(stating that Anti-Federalist insistence on a Bill of Rights stemmed from fear that federal government's
power would be used to invade personal rights).
501. JUDD RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 22 (Elizabeth M.
Schaaf ed., 1998).
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giving the defendant an impartial judge at a trial de novo. However, a
system which essentially allows the government to purchase the
ability to ignore the limits on its exercise of power is fundamentally
inconsistent with the notion of rights designed to secure liberty.50 2
CONCLUSION
Until a phenomenon is given a name, it often goes unrecognized
and unexamined.5 °3 So it is with conditional rules. Because up to now
no one has pointed out the similarity among cases that announce
conditional rules, neither the Court nor commentators has been able
to assess in a systematic way the use of this device.
Taking the conditional rules cases as a whole does not reveal any
insight that the Court has a coherent philosophy of when they are
appropriate and when not. This is not surprising given the failure to
recognize what cases as disparate in time and doctrine as Snyder v.
Massachusetts,0 4 Chavez v. Martinez,5 °5 and Estelle v. Williams-
5°6
502. See Jules L. Coleman & Judy Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335,
1339-40 (1986) ("If rights entail or secure liberties, then it is hard to see how liability rules protect them
.... Because liability rules neither confer nor respect a domain of lawful control ... the very idea of a
'liability rule entitlement,' that is of a right secured by a liability rule, is inconceivable."); James Boyd
White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1273, 1278 n.21 (1983)
(stating that damages for violation of a constitutional right "would be a kind of forced exchange, and
however appropriate that may be in a commercial context where all things are in principle exchangeable,
it would be incompatible with the idea of a right specifically against the government, and with the
reasons why such rights exist"); Dellinger, supra note 385, at 1563 (though liability protection might be
appropriate for private law rights, "it is inconsistent with a constitutional system").
503. Cf Judith Worell, Feminism in Psychology: Revolution or Evolution?, 571 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SC. 183, 189 (2000) (giving a label to date rape and sexual harassment led to their
recognition as a societal problem). The confusion that results from not recognizing that there is such a
thing as a conditional rule was illustrated in the Supreme Court oral argument on November 4, 2009 in
the case of Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, No. 08-1065. Pottawattamie was a § 1983 action against a
prosecutor for allegedly having fabricated evidence that led to the defendant's conviction and
incarceration. The same prosecutor also presented the case at trial. The question before the Court was
complicated by the fact that Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 429 (1976), provided absolute immunity for
the prosecutor from liability concerning any actions he took in the trial stage of the prosecution.
Questions from the bench and answers by the lawyers who argued the case showed a struggle with the
problem of when the prosecutor actually violated the Constitution-and the view of the issue was as if it
presented only two options. One would be at the time the prosecutor fabricated the evidence. The other
would be the time when the prosecutor presented the fabricated evidence at trial. No one ever explicitly
recognized that the rule was a conditional one, making the time that the violation occurred prior to trial
but with the benefit of hindsight. Transcript of Oral Argument, Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, No.
08-1065, pp. 4-16 (U.S. argued Nov. 4, 2009).
504. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 97.
505. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2004).
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to choose just one conditional rule case from each category-all have
in common. At times, the Court adopts a conditional rule without any
recognition of what it is doing, such as in Nelson v. O'Neil.50 7 And in
the eleven cases in which the Court discussed whether to adopt either
an aggregation or liability-type conditional rule, it never recognized
that it had chosen a rule that shared its conditional nature with rules
stemming from other provisions in the Constitution.50 8 It is only in
the ten cases where the Court explicitly considered whether prejudice
should be an element of the underlying rule that one finds any
discussion that refers to cases dealing with other parts of the process
where there was a similar question. But even there, the Court has not
been consistent in applying the reason why it says that prejudice must
be a component of the rule. 5
0 9
However, some things do stand out when you consider all the
conditional rules cases together. Conditional rules almost always
favor the state over the individual. 510  They allow state actors to
506. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
507. Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); see discussion supra Part l.B.iii.
508. The only example of the Court's recognizing in these eleven cases that it has adopted a
conditional rule elsewhere is in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004). Patane cites Martinez, a
case the Court decided the year before, which also raised the question of whether the privilege against
self incrimination could be the basis for civil liability on the part of police officers who acted prior to the
initiation of a formal criminal case. Patane, 542 U.S. at 641 (recognizing that Chavez, 538 U.S. 760
established that "a mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not, by itself, violate a suspect's
constitutional rights").
509. See discussion supra Part ll.A.iv.a.
510. It is not surprising, therefore, that their opponents on the Court come from the Justices who are
most sympathetic to claims based on individual liberties in criminal cases while their supporters come
from those who view state power with a less jaundiced eye. Of the Justices who have sat on five or more
cases presenting an issue of whether to adopt a conditional rule, Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Stevens
are the only ones who voted against adopting a conditional rule more than half of the time, while
Justices Stewart, White, and Burger were the most receptive, favoring them in over nine out often cases.
See appendix B infra. The chart below shows how frequently those Justices who sat on at least five
cases in which adopting a conditional rule was discussed in one of the opinions favored the adoption of a
conditional rule.
Justice Total Cases Favored Conditional Rules
Stewart 8 100%
White 16 94%
Burger 12 92%
Rehnquist 15 87%
Powell 12 83%
Scalia 7 81%
Blackmun 14 79%
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exercise power more freely, make the constitutional basis for
institutional reform harder, and they make it easier to uphold
convictions. Conditional rules also contribute to a lack of clarity and
transparency in government. They make it harder for those who
exercise government power to know what they can and cannot do,
remove much of the incentive for them to avoid abusing their power,
and they make it harder for the rest of us to understand when they
cross a line drawn by the Constitution.
Other than in some of the more obscure areas in the worlds of
regulating soccer, baseball, and football, it is hard to find examples of
other regimes where conditional rules are attractive enough to be
worth adopting. Their use in the realm of constitutional adjudication
is not worth the cost they bear.
O'Connor 10 70%
Stevens 15 40%
Brennan 13 36%
Marshall 14 27%
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APPENDIX A
There are twenty-one cases in which the Supreme Court has either
adopted a conditional rule or explicitly discussed whether to do so.
They are listed here in two fashions. In the first, they appear in
chronological order. After each case is a description of the
conditional rule that the Court adopted or that was discussed in one of
the concurring or dissenting opinions. In the second list, they are
grouped according to whether the conditional rule applicable to the
case was a prejudice rule, an aggregation rule or a liability rule.
1. Chronological List of Conditional Rule Cases
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (excluding the
defendant from a view only violates due process if the defendant was
prejudiced) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (preindictment delay
only violates due process if the defendant was prejudiced)
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971) (a prosecutor's introduction
into evidence of an inculpatory statement by a codefendant only
violates the Confrontation Clause if the codefendant does not
eventually testify) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (denying a defendant
the right to present exculpatory evidence only violates due process if
the defendant was prejudiced) (Conditional rule adopted by the
Court)
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976) (ordering a defendant to
appear in front of the jury wearing distinctive prison clothing only
violates due process if the defendant objects) (Conditional rule
adopted by the Court)
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United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (a prosecutor's
withholding exculpatory evidence only violates due process if the
defendant was prejudiced) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (a state agent who
deliberately overhears a privileged conversation between a criminal
defendant and defense counsel only violates the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of the assistance of counsel if the prosecutor eventually
learns the content of the conversation) (Conditional rule adopted by
the Court)
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (an unnecessarily
suggestive pretrial identification procedure only violates due process
if it results in an identification by a witness who eventually testifies
in a criminal trial) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1978) (refusing to appoint a lawyer
for an indigent defendant charged with a misdemeanor only violates
the Sixth Amendment if the defendant is sentenced to a term of
incarceration) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (a
prosecutor's deporting a potential defense witness only violates due
process if the defendant was prejudiced) (Conditional rule adopted by
the Court)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (a defense attorney's
inadequate performance only violates the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel if the defendant was
prejudiced) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (a prosecutor's
withholding exculpatory evidence only violates due process if the
defendant was prejudiced) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
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Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (denying a defendant
the opportunity to cross examine a witness to show bias should only
violate the Confrontation Clause if the defendant was prejudiced)
(Conditional rule, proposed by the dissent, not adopted by the Court)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) (a prosecutor's asking a
defendant on cross examination if the defendant had remained silent
after receiving a Miranda warning only violates due process if the
defendant answers the question) (Conditional rule adopted by the
Court)
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) (excluding the defendant
from a competency hearing for a prosecution witness only violates
due process if the defendant was prejudiced) (Conditional rule
adopted by the Court)
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) (a prosecutor's
introduction into evidence of a statement by a codefendant that does
not explicitly mention the defendant should violate the Confrontation
Clause if other evidence the prosecutor subsequently introduces
prejudices the defendant by making the statement inculpatory as to
the defendant) (Conditional rule, proposed by the dissent, not adopted
by the Court)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) (a police officer who
tries to restrain a suspect by a show of force only comes under the
restriction of the Fourth Amendment if the suspect complies)
(Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002) (even where a defense
attorney's conflict of interest is apparent to the judge who appoints
the attorney to represent the defendant, it only violates the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel if the conflict
affected the attorney's subsequent performance) (Conditional rule
adopted by the Court)
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Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) (a government official who
uses compulsion to extract an incriminating testimonial statement
from an individual only violates the Fifth Amendment's privilege
against self incrimination if the state eventually uses the statement in
a criminal trial) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (a government official
who uses compulsion to extract an incriminating testimonial
statement from an individual only violates the Fifth Amendment's
privilege against self incrimination if the state eventually uses the
statement in a criminal trial) (Conditional rule adopted by the Court)
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (if a judge,
without a valid reason, denies the defendant the right to hire an
attorney of the defendant's choice, it should only violate the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee to the assistance of counsel if the defendant
was prejudiced) (Conditional rule proposed by the dissent not
adopted by the Court)
2. Conditional Rule Cases By Type of Rule
(i) Prejudice Rules
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971)
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987)
Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002)
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006)
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(ii) Aggregation Rules
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977)
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977)
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1978)
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987)
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003)
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)
(iii) Liability Rules
Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971)
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987)
California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991)
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APPENDIX B
This list indicates the vote of each Justice on every case in which
conditional rules were either adopted or discussed. Opposed means
that the justice wrote or joined an opinion (either a dissent or a
concurring opinion) specifically rejecting the use of a conditional
rule, rather than writing or joining a dissenting opinion that reached a
result different from the majority, but on other grounds. Supporting
means that the justice either wrote or joined an opinion (either a
majority, concurring or dissenting opinion) specifically advocating
the use of a conditional rule.
For those Justices who participated in five or more cases, the last
column indicates the percentage of these cases in which the Justice
favored the conditional rule.
Name of Opposed Supported % FavoringConditional Conditional ConditionalRule in Rule in Rule
Cardozo Snyder
Van Devanter Snyder
Hughes Snyder
McReynolds Snyder
Stone Sny-der
Roberts Snyder
Brandeis Snyder
Sutherland _ Snyder
Butler Snyder
Scalia Richardson; Greer; Stincer; 81%
Gonzalez-Lopez Hodari D.;
Mickens; Chavez
Souter Mickens; Hodari D.; Chavez
Gonzalez-Lopez
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Stevens Scott; Bagley; Agurs; Bursey; 40%
Van Arsdall; Manson;
Greer; Stincer; Valenzuela-Bernal;
Hodari D.; Strickland;
Mickens; Richardson
Chavez;
Gonzalez-Lopez
White Richardson Marion; Nelson; 94%
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey;
Manson; Scott;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland; Bagley;
Van Arsdall;
Greer; Stincer;
Hodari D.
Burger Van Arsdall Marion; Nelson; 92%
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey;
Manson; Scott;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland; Bagley;
Stewart Marion; Nelson; 100%
Chambers; Estelle;
Agurs; Bursey;
Manson; Scott;
Blackmun Van Arsdall; Marion; Nelson; 79%
Greer; Chambers; Estelle;
Richardson Agurs; Bursey;
Manson;
Strickland; Bagley;
Stincer; Hodari D.
Douglas Donnelly Marion; Chambers
Brennan Estelle; Bursey; Marion; Chambers; 36 %
Manson; Scott; Agurs; Strickland;
Valenzuela- Richardson
Bernal; Bagley;
Van Arsdall;
Greer; Stincer
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Marshall Estelle; Bursey; Marion; Chambers; 27%
Manson; Scott; Agurs; Richardson
Valenzuela-
Bernal;
Strickland;
Bagley; Van
Arsdall; Greer;
Stincer; Hodari
D.
Black Nelson
Harlan Nelson
Powell Van Arsdall; Chambers; Estelle; 83%
Richardson Agurs; Bursey;
Manson; Scott;
Valenzuela-Bernal;
Strickland; Greer;
Stincer
Rehnquist Van Arsdall; Estelle; Agurs; 87%
Richardson Bursey; Manson;
Scott; Valenzuela-
Bernal; Strickland;
Bagley; Greer;
Stincer; Hodari D.;
Mickens; Chavez
O'Connor Valenzuela- Strickland; Bagley; 70%
Bernal; Van Greer; Stincer;
Arsdall; Hodari D.;
Richardson Mickens; Chavez
Kennedy Chavez Hodari D.;
Mickens;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Ginsburg Mickens;
Chavez;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Breyer Mickens; Chavez
Gonzalez-Lopez
Thomas Mickens; Chavez;
Gonzalez-Lopez
Roberts Gonzalez-Lopez
Alito Gonzalez-Lopez
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